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
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
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BOER AND UITLANDER



James Duff
H. F. Regan

[Frontispiece.]

BOER AND UITLANDER

The True History of the Late Events
in South Africa

BY
WILLIAM FREDERICK REGAN

WITH ORIGINAL PORTRAITS, MAP AND PLAN

LONDON
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1896

obscure, a juster appreciation of people, of motives, than the veil of prejudice now permits, my book will not have been written in vain. I commend its careful perusal to my countrymen, and I beg of them most fervently, as regards this Transvaal question, not to allow that reputation for justice and fair dealing which Englishmen bear all over the world to be minimised or obscured.

W. F. R.

41 THREADNEEDLE STREET, LONDON, E.C.,
March 1896.

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BOER AND UITLANDER

CHAPTER I

WHO ARE THE BOERS?

THE Cape of Good Hope was discovered by Bartholomew Diaz in 1486, during his command of one of the many expeditions sent out by the Kings of Portugal with a view of discovering an ocean route to India. Diaz only doubled the Cape and then returned home. In 1497, Vasco Da Gama likewise doubled the Cape, and landed in that portion of Southern Africa which is now the Colony of Natal. From that time onwards a few Portuguese adventurers were settled at Table Bay and Saldanha Bay, until the Dutch seized and colonised what was the original Cape Colony in the year 1500. During the Anglo-Dutch wars of 1770, curiously enough, this Dutch settlement was never captured by the British, and only came into our possession in 1795, in the early part of the French Revolutionary War. It was restored to the Dutch in 1802, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Amiens, but was re-taken by Great Britain in 1806 and retained. It was not, however, until some time after the peace of 1815, that any effective steps were taken to colonise this new British possession, and for

very many years the Cape was merely a military post and naval station.

The Boers of the South African Republic, better known, perhaps, as the Transvaal, are the descendants of the old Dutch colonists, who intermarried with a large number of Huguenot refugees expelled from France by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, and sought a home in Holland; from that country they were driven, very much against their will, to the Cape of Good Hope; on their arrival there they became more or less incorporated with the Dutch population, owing to their being forbidden to preach in French or educate their children in that language. Of the present Boer population in South Africa, it has been calculated that about one-third is directly descended from the old Huguenots, as is indeed indicated by the thoroughly French names which some of them bear to the present day.

The seizure of the Cape Colony by Great Britain was very distasteful to its then inhabitants. They had been for many years accustomed to lead a pastoral life, full of freedom and independence. They found themselves at once under the sway of a foreign Government, brought into contact with unsympathetic foreign officials, and, what was much more galling to these free men, they were obliged to pay taxes. Moreover, the good people of Great Britain, no doubt inspired by worthy motives, sent out missionaries to the Cape to "convert" these Boers, a matter which was productive of much ill-feeling.

The Boers have ever been religious men according to their lights; they have found in the Bible all their theology, all their history, all their science, in a word, all their literature. In their homes they had family worship morning and evening, and when marching through the veldt, it was their custom to sing psalms. They never went forth on a journey until after much prayerful deliberation. They usually travelled in company, twenty or thirty families joining together for mutual defence; their long, strongly-built waggons contained as much as was necessary of their household gear and served as a shelter at night, while on the approach of hostile natives, they could easily be made to serve the purposes of an entrenched camp. Now these people, as I have said, strongly resented British rule and the attempted interference with their manners and customs on the part of British officials and British missionaries. As time went on, the Boers found British rule more irksome, and, accordingly, sixty years ago, they determined to throw up their farms, give up everything, in fact, except their freedom, and trek for "fresh fields and pastures new." The Cape Government became alarmed and endeavoured to stop the exodus, but the Boers were not to be turned from their purpose, and their various parties made for the Orange River, where they hoped to be able to settle in peace and quietness. Their object was not achieved without dangers, difficulties and disasters. They were harassed by the Matabeles, who prowled around them, attracted by the large

droves of cattle which the Boers were taking with them. There was much fighting and there were many massacres, but still the Boers "trekked" on nobly assisted by their womenkind. At length, the Boers obtained a grant of territory from Dingin, a great Zulu chief, and they established a regular Government with a Volksraad, military commandant and various other officials necessary to administer the territory of which they had obtained possession. The Cape Government was not, however, prepared to see a miniature republic set up in South Africa, and a military force was accordingly sent to the Port of Natal with the object of preventing all trade with the Boers. After a while better counsels prevailed and the British force was withdrawn, the Boers being left to themselves with Pretorius, a man of great ability, at the head of the Republic. Pretorius attempted to obtain a recognition of the petty State on the part of Great Britain, but the only reply sent to him was the despatch of a British force with orders to take any steps necessary to prevent the setting up of a separate Government by the Boers, who were commanded, on pain of being treated as rebels, to return to British territory. The Boers resisted, and besieged the force sent against them, which was only saved from destruction by a relieving force being despatched from the Cape to its assistance. The Boers were overcome, but neither their courage nor their energy was exhausted, so once again they determined to "trek," and almost the entire body crossed the Vaal River.

While all these events were taking place, a large number of emigrant farmers had settled in that part of South Africa which lies between the Orange and the Vaal River, of which Bloemfontein had become the capital. Sir Harry Smith was appointed Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for South Africa in 1847, with power to annex the territories south of the Vaal River. Soon after his arrival in Cape Colony, the High Commissioner issued a proclamation, bringing under British rule the entire country between the Orange and the Vaal River. Pretorius very quickly decided to resist this arbitrary act, and at once commenced preparations with that end in view. Bloemfontein was captured, and a decisive battle was subsequently fought close to the Orange River. After a long struggle, which Sir Harry Smith, an old Indian soldier, described as one of the most severe engagements that had ever taken place, the Boers were defeated and hotly pursued by the British troops. The Cape Government confiscated the property of the "rebels" who had taken part in the contest, and a reward of £2000 was offered for Pretorius, dead or alive.

The Boers were not, however, prepared to give in, and a desultory warfare was kept up for some years. At length, the Government at home determined to put an end to this unsatisfactory condition of things, and Commissioners were sent out from England with full powers to negotiate with Pretorius, the offer of a reward for his arrest having

been previously withdrawn. The result of these negotiations was the signing of the Sand River Convention on January 17th, 1852. The first article of that Convention "guaranteed in the fullest manner on the part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British Government," and it ended with a full assurance of the warmest wish of the British Government for the future welfare and happiness of these farmers.

There is little doubt that the Sand River Convention was the outcome of the advice of Sir Harry Smith, who appears to have had some idea of thereby creating a permanent buffer and self-defending State. The constitution of this free State was finally settled under that able and judicious statesman, the first President Brand, an English barrister. From time to time the Boers, who overflowed the rather limited accommodation for them in the free State, "trekked" beyond the Keiskama to the east-north-east, and in due course succeeded in consolidating a settlement, and founding what has since become the capital of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. From the foundation of that town, however, a similar state of things existed as has since prevailed at Johannesburg, namely, a steady English immigration, and, accordingly in time, the Natal Boers were largely outnumbered. Once more these intrepid men determined to "trek" this time north-north-east

across the Vaal. They settled in the pastoral rolling veldt, at that time a desolate wilderness, and they built themselves a new capital under Pretorius, who had succeeded Pieter Maritz as leader.

These constant struggles had, not unnaturally, proved a serious obstacle to the development of the country inhabited by the Boers, and were, moreover, a cause of growing weakness. It accordingly came to pass that in 1876, the Republic found itself practically unable to resist the attacks of the powerful chief, Sekekuni. At that time there was a wide-spread feeling at the Cape, which found an echo here in England, that the weakness of the Boers, as against Sekekuni, might possibly bring about a general rising of the Kaffir population in South Africa. About this period Sir Bartle Frere was appointed High Commissioner, and though Sir Bartle had what are now known as imperialistic views respecting South Africa, I believe, as a matter of fact, he was strictly opposed to the annexation of the Transvaal, unless it were brought about in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants. Be that as it may, on the 12th April 1877 Sir Theophilus Shepstone quietly annexed the Transvaal Republic to Great Britain, and it remained a British Colony, in name at any rate, until its independence was restored to it in 1881 by Mr William E. Gladstone. I do not propose here to consider or detail the sad memories connected with the restoration of Boer independence. Whatever may be our feelings in regard to the Boer population, Laing's Nek and

Majuba Hill must ever be unpleasant names for Englishmen, and there can be no doubt that the bloodshed in 1880 and 1881 has caused an estrangement between the British and Dutch races in South Africa which it will take years to eradicate.

Whatever may be our opinion of the Boers—and they have of course, their failings, and, if I may say so, the defects of their good qualities—there can be no doubt whatever that the treatment that the Boers have sustained from successive British Governments between the years 1815 and 1881, is not such as can well be defended on any ethical principle. And I believe, too, that in expressing this opinion I am not giving vent to one which would be contravened or contradicted by any large number of Englishmen. A gentleman of vast experience, and quite as vast ability, writes upon this very matter: “I detest the Boers and all their ways, except their indomitable courage, their aptitude for field exercises, their tenacity of purpose, and their unquenchable love of independence. I think the Natal trekkers who squatted in the Transvaal, have been somewhat cavalierly treated by the British Colonists both of the Cape and of Natal.”

No matter what Englishmen may think of the Boers—and no doubt a good many of my countrymen hate them for no better reason than that they defeated us at Majuba Hill—I believe that if Englishmen clearly comprehended the—to put it mildly—inconsiderate treatment the Boers have met with at the hands of the British Government for so many decades

past, they would not let their prejudices so materially affect their estimate of these Dutch farmers.

All these people have ever asked was to be allowed to have a community to themselves. To procure that they have trudged away 800 miles into a howling wilderness, and it was scarcely to be wondered at, when one considers the sacrifices they have made to retain their independence, that they were not content to accept the annexation which Sir Theophilus Shepstone effected by a stroke of the pen. Once more the Boers find the old condition of things repeating itself. Their country is now overrun by some thousands of men who really have no nationality, because their only object is to acquire gold, and in order to effect that consummation, they are ready to trample under foot not only principles but patriotism. In other respects, however, the Boers find prevalent a very different condition of things from that which existed thirty or forty years ago. They are now surrounded on all sides by British territory, which runs north for hundreds of miles till it touches regions which have been appropriated by one European state or another, and where, moreover, even if it were possible for them to "trek," the climatorial conditions and the products are prohibitive of the favourite Boer pursuit of pastoral life. There is now, accordingly, literally nowhere for them to "trek" if they abandon the Transvaal, and it is, therefore, scarcely to be wondered at if they cling to the independence they have, after much toil and tribulation, achieved, and

mistrust the hotch-potch collection of adventurers who desire the Transvaal because the Transvaal is rich in the precious metal. I do not ask my readers to concur in every opinion set forth in this book, but I do ask them to seriously consider the statements made, to clear their minds of cant and prejudice, and to determine that, so far as in them lies, the sturdy, brave and independent, if rough, Dutch farmers shall have that justice which is the inalienable right of every human being.

CHAPTER II

THE TRANSVAAL—ITS PRINCIPAL FEATURES

As geography is not, I think, a strong point with the public at large, and even after the occurrence of recent events in the Transvaal, a large number of people seem to have but a dim idea respecting the area and general characteristics of what is often incorrectly designated "a little State," I think it just as well to give what I hope my readers will not consider too dry details regarding the physical and other features of the Transvaal. Briefly, then, the Republic under the sway of President Kruger has an area of about 120,000 square miles. Perhaps its extent will be better understood when I say that it is half the size of the Cape Colony and about three times the size of Natal and the Orange Free State. The area of the South African Republic is rather larger than that of Great Britain and Ireland combined.

As regards distances, the nearest point of the Transvaal is about 698 miles from Cape Town, 536 miles from Port Elizabeth, and 220 miles from

Port Natal, while the eastern boundary of the Republic is only about 40 miles distant from the Portuguese possession of Delagoa Bay. The Transvaal territory extends for about 400 miles to the banks of the Limpopo, a river about 300 miles south of the Zambesi. The extreme breadth of the Republic is 400 miles. The South African Republic is bounded on the north by Bechuanaland, on the south by the Orange Free State and Natal and on the east by Zululand and Mozambique.

The two principal rivers of the Transvaal are the Vaal and the Limpopo; the former takes its rise in the high plateau called Hooge veldt, which extends throughout the whole breadth of the Transvaal and forms the water-shed between the rivers flowing south to the Vaal and north to the Limpopo. After receiving all the Transvaal rivers from the north and the Free State rivers on its southern bank, the Vaal River joins the Orange River in the vicinity of Hope Town, and the two combined in one large river, called the Ki Gariep, flow into Alexander Bay on the western side of South Africa, the twin rivers being more than a thousand miles in length and draining a basin of 325,000 square miles. The Limpopo, after receiving a large number of tributaries, empties itself into the sea on the eastern coast of South Africa; neither of these rivers are navigable to any appreciable length.

Three mountain ranges extend through the country from west to east, but the highest altitude is only

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6700 feet. The climate of the Transvaal is one of the finest in the world. Properly speaking there are only two seasons, summer and winter, the former warm and rainy, the latter dry and cold. The dry season sets in at the end of May, and it is not unusual for it to continue till the end of September without even a single shower falling. Although the barometer during the summer months is very high, the heat is seldom oppressive on account of the altitude of the country. The air is always clear, the mornings and evenings are delightful. In winter the few lakes in the country are occasionally covered in the early morning with a thin sheet of ice, but this melts away before the day is far advanced. Extreme cold is practically unknown, and the climate of the Transvaal may unhesitatingly be pronounced one of the finest in the world.

Most of the Transvaal is covered with a rich sward, affording excellent pasture for horses, sheep and cattle. There are considerable extents of forests, from which large quantities of timber are obtained for building and other purposes. Although the Transvaal, from its fertile soil and fine climate, is peculiarly adapted for the growth of cereals, the supply is far below the demand, and large quantities of bread stuffs are accordingly annually imported. The average Boer farmer is certainly not a far-seeing man, and is content to grow just as much wheat as suffices for his own consumption. Considerable attention is paid to

sheep farming and the breeding of cattle and horses. Of the total area of the Republic only about 50,000 acres are under cultivation.

Some reference must be made here to the mining industry of the Transvaal, although I shall have to deal with the matter in greater detail further on. The gold fields of the Rand are now famous all the world over, and the out-put of the mines therein has risen from 230,640 ozs. in 1888 to something like one million-and-a-half ounces in 1895. Coal mines are worked in the eastern portions of the country; iron also abounds, although no steps have as yet been taken to develop the industry, while there is a silver mine close to Pretoria which has a very respectable annual output.

As regards the population of the Transvaal, it is hardly possible to give any even approximately correct figures. According to the official census of 1890, the white population of the Republic numbered 119,128. There is, however, good reason for believing that the population of Johannesburg before the recent trouble was not far short of that figure, and was, moreover, increasing at the rate of somewhere about 1000 per week.

Such are a few meagre details in regard to the South African Republic. I hope, however, I have said enough to enable my readers to comprehend the great natural advantages, irrespective of the great mineral wealth, of this favoured portion of the earth's surface. It can hardly be wondered at that these hunted Boers, having no other place

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whither to "trek," should desire to continue to inhabit the land which is certainly theirs on every ground of right and justice, and that they should be loth to lose their independence and come under the authority and autocracy of what I conceive to be the worst system of government the world could ever see, namely, a Government of financiers whose principle is greed and whose quest is gold.

CHAPTER III

THE CONVENTIONS OF 1881 AND 1884

ALTHOUGH most of the Boer laws are antecedent to the re-establishment of the Republic in 1881 by that noble-minded and heroic statesman, William Ewart Gladstone, that year may, I think, be regarded as in some sense the re-incarnation of the Republic as it now is, and accordingly the Convention signed at Pretoria in 1881 by Sir Hercules Robinson, Sir Evelyn Wood and Messrs J. H. de Villiers, S. J. P. Kruger, M. W. Pretorius and P. J. Jouvart, which was again largely embodied in the London Convention of 1884, may be deemed to be in effect the charter of the Boers. I, therefore, make no excuse for quoting the latter document here in full. I think it best, however, in the first instance, to give the more important clauses of the 1881 Convention, in order to show more clearly the modifications, omissions, etc., which took place in the Convention of 1884. This is, I think, particularly important in view of the question which has arisen, and which we are likely to hear still more of in the future, namely,

how far the Suzerainty of Great Britain over the South African Republic, clearly enunciated as it undoubtedly was in the Convention of 1881, was affected by the Convention of London three years later.

PRETORIA CONVENTION OF 1881

II. Her Majesty reserves to herself, her heirs and successors (a) the right from time to time to appoint a British Resident in and for the said State, with such duties and functions as are hereinafter defined; (b) the right to move troops through the said State in time of war, or in case of the apprehension of immediate war between the Suzerain Power and any foreign State or native tribe in South Africa; and (c) the control of the external relations of the said State, including the conclusion of treaties and the conduct of diplomatic intercourse with foreign Powers, such intercourse to be carried on through Her Majesty's diplomatic and consular officers abroad.

XVI. There will continue to be complete freedom of religion and protection from molestation for all denominations, provided the same be not inconsistent with morality and good order; and no disability shall attach to any person in regard to rights of property by reason of the religious opinions which he holds.

XVII. The British Resident will receive from the Government of the Transvaal State such assistance and support as can by law be given to him for the due discharge of his functions. He will also receive

every assistance for the proper care and preservation of the graves of such of Her Majesty's forces as have died in the Transvaal; and, if need be, for the appropriation of land for the purpose.

XVIII. The following will be the duties and functions of the British Resident:—

1. He will perform duties and functions analogous to those discharged by a *chargé-d'affaires* and consul-general.

2. In regard to natives within the Transvaal State, he will (a) report to the High Commissioner, as representative of the Suzerain, as to the working and observance of the provisions of this Convention; (b) report to the Transvaal authorities any cases of ill-treatment of natives, or attempts to incite natives to rebellion, that may come to his knowledge; (c) use his influence with the natives in favour of law and order; and (d) generally perform such other duties as are by this Convention entrusted to him, and take such steps for the protection of the persons and property of natives as are consistent with the laws of the land.

3. In regard to natives not residing in the Transvaal; (a) he will report to the High Commissioner and the Transvaal Government any encroachments reported to him as having been made by Transvaal residents upon the land of such natives, and in case of disagreement between the Transvaal Government and the British Resident, as to whether an encroachment has been made, the decision of the Suzerain will be final; (b) the British Resident will be the

medium of communication with native chiefs outside the Transvaal, and, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner, as representing the Suzerain, he will control the conclusion of treaties with them; and (c) he will arbitrate upon every dispute between Transvaal residents and natives outside the Transvaal (as to acts committed beyond the boundaries of the Transvaal) which may be referred to him by the parties interested.

4. In regard to communications with foreign Powers, the Transvaal Government through the British Resident and the High Commissioner.

XXVI. All persons other than natives conforming themselves to the laws of the Transvaal State (a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the Transvaal State; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops, and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person, or by any agents whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed upon Transvaal citizens.

XXVII. All inhabitants of the Transvaal shall have free access to the Courts of Justice for the prosecution and defence of their rights.

XXVIII. All persons, other than natives, who established their domicile in the Transvaal between the 12th day of April 1877, and the date when this

Convention comes into effect, and who shall within twelve months after such last-mentioned date have their names registered by the British Resident, shall be exempt from all compulsory military service whatever. The Resident shall notify such registration to the Government of the Transvaal State.

XXXIII. Forthwith after the ratification of this Convention, as in the last preceding Article mentioned, all British troops in Transvaal territory will leave the same, and the mutual delivery of munitions of war will be carried out.

Signed at Pretoria this 3d day of August 1881.

LONDON CONVENTION OF 1884.

Whereas the Government of the Transvaal State, through its delegates, consisting of Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the said State, Stephanus Jacobus Du Toit, Superintendent of Education, and Nicholas Jacobus Smit, a member of the Volksraad, have represented that the Convention signed at Pretoria on the 3d day of August 1881, and ratified by the Volksraad of the said State on the 25th October 1881, contains certain provisions which are inconvenient, and imposes burdens and obligations from which the said State is desirous to be relieved, and that the south-western boundaries fixed by the said Convention should be amended with a view to

promote the peace and good order of the said State, and of the countries adjacent thereto.

II. The Government of the South African Republic will strictly adhere to the boundaries defined in Article I. of this Convention, and will do its utmost to prevent any of its inhabitants from making any encroachments upon lands beyond the said boundaries. The Government of the South African Republic will appoint Commissioners upon the eastern and western borders, whose duty will be strictly to guard against irregularities and all trespassing over the boundaries. Her Majesty's Government will, if necessary, appoint Commissioners in the native territories outside the eastern and western borders of the South African Republic to maintain order and prevent encroachments.

Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African Republic will each appoint a person to proceed together to beacon off the amended south-west boundary, as described in Article I. of this Convention; and the President of the Orange Free State shall be requested to appoint a referee to whom the said persons shall refer any questions on which they may disagree respecting the interpretation of the said Article, and the decision of such referee thereon shall be final. The arrangement already made, under the terms of Article XIX. of the Convention of Pretoria, August 3d, 1881, between the owners of the farms Grootfontein and Vallei-fontein on the one hand, and the Barolong authorities on the other, by which a fair share of the water

supply of the said farms shall be allowed to flow undisturbed to the said Barolongs, shall continue in force.

(The following Article should be compared with Article XVII. of 1881.)

III. If a British officer is appointed to reside at Pretoria, or elsewhere within the South African Republic, to discharge functions analogous to those of a Consular officer, he will receive the protection and assistance of the Republic.

IV. The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or westward of the Republic, until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen.

Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if Her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of such treaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain or of any of Her Majesty's possessions in South Africa.

(The above Article has been held by certain persons and journals in this country to embody the rights of Suzerainty so clearly laid down in the Preamble and Article II. of 1881.)

V. The South African Republic will be liable for any balance which may still remain due to the debts for which it was liable at the date of

annexation, to wit, the Cape Commercial Bank Loan, the Railway Loan and the Orphan Chamber Debt, which debts will be a first charge upon the revenues of the Republic. The South African Republic will, moreover, be liable to Her Majesty's Government for £250,000 which will be a second charge upon the revenues of the Republic.

VI. The debt due, as aforesaid, by the South African Republic to Her Majesty's Government will bear interest at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. from the date of the ratification of this Convention, and shall be repayable by a payment for interest and Sinking Fund of £6, 0s. 9d. per £100 per annum, which will extinguish the debt in twenty-five years. The said payment of £6, 0s. 9d. per £100 shall be payable half-yearly in British currency at the close of each half-year from the date of such ratification, provided always that the South African Republic shall be at liberty at the close of any half-year to pay off the whole, or any portion, of the outstanding debt.

Interest at the rate of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the debt as standing under the Convention of Pretoria shall, as heretofore, be paid to the date of the ratification of this Convention.

VII. All persons who held property in the Transvaal on August 8, 1881, and still hold the same, will continue to enjoy the rights of property which they have enjoyed since April 12, 1877. No person who has remained loyal to Her Majesty during the late hostilities, shall suffer any molestation by reason of his loyalty, or be liable to any

criminal prosecution, or civil action, for any part taken in connection with such hostilities; and all such persons will have full liberty to reside in the country, with enjoyment of all civil rights and protection for their persons and property.

VIII. The South African Republic renews the declaration made in the Sand River Convention and in the Convention of Pretoria that no slavery, or apprenticeship partaking of slavery, will be tolerated by the Government of the said Republic.

IX. There will continue to be complete freedom of religion and protection from molestation for all denominations, provided the same be not inconsistent with morality and good order; and no disability shall attach to any person in regard to rights of property by reason of the religious opinions which he holds.

X. The British Officer appointed to reside in the South African Republic will receive every assistance from the Government of the said Republic in making due provision for the proper care and preservation of the graves of such of Her Majesty's forces as have died in the Transvaal; and, if need be, for the appropriation of land for the purpose.

XI. All grants or titles issued at any time by the Transvaal Government in respect of land outside the boundary of the South African Republic, as defined in Article I., shall be considered invalid and of no effect, except in so far as any such grant or title relates to land that falls within the boundary of the South African Republic; and all persons hold

ing any such grant, so considered invalid and of no effect, will receive from the Government of the South African Republic such compensation, either in land or in money, as the Volksraad shall determine. In all cases in which any native chiefs or other authorities outside the said boundaries, have received any adequate consideration from the Government of the South African Republic for land excluded from the Transvaal by Article I. of this Convention, or where permanent improvements have been made on the land, the High Commissioner will recover from the native authorities fair compensation for the loss of the land thus excluded, or of the permanent improvements thereon.

XII. The independence of the Swazis, within the boundary line of Swaziland, as indicated in Article I. of this Convention, will be fully recognised.

XIII. Except in pursuance of any treaty or engagement made as provided in Article IV. of this Convention, no other or higher duties shall be imposed on the importation into the South African Republic of any article coming from any part of Her Majesty's dominions than are or may be imposed on the like article coming from any other place or country; nor will any prohibition be maintained or imposed on the importation into the South African Republic of any article coming from any part of Her Majesty's dominions which shall not equally extend to the like article coming from any other place or country. And in like manner the same treatment shall be given to any article coming to Great Britain from

the South African Republic as to the like article coming from any other place or country.

The provisions do not preclude the consideration of special arrangements as to import duties and commercial relations between the South African Republic and any of Her Majesty's colonies or possessions.

XIV. All persons, other than natives, conforming themselves to the laws of the South African Republic (a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the South African Republic; (b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses, manufactories, warehouses, shops and premises; (c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by any agent whom they may think fit to employ; (d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry, to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said Republic.

XV. All persons, other than natives who established their domicile in the Transvaal between the 12th of April 1877 and the 8th of August 1881, and who within twelve months after such last-mentioned date, have had their names registered by the British Resident, shall be exempt from all compulsory military service whatever.

XVI. Provision shall hereafter be made by a separate instrument for the mutual extradition of criminals, and also for the surrender of deserters from Her Majesty's forces.

XVII. All debts contracted between the 12th of April 1877 and the 8th of August 1881, will be payable in the same currency in which they may have been contracted.

XVIII. No grants of land which may have been made, and no transfers or mortgages which may have been passed between the 12th of April 1877 and the 8th of August 1881, will be invalidated by reason merely of their having been made or passed between such dates.

All transfers to the British Secretary for native affairs in trust for natives, will remain in force, an officer of the South African Republic taking the place of such secretary for native affairs.

XIX. The Government of the South African Republic will engage faithfully to fulfil the assurances given, in accordance with the laws of the South African Republic, to the natives at the Pretoria Pitso by the Royal Commission in the presence of the Triumvirate, and with their entire assent (1) as to the freedom of the natives to buy or otherwise acquire under certain conditions; (2) as to the appointment of a commission to mark out native locations; (3) as to the access of the natives to the courts of law; and (4) as to their being allowed to move freely within the country, or to leave it for any legal purpose, under a pass system.

XX. This Convention will be ratified by a Volksraad of the South African Republic within the period of six months after its execution, and in default of such ratification this Convention shall be null and void.

I shall have occasion later on to consider whether or no, and in what respect, the Suzerainty of Great Britain over the Transvaal Republic, enunciated in the Convention of 1881, was abrogated or modified by the Convention of 1884.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY, WITH SOME REMARKS ON THE INHABITANTS

THE legislative authority of the Transvaal is vested in the Volksraad, a body somewhat analogous to our House of Commons, the members being elected by their constituents for four years. The number of members is only twenty-one. The Volksraad meets annually at Pretoria, the date of assembly being the first Monday in May, but the President is empowered to call an extraordinary session at any time to consider any matter that he may deem urgent. The only qualification for the Volksraad is, that the member must be thirty years of age, and either have been born in the country or else have been a qualified voter for fifteen consecutive years; he must also be a member of some Protestant church, a regulation which excludes Jews and Roman Catholics, and not only reside in the Transvaal but have a fixed property therein. There are further important and somewhat curious disqualifications for membership of this body. No person

is eligible who is "an openly bad character," while if the father is a member of the Volksraad, his sons and step-sons are for the time ineligible. Coloured persons, those not born in wedlock and officials in receipt of salaries are all disqualified from sitting in the Volksraad. This House possesses a veto over every act of the second chamber. Indeed, the President possesses full discretion in regard to what measures passed in the second chamber he shall submit for the consideration of the first.

The executive of the Transvaal consists of the State President, who is elected by the people for a term of five years, the State secretary, who is elected by the Volksraad for a term of four years, the commandant-general, who is elected by the people for a period of ten years, and the secretary for native affairs and two non-official members, the choice of whom rests with the Volksraad, and each of whom holds office for three years. The president must be thirty years of age, must be a member of some one, though not any particular Protestant church, and must not have been sentenced for any criminal offence; there are no other qualifications.

The chief official in each district, termed the Landdrost, combines the functions of magistrate and civil commissioner; he is assisted by a clerk, who is simultaneously public prosecutor and distributor of stamps. Each district is likewise superintended by a field cornet, who possesses certain judicial and, in time of war, military powers. My readers will, no doubt, have observed

many references to field cornets in connection with the assembly of the Boers to resist Dr Jameson's invasion of the Transvaal.

The South African Republic possesses no standing army, if we except a small corps of mounted artillery. On the other hand, every full-grown Boer is to all intents and purposes a soldier, and the president has the right, with the concurrence of the executive, to call out the burghers at any time in defence of the Republic. The whole force being then under the orders of the commandant-general, by law of the Republic all its inhabitants between sixteen and sixty are liable to be called upon for active service, the first levy being those of men from eighteen to thirty-four, the second of men from thirty-four to fifty, the third of boys between sixteen and eighteen, and men over fifty. The commandeered, as they are usually termed, are required to provide themselves with a gun, clothing and thirty rounds of ammunition. As regards loot taken during a period of hostilities, one-fourth goes to the Government, the remaining three-fourths being equally divided among the men called out.

The law of the country is Roman-Dutch, modified, to a certain extent, by the accepted customs of South Africa. The decrees of the supreme courts of the Cape Colony, if they do not over-ride any local legislation, are regarded by the Transvaal judges as authoritative, being decided on the principles of Roman-Dutch law.

These few details will, I hope, enable my readers

to form some idea as to the mode of Government that obtains in the Transvaal. It is on the whole a simple, rough-and-ready method of administration, well adapted to the requirements of the Boers, though I frankly admit in all respects not suited, or suitable, for persons who have lived in countries like France and England.

The Dutch Boers of South Africa are, as I have already indicated, fearful of the activity of the British Colonists, a fact largely due to their having no taste for expansive development—indeed, they are, by habits and association, quite averse from it. Amongst the purely Dutch element has also gradually sprung up a mixed race, known as *Africanders*, the majority of whom are of partial Dutch descent and are more in sympathy with the pure creole Boers than with the conquering and dominant race—the chief ideal of the Boers being a sort of humdrum routine of pastoral life, varied, if varied at all, by an equally methodical pursuit of the chase, rifle in hand. What they cherish most is to be masters of as large an area as they can of what we should call little better than waste land, for the pasture of their fat-tailed sheep and their oxen, chiefly used for draught purposes. They are, with very few exceptions, if any, expert bullock-drivers and unerring riflemen. They are extremely simple as well as primitive in their habits; and, except, as against the African natives, such as the Kaffirs, the Hottentots and the Fingoes, they are anything but aggressive as neighbours, for the very good reason that they are of extremely stay-at-home

habits and predilections, stolidly wrapped up in their habitual pursuits. Except amongst themselves and their own communities, they are not gregarious. But in their far-away settlements, they are, as a rule, hospitable to isolated strangers from whom they apprehend no transgression of their tastes, peculiarities, immunities or possessions. It is only justice to state that the Boers are hardy, enduring, capable of great physical exertion, indomitably courageous, and endowed with a haughty, though almost tacit, spirit of independence, the gratification of which is ingrained in and entwined with their very existence. It is due to this latter characteristic, combined with a fear born of experience of British aggression, that so soon as British colonists began to be multiplied at and near Cape Town, and afterwards about Port Elizabeth and Durban, numbers of Boers kept on migrating or "trekking" more and more to the north eastward, into Graaffreynet and the country beyond the Orange River, in the latter of which they, as I have already shown, founded the settlement which has since been recognised as independent, under the name of the Orange River Free State; on the further side of which, to the northward, they have since been hemmed in by the extension of the Cape Colony to include what is known by the name of Griqualand West; whilst to the south-east, they were in contact with the skilful and warlike Basutos (Kaffirs), between whom and themselves there was an inextinguishable blood-feud.

It is, I think, desirable to interpolate some remarks

here with reference to the juxtaposition of what have now become two autonomous Boer States, in the very heart of our South African Territories, and actually formed out of and within our own colonies. The Boers of the Orange River State and those of the Transvaal are really one and the same people, having a perfectly identical origin, extraction, descent and characteristics; those of the Transvaal being but a portion of the same aggregate community, which, at the close of the last Basuto War, and on the complete subjection of Moshesh and Sandilli—having no squattings in the Orange River settlement when that was recognised as an independent State—had sought further seclusion from the British settlers by “trekking” beyond the Transkei, and after that again, northward, beyond the Vaal for the like purpose. The two States are naturally allied in all their sympathies of blood, habits and sentiments; and as they are conterminous along the whole stretch of the Orange River State’s north-eastern boundary, which forms by far the greater part of the Transvaal’s southern frontier, it is not at all unlikely that (especially if pressed by an attempt to coerce either the one or the other) they may combine and become consolidated under one central Government, whether at Pretoria or at Bloemfontein, or even, perhaps, at Johannesburg, if the restlessness of the Uitlanders were reduced to subjection, a consummation which would enable the united Boers to wield forces, especially on their own territory, which could not be quite lightly reckoned with. It is further to be observed

that in the event of a combination of forces, at any rate, which was quite recently imminent upon the sudden invasion of the Transvaal from the west, our diamond mining settlement, in Griqualand West, might be seriously exposed to sudden incursion. Kimberley is close upon the western frontier of the Orange River State, and within convenient striking distance of the south-western angle of the Transvaal; whilst a hostile occupation of Griqualand West would all but isolate Bechuanaland from Cape Colony, and would seriously menace the line of communication by land between Cape Town and Matabeleland. Again, the Orange River State is conterminous with our colony of Natal, at the north-eastern extremity of the former and the north-western extremity of the latter, which has also a small stretch of extreme north-eastern frontier conterminous with the Transvaal, which, together with the Orange River State, comprises little, if any, less of territorial extent than does the Cape Colony, and not much less than the Cape Colony, Natal and British Zululand combined. These facts suggest many grave possible contingencies, to which the crude, ill-formed, vacillating policy of successive Governments in England has exposed the future of our great South African possessions. It would be no such very easy strategy, in the event of an open conflict between the British Government and the combined Boers, to isolate them at all effectually. In a rugged country like South Africa, where roads and railways are still but few and imperfect, at the best, and military movements, like all other occasions

of transport, must be conducted over more or less difficult ground, with peculiarities and means of conveyance over which all the Boers are familiar, they would have a great advantage in manœuvring as well as in mobilisation and marching. To this advantage must be added also that their common base would be a compact, united and central position, and that they can produce all absolutely indispensable supplies, excepting, possibly, sufficient of arms and ammunition, within their own borders. No doubt, if England were resolved to subjugate them at any cost, commanding nearly the whole coast line as she does, the Boers of both States, even with their Afrikander adherents, would be in time defeated, and those inhabiting the Cape Colony and Natal would be prevented from becoming insurrectionary agitators ; but it would not promote the prosperity of any part of South Africa that a large proportion of the population, of the characteristics of the Boers and Afrikanders, should be kept by overpowering and costly repression in a state of sullen subjection, and, accordingly, the best interests of Great Britain evidently lie in the cultivation of not only a good understanding, but a cordial alliance with the Boers of both the Transvaal and the Orange River Free State.

CHAPTER V

THE CHARTERED COMPANY

THE British South Africa Company, better known as the Chartered Company, ought not in one way to have any concern whatever with the Transvaal, and, accordingly, would not need any mention in a book dealing with that Republic. Unfortunately, however, the events of the past few months have brought the Chartered Company into notoriety, from the fact that its late administrator led the armed forces under his command into the territory of a friendly nation. Dr Jameson, and the greater number of the men whom he led into the South African Republic, have arrived in this country for the purpose of being put upon their trial for their conduct in connection with that raid. They have every right to expect an impartial trial; but while the case against them, so far as the law is concerned, is still *sub judice*, it would be obviously improper that either in a book or a newspaper any statements might appear which could, in the slightest degree, have a prejudicial effect

on their approaching trial. The Chartered Company is, likewise, to some extent, upon its trial, and directly the charges which will be preferred against Dr Jameson and his fellow-prisoners have been adjudicated on, it is pretty well certain that a full and exhaustive inquiry will be held into the connection, if any, which existed between the Chartered Company or any of its officials in regard to Dr Jameson's raid into the Transvaal. It is only fair to say that Mr Rhodes has asked for that inquiry, and, so far as my personal opinion goes, I may say that I do not believe for a moment that Mr Rhodes has any reason to fear the result of that inquiry. I have known that gentleman for a long time; I have watched his career with the deepest interest; I am certain that he is a man with large ideas, great aspirations, no doubt considerable ambition. But, at the same time, he is a man of tact and caution, and I shall refuse to believe that Mr Rhodes knew anything of, much less authorised, that fatal incursion of Dr Jameson into Transvaal territory. Now, I do not intend in this book to criticise the Chartered Company any more than I do to cover it with fulsome eulogy. The Chartered Company has, in the past, done a considerable amount for the development and advancement of South Africa, and especially a portion of South Africa in which I am greatly interested. But, at the same time, I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that Chartered Companies are far from being the best means of administering a new country inhabited by a large

native population. It has been pleaded that the administration of newly-occupied portions of the earth's surface by Chartered Companies is economical for the mother-country, which gets all the *kudos* of possession without incurring the cost of administration. This is undoubtedly true, but, at the same time, it must not be forgotten that the objects of such companies are, to a large degree, incompatible with the just and upright administration of a new and undeveloped country. The primary object of a company must be a pecuniary one, and its shareholders the very first consideration. The example of the East India Company, which we so often hear quoted, is really nothing in point. We have progressed marvellously in many ways since the days of "John Company," and it is no exaggeration to say that the means by which the East India Company annexed large portions of what now constitute the Indian Empire, if attempted to be carried into effect at the present day in any part of the world, would rouse such a storm of indignation in this country as would sweep from office any minister or ministry that attempted either to tolerate or justify them. Wherever Chartered Companies exist at the present time or have existed of late years, in East, West, or South Africa, their rule has, to my knowledge, been disadvantageous to the native races under their control, and in many instances has brought discredit on Great Britain. In any case, it is manifestly an absurdity that a trading corporation should be allowed to have armed forces

at its disposal, under the command of an officer who is not directly responsible to the Imperial Government. And I say this, not only as regards the Chartered Company, but also in reference to the Royal Niger Company.

As I shall have occasion throughout this book to refer from time to time to the Chartered Company within the limitations that I have laid down in this chapter, I think it necessary, in order that my readers may have a clear and comprehensive idea as to the terms on which the Company was placed in full possession of its rights and privileges, that I should give here the full text of the charter, which Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen was pleased to grant it on the 29th October 1889.

"VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

"To all whom these presents shall come, greeting.

"Whereas a humble petition has been presented to us in our Council by the Most Noble James, Duke of Abercorn, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath; the Most Noble Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, Knight of the Most Ancient and Most Noble Order of the Thistle, Privy Councillor; the Right Honourable Edric Frederick, Lord Gifford, V.C.; Cecil John Rhodes of Kimberley, in the Cape Colony, Member of the Executive Council, and of the House of Assembly of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope; Alfred Beit of 29

Holborn Viaduct, London, Merchant; Albert Henry George Grey of Howick, Northumberland, Esquire; and George Cawston of 18 Lennox Gardens, London, Esquire, Barrister-at-Law.

“And whereas the said petition states, amongst other things:—

“That the petitioners and others are associated for the purpose of forming a company or association, to be incorporated, if to us should seem fit, for the objects in the said petition, set forth under the corporate name of the British South Africa Company.

“That the existence of a powerful British company, controlled by those of our subjects in whom we have confidence, and having its principle field of operations in that region of South Africa lying to the north of Bechuanaland and to the west of Portuguese East Africa, would be advantageous to the commercial and other interests of our subjects in the United Kingdom and our Colonies.

“That the petitioners desire to carry into effect divers concessions and agreements which have been made by certain of the chiefs and tribes inhabiting the said region, and such other concessions, agreements, grants and treaties as the petitioners may hereinafter obtain within the said region or elsewhere in Africa, with the view of promoting trade, commerce, civilisation and good government (including the regulation of liquor traffic with the natives) in the territories which are or may be comprised, or referred to in such concessions, agreements, grants and treaties as aforesaid.

"That the petitioners believe that if the said concessions, agreements, grants and treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the natives inhabiting the said territories will be materially improved and their civilisation advanced, and an organisation established which will tend to the suppression of the slave trade in the said territories, and to the opening up of the said territories to the immigration of Europeans, and to the lawful trade and commerce of our subjects and of other nations.

"That the success of the enterprise in which the petitioners are engaged would be greatly advanced if it should seem fit to us to grant them our Royal Charter of Incorporation as a British Company under the said name or title, and with such powers as to us may seem fit for the purpose of more effectually carrying into effect the objects aforesaid.

"That large sums of money have been subscribed for the purpose of the intended Company by the petitioners and others, who are prepared also to subscribe or to procure such further sums as may hereafter be found requisite for the development of the said enterprise, in the event of our being pleased to grant to them our Royal Charter of Incorporation, as aforesaid.

"Now, therefore, we, having taken the said petition into our Royal consideration in our Council, and being satisfied that the intentions of the petitioners are praiseworthy and deserve encouragement, and that the enterprise in the petition described may

be productive of the benefits set forth therein, by our Prerogative Royal and of our special Grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, have constituted, erected and incorporated, and by this our Charter, for us and our heirs and royal successors, do constitute, erect and incorporate into one body, politic and corporate, by the name of The British South Africa Company, the said James, Duke of Abercorn, Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, Edric Frederick, Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Grey, and George Cawston, and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time become, and are, members of the body, politic and corporate, by these presents constituted, erected and incorporated with perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to break, alter, or renew the same at discretion, and, with the further authorities, powers and privileges conferred, and subject to the conditions imposed by this our Charter: And we do hereby, accordingly will, ordain, give, grant, constitute, appoint and declare as follows (that is to say):—

“1. The principal field of the operations of The British South Africa Company (in this our Charter referred to as “the Company”) shall be the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British Bechuanaland, and to the north and west of the South African Republic, and to the west of the Portuguese Dominions.

“2. The Company is hereby authorised and em-

powered to hold, use, and retain for the purposes of the Company and on the terms of this our Charter, the full benefit of the concessions and agreements made as aforesaid, so far as they are valid, or any of them, and all interests, authorities and powers comprised or referred to in the said concessions and agreements. Provided always that nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect any other valid and subsisting concessions or agreements, which may have been made by any of the chiefs of the tribes aforesaid. And in particular, that nothing herein contained shall prejudice or affect certain concessions granted in, and subsequent to, the year 1880, relating to the territory usually known as the district of the Tati, nor shall anything herein contained be construed as giving any jurisdiction, administrative or otherwise, within the said district of the Tati, the limits of which district are as follows: From where the Shasi River rises to its junction with the Tati and Ramaquaban Rivers, thence along the Ramaquaban River to where it rises, and thence along the watershed of those rivers.

“3. The Company is hereby further authorised and empowered, subject to the approval of one of our Principal Secretaries of State (herein referred to as “Our Secretary of State”) from time to time, to acquire by any concession, agreement, grant or treaty, all or any rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions and powers of any kind or nature whatever, including powers necessary for the purposes of government,

and the preservation of public order in, or for the protection of territories, lands or property, comprised or referred to in the concessions and agreements made as aforesaid, or affecting other territories, lands or property in Africa, or the inhabitants thereof, and to hold, use, and exercise such territories, lands, property rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions and powers respectively for the purposes of the Company, and on the terms of this our Charter.

“4. Provided that no powers of government or administration shall be exercised under, or in relation to any such last-mentioned concession, agreement, grant or treaty in such form, until such maps or particulars as our Secretary of State approves, verified as he requires, has been transmitted to him, and he has signified his approval thereof, either absolutely or subject to any conditions or reservations. And provided also that no rights, interests, authorities, jurisdictions or powers of any description shall be acquired by the Company within the said district of the Tati, as hereinbefore described, without the previous consent in writing of the owners for the time being, of the concessions above referred to, relating to the said district, and the approval of our Secretary of State.

“5. The Company shall be bound by, and shall fulfil all and singular the stipulations on its part, contained in any such concession, agreement, grant, or treaty as aforesaid, subject to the subsequent

agreement affecting those stipulations approved by our Secretary of State.

"6. The Company shall always be and remain British in character and domicile, and shall have its principal office in Great Britain, and the Company's principal representative in South Africa, and the directors shall always be natural born British subjects, or persons who have been naturalised as British subjects by or under the Act of Parliament of our United Kingdom; but this Article shall not disqualify any person nominated a director by this our Charter, or any person whose election as a director shall have been approved by our Secretary of State, from acting in that capacity.

"7. In case at any time any difference arises between any chief or tribe, inhabiting any of the territories aforesaid, and the Company, the difference shall, if our Secretary of State so require, be submitted by the Company to him for his decision, and the Company shall act in accordance with such decision.

"8. If at any time our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from, or object to any of the dealings of the Company with any foreign power, and to make known to the Company any suggestion founded on that dissent or objection, the Company shall act in accordance with such suggestion.

"9. If at any time our Secretary of State thinks fit to object to the exercise by the Company of any authority, power or right within any part of the territories aforesaid, on the ground of there

being an adverse claim to, or in respect of that part, the Company shall defer to that objection until such time as any such claim has been withdrawn, or finally dealt with, or settled by our Secretary of State.

“10. The Company shall, to the best of its ability, preserve peace and order in such ways and manners as it shall consider necessary, and may with that object make ordinances (to be approved by our Secretary of State), and may establish and maintain a force of police.

“11. The Company shall, to the best of its ability, discourage and so far as may be practicable, abolish by degrees any system of slave trade or domestic servitude in the territories aforesaid.

“12. The Company shall regulate the traffic in spirits and other intoxicating liquors within the territories aforesaid, so as, as far as practicable, to prevent the sale of any spirits or other intoxicating liquor to any natives.

“13. The Company as such, or its officers as such, shall not in any way interfere with the religion of any class or tribe of the peoples of the territories aforesaid, or of any of the inhabitants thereof, except so far as may be necessary in the interests of humanity, and all forms of religious worship or religious ordinances, may be exercised within the said territories, and no hindrance shall be offered thereto except as aforesaid.

“14. In the administration of justice to the said peoples or inhabitants, careful regard shall always

be had to the customs and laws of the class, or tribe, or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of lands and goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce and legitimacy, and other rights of property and personal rights, but subject to any British laws which may be in force in any of the territories aforesaid, and applicable to the people or inhabitants thereof.

“15. If at any time our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any part of the proceedings or system of the Company relative to the peoples of the territories aforesaid, or to any of the inhabitants thereof, in respect of slavery or religion, or the administration of justice, or any other matter, he shall make known to the Company his dissent or objection, and the Company shall act in accordance with the directions duly signified.

“16. In the event of the Company acquiring any harbour or harbours, the Company shall freely afford all facilities for or to our ships therein without payment, except reasonable charges for work done or services rendered, or materials or things supplied.

“17. The Company shall furnish annually to our Secretary of State, as soon as conveniently may be after the close of the financial year, accounts of its expenditure for administrative purposes, and of all sums received by it by way of public revenue, as distinguished from its commercial profits, during the financial year, together with a report as to its public



CECIL RHODES.

FROM A PORTRAIT BY ELLIOT AND FRY.

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proceedings and the condition of the territories within the sphere of its operations. The Company shall also, on or before the commencement of each financial year, furnish to our Secretary of State an estimate of its expenditure for administrative purposes, and of its public revenue (as above defined) for the ensuing year. The Company shall, in addition, from time to time, furnish to our Secretary of State any reports, accounts or information which he may require to be furnished.

“18. The several officers of the Company shall, subject to the rules of official subordination and to any regulations that may be agreed upon, communicate freely with our High Commissioner in South Africa, and any other of our officers who may be stationed within any of the territories aforesaid, and shall pay due regard to any requirements, suggestions or requests which the High Commissioner or other officers shall make to them or any of them, and the Company shall be bound to enforce the observance of this Article.

“19. The Company may hoist and use on its buildings and elsewhere in the territories aforesaid, and on its vessels, such distinctive flag indicating the British character of the Company, as our Secretary of State and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall, from time to time, approve.

“20. Nothing in this our Charter shall be deemed to authorise the Company to set up or grant any monopoly of trade; provided that the establishment of or the grant of concession for banks, railways, tramways, docks, telegraphs, waterworks or other

similar undertakings, or the establishment of any system of patent or copyright approved by our Secretary of State, shall not be deemed monopolies for this purpose. The Company shall not, either directly or indirectly, hinder any company or persons who are now or hereafter may be carrying on lawfully and peacefully any business, concern or venture within the said district of the Tati, hereinbefore described, but shall, by permitting and facilitating transit by every lawful means to and from the district of the Tati across its own territories, or where it has jurisdiction in that behalf, and by all other reasonable and lawful means, encourage, assist and protect all British subjects who are now, or hereafter may be, lawfully and peacefully engaged in the prosecution of a lawful enterprise within the said district of the Tati.

“21. For the preservation of elephants and other game, the Company may make such regulations and (notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained) may impose such licence duties on the killing or taking of elephants or other game as they may see fit; provided that nothing in such regulations shall tend to diminish or interfere with any hunting rights, which may have been, or may hereafter be, reserved to any native chiefs or tribes by treaty, save so far as any such regulations may relate to the establishment and enforcement of a close season.

“22. The Company shall be subject to, and shall perform and undertake all the obligations contained in or undertaken by ourselves under any treaty

agreement or arrangement between ourselves and any other State or Power, whether already made or hereafter to be made. In all matters relating to the observance of this Article, or to the exercise within the Company's territories, for the time being, of any jurisdiction exercisable by us under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, the Company shall conform to and observe and carry out all such directions, as may from time to time be given in that behalf by our Secretary of State, and the Company shall appoint all necessary officers to perform such duties, and shall provide such courts and other requisites, as may from time to time be necessary for the administration of justice.

"23. The original share capital of the Company shall be £1,000,000, divided into 1,000,000 shares of £1 each.

"24. The Company is hereby further specially authorised and empowered for the purposes of this our Charter from time to time:—

"I. To issue shares of different classes or descriptions, to increase the share capital of the Company, and to borrow moneys by debentures or other obligations.

"II. To acquire and hold, and to charter or otherwise deal with steam vessels and other vessels.

"III. To establish or authorise banking companies and other companies, and undertakings or associations of every description for purposes consistent with the provisions of this our Charter.

"IV. To make and maintain roads, railways, tele-

graphs, harbours and any other works which may tend to the development or improvement of the territories of the Company.

“V. To carry on mining and other industries, and to make concessions of mining, forestal or other rights.

“VI. To improve, develop, clear, plant, irrigate and cultivate any lands included within the territories of the Company.

“VII. To settle any such territories and lands as aforesaid, and to aid and promote immigration.

“VIII. To grant lands for terms of years, or in perpetuity, and either absolutely or by way of mortgage or otherwise.

“IX. To make loans or contributions of money, or money's worth, for promoting any of the objects of the Company.

“X. To acquire and hold personal property.

“XI. To acquire and hold (without licence in mortmain or other authority than this our Charter) lands in the United Kingdom, not exceeding five acres in all, at any one time for the purposes of the offices and business of the Company, and (subject to any local law) lands in any of our colonies or possessions and elsewhere, convenient for carrying on the management of the affairs of the Company, and to dispose from time to time of any such lands when not required for that purpose.

“XII. To carry on any lawful commerce, trade, pursuit, business, operations or dealing whatsoever in connection with the objects of the Company.

“XIII. To establish and maintain agencies in our colonies and possessions and elsewhere.

“XIV. To sue and be sued by the Company’s name of incorporation, as well in our courts in our United Kingdom, or in our courts in our colonies or possessions, or in our courts in foreign countries or elsewhere.

“XV. To do all lawful things, incidental or conducive to the exercise or enjoyment of the rights, interests, authorities and powers of the Company in this our Charter, expressed or referred to, or any of them.

“25. Within one year after the date of this our Charter, or such extended period as may be certified by our Secretary of State, there shall be executed by the members of the Company for the time being a deed of settlement, providing so far as necessary for—

“I. The further definition of the objects and purposes of the Company.

“II. The classes or descriptions of shares into which the capital of the Company is divided, and the calls to be made in respect thereof, and the terms and conditions of membership of the Company.

“III. The division and distribution of profits.

“IV. General meetings of the Company; the appointment by our Secretary of State (if so required by him) of an official director, and the number, qualification, appointment, remuneration, rotation, removal and powers of directors of the Company, and of other officers of the Company.

“V. The registration of members of the Company,

and the transfer of shares in the capital of the Company.

"VI. The preparation of annual accounts to be submitted to the members at a general meeting.

VII. The audit of those accounts by independent auditors.

"VIII. The making of bye-laws.

"IX. The making and using of official seals of the Company.

"X. The constitution and regulation of committees or local boards of management.

"XI. The making and execution of supplementary deeds of settlement.

"XII. The winding up (in case of need) of the Company's affairs.

"XIII. The government and regulation of the Company and of its affairs.

"XVI. Any other matters usual or proper to be provided for in respect of a Chartered Company.

"26. The deed of settlement shall, before the execution thereof, be submitted to and approved by the Lords of our Council, and a certificate of their approval thereof, signed by the clerk of our council, shall be endorsed on this our Charter, and be conclusive evidence of such approval, and on the deed of settlement; and such deed of settlement shall take effect from the date of such approval, and shall be binding upon the Company, its members, officers and servants, and for all other purposes whatsoever.

"27. The provisions of the deed of settlement or of any supplementary deed, for the time being in force,

may be from time to time repealed, varied or added to by a supplementary deed, made and executed in such manner as the deed of settlement prescribes. Provided that the provisions of any such deed relative to the official director shall not be repealed, varied or added to without the express approval of our Secretary of State.

"28. The members of the Company shall be individually liable for the debts, contracts, engagements and liabilities of the Company, to the extent only of the amount, if any, for the time being unpaid on the shares held by them respectively.

"29. Until such deed of settlement as aforesaid takes effect, the said James, Duke of Abercorn, shall be the president; the said Alexander William George, Duke of Fife, shall be vice-president; and the said Edric Frederick, Lord Gifford, Cecil John Rhodes, Alfred Beit, Albert Henry George Grey and George Cawston shall be the directors of the Company, and may, on behalf of the Company, do all things necessary or proper to be done under this our Charter by or on behalf of the Company. Provided always that, notwithstanding anything contained in the deed of settlement of the Company, the said James, Duke of Fife, and Albert Henry George Grey shall not be subject to retire from office in accordance with its provisions, but shall be and remain directors of the Company until death, incapacity to act or resignation, as the case may be.

"30. And we do further will, ordain and declare that this our Charter shall be acknowledged by our

governors, and our naval and military officers, and our consuls, and our other officers in our colonies and possessions, and on the high seas and elsewhere, and they shall severally give full force and effect to this our Charter, and shall recognise and be in all things aiding to the Company and its officers.

“31. And we do further will, ordain and declare that this our Charter shall be taken, construed and adjudged in the most favourable and beneficial sense for, and to the best advantage of, the Company, as well in our courts as in our United Kingdom, and in our courts, in our colonies and possessions and in our courts in foreign countries or elsewhere, notwithstanding that there may appear to be in this our Charter any non-recital, mis-recital, uncertainty or imperfection.

“32. And we do further will, ordain and declare that this our Charter shall subsist and continue valid, notwithstanding any lawful change in the name of the Company, or in the deed of settlement thereon, such change being made with the previous approval of our Secretary of State, signified under his hand.

“33. And we do further will, ordain and declare that it shall be lawful for us, our heirs and successors, and we do hereby expressly reserve to ourselves, our heirs and successors, the right and the power, by writing under the general seal of the United Kingdom, at the end of twenty-five years from the date of this our Charter, and at the end of every succeeding period of ten years, to add, to alter or repeal any of the provisions of this our Charter, or to enact other

provisions in substitution for, or in addition to, any of its existing provisions. Provided that the right and power thus reserved shall be exercised only in relation to so much of this our Charter as relates to administrative and public matters. And we do further expressly reserve to ourselves, our heirs and successors, the right to take over any buildings or works belonging to the Company, and used exclusively or mainly for administrative or public purposes, on payment to the Company of such reasonable compensation as may be agreed, or as, failing agreement, may be settled by the commissioners of our treasury. And we do further appoint, direct and declare that any such writing under the said great seal shall have full effect and be binding upon the Company its members, officers and servants and all other persons, and shall be of the same force, effect and validity as if its provisions had been part of and contained in these presents.

“34. Provided always, and we do further declare that nothing in this our Charter shall be deemed or taken in anywise to limit or restrict the exercise of any of our rights or powers with reference to the protection of any territories, or with reference to the government thereof, should we see fit to include the same within our dominions.

“35. And we do lastly will, ordain and declare, without prejudice to any power, to repeal this our Charter by law belonging to us, our heirs and successors, or to any of our courts, ministers or officers, independently of this present declaration and reserva-

tion, that in case at any time it is made to appear to us in our Council that the Company has substantially failed to observe and conform to the provisions of this our Charter, or that the Company is not exercising its powers under the concessions, agreements, grants and treaties aforesaid, so as to advance the interests which the petitioners have represented to us to be likely to be advanced by the grant of this our Charter, it shall be lawful for us, our heirs and successors, and we do hereby expressly reserve and take to ourselves, our heirs and successors, the right and power, by writing under the great seal of our United Kingdom, to revoke this, our Charter, and to revoke and annul the privileges, powers and rights thereby granted to the Company.

“In witness whereof, we have caused our letters to be made patent.”

CHAPTER VI

THE GENESIS OF THE RECENT TROUBLE

It will now be necessary to revert to what was the outcome of the successive "treks" of the Boers outside the Orange River Settlement, under the stress of an increase, which had become very rapid—even before the diamond and gold discoveries—of British settlers, before the approach of whom the Boers continually receded farther and farther until they found themselves driven into collision with the savagely warlike people of Chaka, Dingan, Cotewayo and others, whether chiefs or natives, in much the same manner that we ourselves were ultimately forced into conflict with the last-named Zulu chief (or king) on account of the transgressions across the Tugela, alleged to have been committed by the Boers of interior Natal some few years sooner, and before they had "trekked" to the northward across the Vaal, that is, whilst they were still Natal colonists, and at a time when the Zulus were on cordially friendly terms with the Natal Government. The reason why I take up this merely sketchy narrative of

Boer movements at the point of the first Zulu war is that this period embraces the origin of all the conflicts and disagreements we have since had with the Boers of the Transvaal. That Zulu war and the conflicts which succeeded it arose from the fact that in 1877 we abruptly annexed the Transvaal to Natal by a proclamation of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and that, upon our thus resuming the governmental authority over the Transvaal Boers and the fresh territory upon which they had squatted, Cetewayo held the British Government responsible for the depredations which he alleged to have been committed upon his territories when the same Boers were still in Natal. The pretext for this reclamation, indeed, was neither without some cause, nor wanting in diplomatic finesse. I believe it was the fact that the Boers from the vicinity of Pietermaritzburg had at one time raided and seized the cattle of the Zulus. This the Zulus did no more to resent or to obtain redress for than to cross the Tugela in the other direction and to seize cattle belonging to the Boers. But the latter had, subsequently, committed another encroachment by appropriating and squatting upon land along the Tugela, where the Zulu kraals made it evident that they were the rightful possessors of the land, whom, nevertheless, the Boers had forcibly expelled. It has been the constant policy of the British Government to avoid conflicts with the native African races as much as possible. Nay, more, it has been

the settled principle of the Colonial Office to treat the native races most considerately, and to protect them from molestation in their own respective locations, and that has frequently brought the British authorities into collision of the Boers, so as to have occasioned an exacerbation of their community against us, which they have been prone to vent by incessant hostility towards the natives, the effects of which had re-acted against us by involving us in the vindictiveness occasioned by persecutions to which we have been constantly opposed. So that the intractably dogged spirit of the Boers has never ceased, for the last forty years at least, to keep us in a double state of turmoil with the Kaffirs and with themselves. On the other hand, it must be admitted that, as in their progress, the Boers have generally borne the brunt of the roughest pioneers' work, and often the most severe fighting, their track has been followed—as it has been recently in the golden Rand—by eager British and other adventurers, fond of enterprise, as well as stimulated by prospects of sudden wealth, for which the Boers have singularly little taste or ambition, and ever on the *qui vive* for fresh fields of industry, commerce and money-making. The Boers, again, are too nervously and, I might say, fanatically exclusive to be at all grateful (even if they condescend to notice it otherwise than as a kind of intrusion) for the development and enrichment of their own country by the more actively-disposed Emigrants, allured by gold, who have

scrambled into the El Dorado in their wake. Indeed, the vast deposits of the precious metal, with which by far the greater part of the Transvaal abounds—large as the expanse is—would very likely have been left undisturbed in the earth if its exhumation had depended upon the Boers themselves. However, they may obtain a large share of it in the not excessive imposts to which they have subjected the mine owners and workers, who are aliens, and whom the Burgher government would rather retain in that relation towards their polity. But the question is, how the Boers of the Transvaal achieved or drifted into that position, especially in respect of Englishmen? To resume the narrative, briefly this is how it came about:—When, in 1877, Cetewayo made his reclamation for the restitution of part of the Zulu territory which had been appropriated by the Natal (then Transvaal) Boers, a British boundary commission had been appointed to investigate the claim. The commissioners reported in favour of the Zulus. The Boers, who had still kindred allies left amongst the Natal colonists who were keen land speculators, then negotiated with them to oppose the retrocession, whilst they got emissaries of their own to interview Sir Bartle Frere in the like sense, suggesting that by merely dilatory tactics the Zulus would probably be provoked into actual hostilities, so as to afford the High Commissioner an opportunity to engage in a war of conquest in the admitted Zulu territory, to result in the annexation of that also. Thus the report of the boundary commissioners was not

divulged until, at length, it was communicated to Cetewayo, with a condition of retrocession that he should immediately disarm and disband his impis; while the Boers, delighted at the prospect of war, during which they themselves could prepare for resistance, secretly encouraged Cetewayo to resist the demand. The condition, in fact, was quite unreasonable, because having admitted that the Zulu land claims were well founded, Sir Bartle Frere had clearly no right to make the retrocession conditional upon a disarming of the Zulus, for which, upon settlement of the question, there was no justification. The condition, however, was insisted upon by the High Commissioner as an *ultimatum*, and the *mot d'ordre* became a war of extermination against the Zulus—heretofore powerful allies, especially against the Boers—which served the double purpose, firstly, of engrossing the attention of the British authorities (averted from the Boer preparations) and of relieving the Boers themselves of the pressure or menacing power of the Zulus close to their own Transvaal borders. Encouraged by the Boers, who promised not to molest him from the north, Cetewayo, so far from complying with the arrogant condition attempted to be imposed upon him, at once massed his impis on his western frontier, whilst the British forces, under Lord Chelmsford, were being prepared to take the initiative in attempting to enforce the Zulu disarmament; and on the 12th of January 1879, the British commander crossed the Tugela in force, advancing with great imprudence with separated corps, so as to expose

a mere isolated detachment to overwhelming attack and annihilation at Isandhlwana, after which, but for the gallant stand made by a few resolute men at Rorke's Drift, the whole colony of Natal would have been left helplessly open to be overrun by the Zulus, whilst the Transvaal Boers were ready to profit by the British disasters to assert their independence and to expel, if not execute (which the most stern amongst them had urged should be done) all the British officials who had been commissioned to carry on the executive provincial government after the annexation of 1877. Early in 1880 the Transvaal Boers began to manifest decisively the policy upon which they were bent. They had assured themselves of cordial sympathy—even to an understanding of combined and concerted action—on the part of their neighbours of the Orange Free State. They applied to Sir Bartle Frere to be reinstated in their autonomy by the revocation of the Act of Annexation, only to receive a flat refusal. They sent deputations to England, to advocate the cause of their independence, in which they were supported in the House of Commons by Mr Courtney and several of the more influential Radicals, as well as by Mr Parnell and the Irish Home Rulers. Even Mr Gladstone, in his characteristically eloquent provincial speeches, espoused their cause, but they failed to secure the assent of the Government. Ultimately, they seized as a *casus belli* upon the complaint of a burgher at Pretoria, that he had been subjected to an unjust and illegal exaction by the local colonial authorities.

On December 18th, 1880, they, at length, revolted, and proclaimed at Heidelberg a Republic, to be presided over by a Triumvirate, consisting of Pretorius, Kruger and Joubert, whereupon the Burghers, commanded by Joubert, promptly attacked the small British force on the spot, under Colonel Anstruther, whom they defeated at Brunkers Spruit, with the immediate consequence that Sir George Colley set about an effort to re-conquer and re-subject the Transvaal, in which attempt he was finally overthrown and killed at Majuba Hill. From the date of that disaster the sequel is of common knowledge. The noble surrender of Gladstone's Government, in the Convention of 1881, was subsequently modified by the concessions recorded in the Convention of 1884, followed progressively. The recall of Sir Bartle Frere necessarily followed the recognition of the Boer Republic in 1881. That both the policy and military operations of Sir George Colley, who had been reinforced by Sir Evelyn Wood, were egregiously mismanaged, is a conclusion quite unavoidable in contemplating the repulses sustained by the forces at Laing's Neck and Ingogo, and their virtual annihilation at Majuba Hill, particularly when it is borne in mind that, whilst Sir George Colley was precipitating military disaster, he was actually engaged in negotiations with Joubert and Kruger to agree upon terms of accommodation. But whereas Sir George Colley in his own justification affirmed that he had no alternative, in view of the long and apparently inexplicable delay of the Boers in answering his

communications, it should not be overlooked that Sir George was hardly supported by the home Government, even in a half-hearted way, whereas the Boers were already being encouraged in their resistance by assurances that Mr Gladstone was favourable to their aspirations, and had formulated his Convention or capitulation, *in petto*. What is irresistibly established by a review of the whole conduct of the Transvaal Boers since their exodus from Graafreynet and their first settlement in interior Natal, in their dealings whether with the natives or with the British authorities—from subjection to whom it was their aim to extricate themselves—is that they have throughout been determined on independence. Their predominant political characteristic, exalted by their aversion to intercourse with anything British, is a profound aversion to rubbing shoulders with aggressive foreigners. But that renders it all the more essential that such ill-advised, and worse concerted, demonstrations should be eschewed as those latterly made by the Uitlanders of Johannesburg, and their speculating gamesters, quite unequal as they have proved themselves to either political or military combinations, adapted to cope with astute reflective leaders (however rough and ready) such as are Kruger, Joubert and others amongst the governing Boers of Pretoria. The example of the comparatively pacific and conciliatory disposition of the Orange River Boers should not be adopted as a standard in dealing with those of the Transvaal.

My readers will have observed that in this chapter I have acted on the principle of "nothing extenuate." No man who aimed at writing an impartial book dealing with the Transvaal question could deny that the policy and polity of the Dutch Boers in South Africa during the present century have been in some respects open to censure. But before judgment is passed upon the actions of the Boers, their position, the difficulties they have had to contend with, the manner in which they have been hunted from one settlement to another, should, I think, in all fairness be taken into account. When this is done, I believe the historian of the future, able to calmly and dispassionately survey men and things free from a cloud of prejudice, will conclude that, considering their environment, the Boers were a singularly brave, estimable and God-fearing race.

CHAPTER VII

THE GOLDEN TRANSVAAL,—BOERS AND UITLANDERS

LORD DUNMORE, in the able paper he contributed to the *Pall Mall Magazine* for January respecting the rise and growth of Johannesburg, aptly quoted, as the heading of his article, the well-known lines of Ovid :—

“Aurea nunc vere sunt saecula : plurimus auro
Venit horos : Auro conciliatur amor.”

Lord Dunmore utilised the Latin poet's aphorism, that by gold men frequently attain the highest honour and can win even love itself, as an introduction to the fact he records, viz., that on the 10th July 1895 the chairman of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange mounted his rostrum and announced that the output of gold from the Rand during the previous month had reached 200,941 ounces, valued at £775,000. The total output for the year 1895 was, I may here state, 2,277,685 ounces, being an increase of over 250,000 ounces on 1894, and of about 800,000 ounces on the output for 1893. In the article referred to, the writer quotes figures to show that the Witwatersrand Gold Field yields to the world over 25 per cent. of its gold supply, although it was only

in the month of May 1887 that the first output was registered. Besides the Rand mines there are many others in the Transvaal, and the value of the total yield from the gold mines of the State during last year was probably not less than £30,000,000.

The Transvaal is, without doubt, the richest gold-producing country in the world, and its fame as such and the fortunes that have been made there, have not unnaturally attracted thither all sorts and conditions of men and women from all parts of the world, mad to acquire wealth by some means or other, and perhaps not over particular as to the means. As a consequence of this invasion from without, the population of Johannesburg has been increasing in numbers in a marvellous manner. The inhabitants are, as might be expected, not exactly the pick of Christendom, and even many of the men at the top of the tree are hardly the class that would be admitted into any respectable West End Club. It is a mixed—terribly mixed, however, regarded—mass, that inhabits the golden city, and, though these people have brought wealth to the Transvaal by developing its mineral resources, it must be remembered that they have acquired wealth in the process. It must also not be forgotten that they came to the Transvaal of their own free will and cognisant of its laws, the disabilities imposed on aliens by the Transvaal Constitution, and the dislike of the Boers to have their pastoral life infringed on by a crowd of hungry financiers, ready to trample down everything and everybody in their mad pursuit of gold.

The public have heard a considerable amount during the past few months, and are doubtless fated to hear a good deal more for some time to come, respecting the grievances of the Uitlanders. Knowing what I do of the motley community embraced in the latter appellation, I cannot help feeling some little surprise and a considerable amount of disgust at the manner in which the somewhat credulous British public have been "misled" in regard to the Uitlanders and their "grievances." People here at home, or at any rate a large number of them, I verily believe, imagine that the Uitlanders are a highly-respectable, law-abiding English community resident in the Transvaal, who have been ground down under the heel of President Kruger and his myrmidons, denied liberty of speech, liberty of the press, and every other liberty and privilege, save and except the liberty to exist and toil and moil week after week, and heap up riches for Kruger and his Boer *confrères*.

Of course, such a conception as this is simply pure burlesque. In no country in the world are aliens admitted to the full right of citizenship without having previously given some indications of their intention to become peaceful and loyal subjects of the land in which they may have settled. Why should the Transvaal be any exception to the generally received law of other nations? What the Uitlanders have all along not asked, but, in fact, demanded with menaces, has, in effect, been that they, *qua* aliens, should have all the rights and privileges of citizenship without any of its

burdens. All this sound and fury in the Press about the franchise, taxation without representation, the education laws of the Transvaal, and so on, has been largely, if not altogether, a spurious agitation. What the Uitlanders have all along desired, and what they still hope to achieve, is to get the Rand to themselves, not from patriotic or in any degree pure motives, but simply and solely from a hankering after filthy lucre, and a desire to acquire wealth even more rapidly than has been the case up to the present.

But even supposing that the grievances of the Uitlanders were substantial, it was evidently their duty to trust to the good offices of President Kruger to get the Volksraad to consider and redress them. Men who, of their own free will, repair to and settle in a foreign country, must take the laws of that country as they find them, and cannot reasonably expect to have those laws altered at their behest, simply because they may in some respect or other find them irksome, or, where not irksome, merely because they dislike them.

I might very well leave this part of the question here, but as I fear that a considerable number of people in this country still entertain the idea that President Kruger is as a ruler far more autocratic than the Czar, and that liberty of speech and liberty of the Press are totally unknown within the confines of the South African Republic, I think it best to touch on these few matters before concluding this chapter. As regards liberty of speech, anyone who

has read even a very brief *resumé* of the speeches at meetings of the National Reform Union held in Johannesburg, will hardly conclude that there is any restriction in this respect within the Transvaal. I think I am safe in saying that in no European country, Great Britain not excepted, would such language in respect of the rulers of the country, as was indulged in by speakers at these meetings, have been allowed to pass unnoticed. One can hardly imagine a National Reform Union of French subjects, resident in Berlin, assembling together in public meeting and denouncing the German Emperor and his Government in language similar to that employed by some of the gentlemen I allude to in regard to President Kruger and his Government. The speeches of these persons were nothing but sedition from beginning to end; and though President Kruger, in the light of recent events no doubt, acted properly in treating the speeches and the speakers with the contempt they deserve, nevertheless, the fact that he did so treat them in this manner can hardly be put forward in support of the contention that his disposition is aggressively autocratic, and that liberty of speech is an unknown commodity within the South African Republic.

In respect of the liberty of the Press, the charges which have been levelled against President Kruger in newspapers are still more outrageous. A paper, termed *The Johannesburg Critic*, has from time to time inserted in its columns what are termed "open letters." A number of these letters have

been republished in volume form in this country under the title of *Open Letters to Celebrities and Others connected with South Africa*. The title hardly appears to me to be an apt one considering that one of the personages addressed in this volume is Father Christmas, whom the writer terms "Reverend and Hoary Sir," but let that pass. I only refer to this volume in order that my readers, if they think fit, may verify the one or two quotations I am about to take therefrom. Now, I am no believer in what are termed "personalities" in journalism. I am quite aware of the fact, and I very much deplore it, that the Press of late years has shown a fondness for this vulgar and degrading form of "literature." Nevertheless, this personal kind of writing may be well done or it may be very badly done, and on the whole, I have no hesitation in saying that the letters in question are throughout models of how it is possible for a man who has but a feeble grasp of it to maul the English language. But though feeble, badly written, these letters are interesting, inasmuch as they show clearly enough that the allegation made against the Transvaal Government, that it restricts the liberty of the Press is not quite correct. In the volume to which I have alluded there is a letter addressed to President Kruger. Here is the manner in which the editor of a paper published in the Transvaal, in which country we are asked to believe the Press is muzzled and hampered and

not permitted to write fully and freely in regard to men and things, refers to the head of the State :—

“SIR,—I know you believe in God. So, in His Holy Name, I will address you. Turn over the pages of your Bible and read where you will at random and tell me if you can find one single passage in which the oppressor has not fallen sooner or later under the wrath Divine. Saul stood head and shoulders above his fellows, and yet he fell on his own sword at last. Ahab coveted his neighbour's vineyard, and the dogs licked his blood at the pool of Samaria. Pharaoh persecuted the children of Israel, and he and his host perished in the Red Sea. One more (?) text and I have finished. Remember this, ‘Whoso abaseth himself shall be exalted, and whoso exalteth himself shall be abased.’

“You have raised your horn aloft, and have pushed and thrust with it hither and thither as it pleased you, and have said to yourself, ‘Who shall withstand the power of my might?’ Sir, you have been tried in the balance and found wanting. All the good gifts of God, all His infinite mercies have been showered on you in vain, and while you dream of enlarging your barns, and possessing yourself in ease and fatness, your soul has already been demanded of you.

“There is no need for me at the present moment to recapitulate how you abuse the trust which has been placed in your hands, how you have

broken promise after promise, how you have permitted a venal and hireling crew to fatten on the industry by which your land has prospered, how you have not only set your face against the reasonable demands of those who have made you what you are, but how you have turned your face away from the poor and the destitute, and with an overflowing treasury, insisted upon heaping up dues on the very necessities of life, which your own sluggish and unprogressive burghers have refused to supply.

"More still; you have attempted to turn a free Republic into an autocratic oligarchy. You have done all that in you lay to bring the natural representation of the people into a court of appeal, of which you were to be the final judge. You have endeavoured to reduce the bench of justice into a mere puppet of your own arbitrary will. You have dreamt of a power by the side of which the most absolute rule in the whole world would appear to be a liberal and popular Government."

And so on, and so on. In the book from which I have quoted, every leading official of the Transvaal Government is vilified and vituperated in language even more violent and malignant than that applied to President Kruger. I must apologise to my readers for inflicting on them such a long extract from this book. I only do it to show that in the Transvaal Republic the Press has not only liberty but licence. One would very much like to

know what is this writer's conception of an "autocratic oligarchy," and one would also very much like to know what would have been this writer's fate if he had indited and published under an "autocratic oligarchy" such observations as those which he has addressed to the President and State Officials of the country under whose protection he was living and whose asylum he has so outraged.

CHAPTER VIII

JAMESON'S RAID: THE STORY OF A TRAGIC FIASCO

ON the 26th December 1895, the National Reform Union at Johannesburg issued a manifesto to the people of the Transvaal, detailing the reforms demanded by the Uitlanders. These reforms were as follows:—

1. The establishment of the Republic as a true republic under a constitution approved of by the whole nation.
2. An amicable franchise and fair representation.
3. The equality of the Dutch and English languages.
4. The responsibility to the legislature of the heads of the great departments.
5. The removal of religious disabilities.
6. The establishment of independent courts of justice, with adequate pay for the judges to be properly secured.
7. Liberal education.
8. An efficient civil service, with adequate pay and pension system.
9. Free trade in African products.

The manifesto concluded with these ominous words :
" We shall expect an answer in plain terms, according to your deliberate judgment, at the meeting to be held on January 6th."

On the 29th December, or just three days after the date of this manifesto, Mr Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, despatched to Sir Hercules Robinson, Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, the following extraordinary cablegram :—
"Strictly confidential. It has been suggested, although I do not think it probable, that an endeavour might be made to force matters at Johannesburg to a head by some one in the service of the Company advancing from Bechuanaland Protectorate with police. Were this to be done, I should have to take action under Articles 22 and 8 of the Charter. Therefore, if necessary, but not otherwise, remind Rhodes of these Articles, and intimate to him that, in your opinion, he would not have my support, and point out the consequences which would follow." The following day, December 30th, the High Commissioner cabled to Mr Chamberlain as follows :—
"I learn on good authority movement at Johannesburg has collapsed. Internal divisions have led to the complete collapse of the movement, and leaders of the National Union will now probably make the best terms they can with President Kruger." The same afternoon, the Secretary for the Colonies cabled to Sir Hercules Robinson :—"Your telegram received. Are you sure Jameson has not moved in consequence of collapse? See my telegram of yesterday." A

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quarter of an hour subsequent to forwarding this cablegram, Mr Chamberlain received the following one from the High Commissioner:—"Information reached me this morning that Dr Jameson was preparing to start yesterday evening for Johannesburg with a force of police. I telegraphed at once as follows:— 'To the Resident Commissioner in the Bechuanaland Protection. There is a rumour here that Dr Jameson has entered the Transvaal with an armed force. Is this correct? If it is, send a special messenger on a fast horse directing him to return at once. A copy of this telegram shall be sent to the officers with him, and they shall be told Her Majesty's Government repudiate this violation of the territory of a friendly State, and that they are rendering themselves liable to severe penalties." If I hear from Newton that the police have entered the Transvaal, shall I inform President Kruger that Her Majesty's Government repudiate Jameson's action?" A little later on the same day, the Colonial Secretary received the following cablegraphic despatch from Sir Hercules Robinson:—"I have received the following from the British Agency in the South African Republic:—' 30th December. Very urgent. President of South African Republic sent for me, and the General then read to us a telegram from Landdrost of Zeerust, that a number of British troops have entered the Transvaal Republic from Mafeking and cut the wire, and are now on the march to Johannesburg. I assured the President that I could not believe the force consisted of British troops. The General

then said they may be Mashonaland or Bechuanaland police, but he believes the information that a force had entered the State, and he said he would take immediate steps to stop their progress. His Honour requested me to ask Your Excellency whether this force is composed of British troops or police under Your Excellency's control, or whether you have any information of the movement?' I replied that I had heard a rumour to the same effect, and have telegraphed to inquire, adding that, if true, the step has been taken without my authority or cognisance, and that I have repudiated the act and ordered the force to return immediately." The same night Mr Chamberlain cabled to the High Commissioner as follows:—"In reply to your telegrams relative to the situation in South African Republic, your action is cordially approved. I presume that Mr C. J. Rhodes will co-operate with you in recalling Administrator of Matabeleland. Keep me informed fully of political situation in all its respects. It is not clearly understood here. Leave no stone unturned to prevent mischief." The following morning, Tuesday, December 31st, Sir Hercules Robinson cabled, that in consequence of an urgent telegram from the British Agent in the Transvaal, he had instructed the Agent to send at once a thoroughly trustworthy mounted express with the following message to Dr Jameson who was to be met on the road:—"Her Majesty's Government entirely disapprove your conduct in invading Transvaal with armed force. Your action has been repudiated. You are ordered to return at once from the country, and

will be held personally responsible for the consequences of your unauthorised and most improper proceeding."

And now to revert to Dr Jameson and his proceedings. On Sunday, December 29th, the late Administrator of the Chartered Company's territory, in company with Sir John Willoughby, the Commandant of the Chartered Company's forces, started from Mafeking with a force, whose numbers have been variously stated at from 400 to 600 men, besides eight Maxim and three Whitworth guns. The party cut the telegraph wires, and in crossing the Transvaal frontier they were met by an official of the Republic who advised them to retire, and warned them of the consequences of their act. To this caution Dr Jameson replied in writing, as follows:—

"SIR,—I am in receipt of your protest of above date, and have to inform you that I intend proceeding with my original plan, which had no hostile intentions against the people of the Transvaal, but we are here in reply to an invitation from the principal residents of the Rand to assist them in their demand for justice and the ordinary rights of every citizen of a civilised State."

The messengers despatched with the order of recall overtook Jameson close to the Elan River, and received a verbal message that the orders had been received and would be "attended to."

President Kruger had no intention whatever

of allowing this party to make a triumphal entry into Johannesburg, and the burghers who had been commandeered, on the first news of Jameson's party having crossed the frontier, intercepted him at Krugersdorp, some fifteen miles from Johannesburg. Here the fighting commenced at one a.m. on New Year's Day. On the approach of Jameson to Krugersdorp, he gave notice to the women and children to leave the town, as he was going to take it. He was, however, a little bit premature. The road to Krugersdorp lay directly between two kopjes, and these were both strongly held by the Boers, who led him towards them by those tactics which have been always employed with so much success in Kaffir warfare. Small bodies kept retreating before him and gradually brought him to their first main position. Finding the fire too hot for him there, he could only throw some shells into the town or the court house, and then took the other road through Randfontein, by Brink's farmhouse at Dornkop. At Randfontein two troopers were killed, but again the Boers reserved their full attack. Beyond Dornkop, they commanded the road strongly on two sides, and as the night closed in, Jameson seems to have had them all round him. He was on a small kopje and some ground stretching beneath, but the enemy were overlooking him from four sides.

It seems that on Wednesday afternoon (January 1) the Boers had not more than 1500 men on the field, but during the night the different contingents coming in brought their numbers up to some 4000 men, all



DR JAMESON.

LONDON STERROSCOPIC COV., 54 CHEAPSIDE, E.C.

[age 82.]

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mounted and armed with Martini-Henry rifles. Their ammunition, which had run short during the attack on Krugersdorp, had been augmented by special trains running out from Johannesburg. The line between Langlaate and Krugersdorp was blown up in one place but not until after the supplies had been sent, so that the defence committee only succeeded in angering the Boers without doing the smallest good to Jameson. Through the night the English shelled the Boer's position, and tried to find them by aid of the electric light, but all in vain. Hidden behind the boulders and sheltered by the rising ground, they were perfectly protected. In the morning the Chartered Company's men were caught in a trap, from which the only escape was to break through the line of Boer marksman. Under Major Coventry, a gallant charge was made up to the kopjes, but the horses were shot under them, and the men had to creep to the reeds for protection.

After four hours' fighting, at about nine a.m., it became apparent that everything was lost, and Jameson hoisted the white flag.

It has been stated, since Jameson's arrival in England, that the white flag was hoisted not because further fighting was seen to be hopeless, but owing to the fact that the command of Her Majesty's Government for Jameson to retire was not received till the battle of Krugersdorp was drawing to a close.

The Boers did not at once respond, but the doctor's men piled their arms in the centre of a square and

formed up. What caused the delay does not seem certain, but it is understood that the Boers sent back for further orders. Then they came down with a sort of rush, and took the whole force prisoners, and with them all the arms and ammunition. The wounded men were placed in Brink's farmhouse, which was converted into a sort of hospital, whilst the prisoners were marched into Krugersdorp. Many were so exhausted that they could hardly sit on their horses, and they seem to have been treated with every consideration. As soon as food could be obtained, it was given them, and so famished were they that they were fainting for the want of it. In the hospital, Boers and English were lying together, and were soon tended by sisters of mercy and ministers of religion, as at Krugersdorp the people had been watching and reporting the fight with eager anxiety. Several mine managers saw it all through, and as soon as the Boers had moved off, went out with parties of Kaffirs to bury the dead. Many horses lay about the field, as the Boers aimed particularly at them. Judging from the numbers of killed and wounded, the shooting does not appear to have been particularly good on either side; but, undoubtedly, the Boers were far superior in this matter to the Company's men. Rumour had long asserted that these farmers had lost their skill in shooting, now that there is so little big game about the country. The event seems to show that, though they may not be as expert as their forefathers, they were far superior

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to British soldiers, even when trained and practised so continuously as the Bechuanaland police.

I am, I may remark, indebted for the greater portion of this narrative of the fight to the excellent account of the same sent by the special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in Johannesburg.

There can be no doubt whatever that Jameson, when he crossed the border, not only under-rated the enormous difficulties of the task before him, but was woefully in error as to the action of the Uitlanders of Johannesburg. So far as can be ascertained, Jameson's force had started from Mafeking with only three biscuits and one tin of "gully," or Chicago tinned beef, per man. The supplies which ought to have met them from Johannesburg, with 250 horses, 100 mules and four waggons, fell into the hands of the Boers at Riet Spruit, near Krugersdorp, after the fight was all over. The doctor's intention was, it is said, to take Krugersdorp, and use the railway line as a means of getting at Johannesburg. Undoubtedly he expected to meet there a reinforcement of at least 2000 mounted men from Johannesburg, with the supplies above mentioned. All he did, in fact, receive was a message from the Defence Committee, saying that they had concluded an armistice with the President until the High Commissioner had been up to Pretoria, and that, therefore, they could render him no assistance. With a gesture of disgust Jameson tore up the paper, and said, "I have done with Johannesburg." Here, too, was given him the proclamation of the High Commissioner, calling upon

the British subjects to disarm, and bidding every loyal subject refuse aid or countenance. His plight was, indeed, desperate from that moment. What had been done by the Johannesburg Committee is incomprehensible on any supposition, save that at the last moment they "funked" a fight. Without doubt they had given Jameson an invitation, and then knowing he was out on the veld with his force, they concluded an armistice, which made his fate a certainty.

The deputation to Pretoria consisted of Messrs L. Phillips, Max Langermann, Abe Bailey and another, and they met the special commission of the Transvaal Government, consisting of the President, the Chief Justice and some more. They claimed on their return to have received a favourable reply on the different points of their manifesto, but the only actual arrangement was for a suspension of hostile movements for some days, and a promise that, except in case of riot, the burghers would not enter Johannesburg.

The Boers brought their prisoners to Pretoria. The feeling against them ran high among the simple farmers of the Transvaal, who were naturally annoyed at the wanton aggression of their territory and at being called away from their farms to defend it. It is certain that, had it not been for the restraining influence of the commandant, Jameson would assuredly have been shot in the public square of Pretoria. Immediately after the news of the engagement had reached England, Mr Chamberlain

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cabled to President Kruger asking him to deal with the prisoners generously, and to show magnanimity in the hour of victory. To this the President replied on January 4th, that the case of the prisoners would be decided strictly according to the traditions of the Republic, and that there would be no punishment which was not in accordance with the law. The case of Dr Jameson and his associates was referred to the judges of the High Court of the South African Republic, who sentenced Dr Jameson and his officers to be shot. The President, however, declined to sign the warrant necessary to carry this sentence into effect, and decided instead to hand the prisoners over to Her Majesty's Government on the Natal frontier as soon as Johannesburg had been disarmed. Everyone is aware of the Queen's message to the President, recognising his clemency and magnanimity. The whole civilised world has been at one with Her Majesty in so thinking. The President of the South African Republic, instead of appearing as the haughty, aggressive, overbearing, merciless autocratic individual, that he has been depicted in certain quarters, has proved himself to be a man singularly merciful and conciliatory.

No impartial man can help admitting that President Kruger's conduct generally, when flushed with victory and when invaders and Uitlanders were within his power, has been magnificent, magnanimous, merciful and moderate to a degree. The Uitlanders have, till they sold Jameson by behaving like poltroons, received far more sympathy than they

deserve. Let us not forget that the Boers have rights also, and that their rights should not be trampled under foot, simply because Johannesburg is overrun with an alien population gathered from the four corners of the earth, a population, too, which, after indulging in bluster and braggadocio and uttering threats and menaces to the head of the State under whose protection it was living, showed clearly enough when the time came for it to act, that it had no stomach for the fight.

CHAPTER IX

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I DO not envy the historian of the future who has to deal with the Transvaal question in all its ramifications, and endeavours to do so impartially and truthfully. There have probably been more barefaced and malignant falsehoods told, either by word of mouth or in the Press, in regard to the momentous occurrences of the last three months in South Africa than in respect of any similar events in the world's history. The attempt to sift the wheat from the chaff in the mass of material at one's disposal, is a delicate and difficult, I might almost say an insuperable, one, but I have made the attempt carefully and conscientiously, and I believe that this book is the first unbiassed endeavour to deal with men and matters in the South African Republic wholly and solely in the interest of truth and justice. I can at least honestly say that I have no axes to grind, no ulterior objects in view in inditing and publishing this work. My sole object is the quest for truth, and with that

end in view, I care nothing for the feelings of individuals. /

With these few preliminary remarks, I shall now return to the various and varied circumstances connected with Dr Jameson's raid. In the last chapter I traced events down to the defeat and surrender of the Chartered Company's forces to the Boers at Krugersdorp. Let us now see what was happening at Johannesburg all this time. Let us discover what the pot-valiant warriors of the Rand, who had talked so loftily and threatened so constantly and continuously, were doing when the invasion that they had invited actually came about. These men of blood and thunder had set fire to the powder magazine, and so frightened were they at the smoke and noise that they, metaphorically of course, scampered off in sheer confusion. So far as I can ascertain, the news of Jameson's raid reached Johannesburg on Monday, December the 30th. The naughty children of the Rand, who had only after all been playing with fire, were terribly alarmed. That same day President Kruger issued a proclamation calling on all burghers to defend the country. The following day brought a proclamation from the High Commissioner directing all British subjects to disarm. In reply to this proclamation, the Johannesburg warriors telegraphed to Sir Hercules Robinson that they had absolute information that a large force of Boers had been commandeered to Johannesburg, with directions to shoot down all concerned in the agitation, and the High Commis-

sioner was, accordingly, called upon to use his intervention to protect the lives of these financial firebrands. It seems now that the source of the "news" wired to the High Commissioner was the prolific imagination of the Johannesburgers, who were in that state of abject funk when a man gets frightened at his own shadow and alarmed at the sound of his own footsteps. While Jameson was waiting for the Johannesburgers, the Johannesburgers were, to use a vulgar expression, trying to save their own bacon. They, accordingly, decided to do nothing in regard to Jameson, and an armistice was concluded, the Johannesburgers making abundant safeguards for their own preservation, but insisting on no stipulations whatever in regard to the safety of Jameson and his party. On the 5th January an ultimatum was presented by the Boer Government to the Johannesburgers, demanding the surrender of their arms as a condition precedent to the discussion and consideration of grievances. In order to effect this, the British agent, Sir Jacobus De Wet, was sent with despatches by the High Commissioner from Pretoria with a message which he conveyed in the following words:—

"Men of Johannesburg, friends, and fellow-subjects of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen" (which was cheered to the echo), "I regret I am before you under such painful circumstances." He then went on to say that he sympathised with the grievances Johannesburg complained of, but circumstances had

so changed that he had to ask them to do a thing which would perhaps pain many a heart, but he begged them as men to use their judgment, and not to allow their English blood, English courage and English valour to override their judgment. Every human being unbiassed in mind believed in pluck, perseverance and determination in Englishmen. (Loud cheers.) He had to announce that Jameson and his brave fellows — misguided, but brave — (tremendous cheering)—were prisoners. A terrible mistake was undoubtedly made by someone, which had placed them in a most awkward and painful position, and he rejoiced to announce that Jameson and his men were to be honourably handed over to Her Majesty's Government—(loud cheers)—and to be dealt with according to the laws of Great Britain, but one condition was that the men of Johannesburg should lay down their arms. ("We will not," and prolonged groans.) As their friend and loyal subject and servant of the Queen, from the time of his manhood to the present moment, he appealed to them as Britons not to act idiotically, not to refuse to give up their arms. (Cries of "Who to?") To-day was not the time to let feelings of enthusiasm carry them away. It was the time to be guided by judgment and counsel, and to let these prevail over national sentiment. He was expressing the wishes of the High Commissioner, who at his request allowed him to come, and, if possible, avert bloodshed. He appealed to the men of Johannesburg to set aside the national feelings by which they

were fired. They might fight bravely like lions, but he would tell them it was utterly impossible for the men in Johannesburg to hold their position. (Dissent.) If they fought, with all their pluck and determination, they would have to die. (Cries of "Never.") If they did not care for their own lives, as men with brave hearts did not, let them consider women and children — (cheers) — and many other innocent people who had had nothing to do with the movement. Let them consider the position of this town, which might be in ashes if Johannesburg persevered in the present course. He put it, could they by all their pluck and bravery hold this place? They would be starved out, they would perish from famine and thirst. He was in sympathy with the men of Johannesburg, but begged and besought them as a fellow - subject, and as representative of the Queen on behalf of the High Commissioner, to consider their position. They were not surrendering through cowardice. There was no disgrace in that. (Cries of "What are the conditions?") Well the Government of the Transvaal was disposed to be lenient.

The disarmament proceeded somewhat tardily owing to the, as it now appears, false statements made by the National Reform Committee in regard to the number of rifles at their disposal. These gentlemen had in boasting language declared they had 30,000 rifles available, and the Boers naturally wanted these 30,000. When the time for disarmament came, it

seems there were only 3000 rifles, and as the Boer people were unable to conclude which statement of the Johannesburgers was true and which was false, they set about searching offices and mines for those 30,000 rifles which existed only in the perfervid imagination of the National Reform Committee. The falsehoods of the Committee were not, however, confined to this question of arms. In respect to Jameson they appear to have, from the very first, deliberately given false information to their dupes. Even after his force had been defeated and made prisoners, various members of the Reform Committee assured the dupes, who, with singular credulity believed in them, that the doctor was safe at Laanglaagte, that he would be in Johannesburg shortly, and so on, etc. When the truth as to Jameson's defeat and capture did leak out, it is hardly to be wondered at that the Johannesburg populace, who were not financiers and, therefore, had not that peculiarly constructed organ which, for want of a better appellation, I may term the financial conscience, were exceeding wroth, and mobbed the offices and houses of the members of the National Reform Committee.

I cannot help pitying these magnates of the Rand, to whom, in their greed for gold, all these terrible troubles have been solely due.

Before I leave this matter of the warlike Johannesburgers, I should like to refer to the graphic account given by the special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* in regard to the composition of the "force" with which, if we can believe them, the financiers

of Johannesburg proposed to overthrow the Boer Government and establish a plutocratic Republic. In Government Square at Johannesburg and the other open places in the centre of the town were, remarked the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, being drilled the most extraordinary motley and mongrel force ever set eyes on.

"To distinguish one corps from another different ribbons were worn round the arms, and of these showy adornments the wearers seemed inordinately proud. From the variety of colours, their nationalities must have been as numerous as the peoples of the globe; but in the squads and companies I saw they were curiously and quaintly intermingled. Clerks and shops assistants made up the majority, and they were occupied in the elementary lessons of military drill. 'Form fours,' 'Open order,' and so forth were the words of command given. Very few had rifles, and those who had seized and handled their arms in a way that made one careful to give them a wide berth. Flourished about like a walking-stick, a Lee-Metford is a dangerous weapon. All this would have been very amusing on Drury Lane stage, but it had a ghastly side to it when you knew that Jameson was fighting hard within twenty miles and the whole country up in arms. What I thought was of the awful responsibility that rested on the heads of the men who were taking these 'recruits' out as food for Boer powder. Another funny side to it was the way in which smartly-dressed ladies were driving about armed with mysterious passwords to go

through the lines of outposts. Inside the town it was a gigantic burlesque."

This would, indeed, all have been very laughable were it not so serious. But what could be expected of such a motley and hybrid community as is that of Johannesburg, a community, the weak points of which, I may remark, has been happily and effectively satirised in an article, entitled "Johannesburg the Golden," which appeared in a recent number of *Temple Bar*? What can be more pungent, more truthful or more vivid than the following remarks in regard to Johannesburg "Society"? — The *elite*, the mine owners, and original possessors of land—all millionaires many times over—taking them collectively, hardly display those qualities which "stamp the rank of Vere de Vere." The women are vulgar and illiterate, with dyed hair and artificial complexions; they wear outrageously loud toilettes, and are plastered with diamonds at all hours. Most of them are former members of theatrical touring companies, barmaids or shopgirls, and they are to be seen all day long driving about the streets in their gorgeous carriages. The men are principally of the pronounced Hebrew type, loud in manners and dress, ostentatiously drinking champagne at a pound a bottle, at all hours of the day, and causing the beholder to reflect upon the quotation from the "Lady Slavey": "Can I not do as I like? Am I not a millionaire?"

But *revenons à nos moutons*. After various discussions between the High Commissioner and President Kruger, in which the latter evinced that grand

magnanimity of character which has shone out before the whole world, the President of the Transvaal Republic voluntarily handed over to the representative of Her Majesty every one of the men who had invaded his country. It is interesting to relate that before these prisoners were released, they drew up a memorial to President Kruger, thanking the Government and the officials with whom they had been brought in contact during their incarceration, for the great kindness shown to them throughout. And here I must leave this matter.

CHAPTER X

GERMANY, PORTUGAL AND GREAT BRITAIN

DURING the first ten days of January 1896, the great level-headed British public lashed itself into a wild state of fury over a not very important, but perhaps somewhat indiscreet, cablegram despatched by the German Emperor to President Kruger. Now, I have neither the time nor the inclination to enter into any recondite dissertation in respect of the high German and low German branches of the great Teutonic family. Nor shall I, as some rather pedantic newspapers in this country have done, attempt to prove that the Transvaal Boers, in respect of racial descent, have more affinity to the English than with the German. A discussion of a matter of this kind, however interesting to the ethnologist, is not of very great practical importance. Rightly or wrongly, Germany has for some time past evinced a profound interest in the Transvaal, in which, it must be remembered, there is a very

large German community. We can see this plainly by reference to the official White Book relating to the affairs of the South African Republic, which was published at Berlin on February 12th. The very first despatch in this book from the German Foreign Secretary to the German Ambassador in London is dated more than a year ago. In this despatch the Foreign Secretary states that the beginning and end of German policy, with respect to the Transvaal, is the protection of the material interests of Germany, which require the maintenance of the Transvaal as an independent State in the measure of the Treaty of 1884, and the upholding of the *status quo* guarding the railways and the harbour of Delagoa Bay. Dr Jameson's idea that Rhodesia would become the commercial union amalgamation or federation of all South African States was fated to be antagonistic to German interests. On 30th December 1895 a telegram was sent from Berlin to the German Consul at Pretoria, instructing him to impress strongly upon the Government of the Republic that all provocation must be most rigorously avoided if the good will of Germany was to be preserved. The very same day the German residents at Pretoria forwarded a telegram to the Emperor William imploring his immediate intervention to avert impending misery and bloodshed. On 31st December, the Foreign Secretary in Berlin despatched a cablegram to the German Consul in Pretoria, which might undoubtedly have been attended with momentous consequences. It informed him that in case of emergency, but then

only after consulting President Kruger, and for the sole purpose of protecting the Consulate and the lives and property of German subjects, he should requisition the services of a landing party from the cruiser *Seeadler*, to be employed so long as the disturbances continued.

At the same time the German Minister at Lisbon was directed to acquaint the Portuguese Government that Germany, in resorting to this measure, which was intended to serve only humane purposes, counted the more confidently upon the assent of the Portuguese Government, inasmuch as she had no other way open to her of seeing to the protection of her threatened subjects. The detachment from the cruiser which it was proposed to land would not exceed fifty men at the most, and this was a proof that its object was purely protective.

On 1st January 1896, Count Hatzfeldt telegraphed that his impression was that the Jameson Expedition, which His Excellency alludes to as "the proceedings of the Chartered Company," was in every respect distasteful to the British Government. On the same day the German Consul announced from Pretoria that the danger was over for Germans.

According to another despatch from London, Lord Salisbury, on January 3d, expressed the hope to Count Hatzfeldt that the Transvaal Question might be regarded as ended.

The last despatch in the White Book is a telegram from Baron Marschall to Count Hatzfeldt, dated January 6th, in which the German Foreign Secretary

observes, in reference to some remarks which had been made to him by Sir F. Lascelles, the British Ambassador, that he feels it necessary to protest against the view taken in the English Press that the telegram of the Emperor to President Kruger was an act of hostility to Great Britain or embodied an encroachment upon British rights.

Now, I frankly admit that the German Emperor's cablegram to President Kruger, as well as the one to the German Consul at Pretoria, to which I have referred, were in many respects indiscreet communications. But we must not, if we are to arrive at a right judgment in this matter, disguise from ourselves the fact that the Convention of London, which I have deemed necessary to include *in extenso* in this book, if carefully read and considered in an impartial spirit, most certainly and to all intents abrogated the Suzerainty of Great Britain over the Transvaal, which was expressly and implicitly defined and declared in the Pretoria Convention of 1881, but was neither implicitly nor yet inferentially set forth in the London Convention of 1884. In fact, when the latter Convention is dispassionately dissected, it will, I contend, be found that not only was the Suzerainty of this country over the Transvaal not therein asserted, but moreover that everything in the Convention leads one to believe that such Suzerainty was at that time permitted to lapse. In regard to the much discussed Article of the 1884 Convention, respecting the treaty-making powers of the South African

Republic, if people would only read the Article in question instead of deriving their opinions from the newspapers, they would see that the Transvaal is not precluded from entering into Treaties with any foreign State. ARTICLE IV. clearly states that the South African Republic will *conclude* no treaty with a foreign Power until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen. The Article then goes on to say that such approval shall have been considered to have been granted, if Her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving the copy of such treaty, have notified that the *conclusion* is in conflict with the interests of this country. Now mark, that this is the only Article in the whole of the Convention of 1884 upon which the claim to exercise Suzerainty is now put forth. And mark also that there is nothing whatever in this clause to justify the assertion I have over and over again seen repeated in the Press, that the Transvaal cannot hold any direct relations or directly negotiate with a foreign State. The words of the Article, if words convey any meaning whatever, are clear and distinct. They, in effect, are that the South African Republic may enter into treaty arrangements with foreign Powers, but that such treaties shall be inoperative, and shall not be deemed to have been concluded until a period of six months after the receipt of such treaty by Her Majesty's Government shall have elapsed when, if no disapproval has been expressed, such treaty shall automatically become valid. A flimsy basis this

upon which to base a claim of Suzerainty, in all conscience. In truth, we never heard of this Suzerainty until the action of the German Emperor and his Government forced Mr Chamberlain into taking up the rôle of a Jingo. Now, as I have said, I think the action of the German Emperor and the German Government was indiscreet, but at the same time the manner in which the British public lost their heads over such indiscretion was a trifle too ludicrous. For the matter of that President Kruger had no more desire for German than he has for English interference in the affairs of his State, and he would most certainly and most justifiably resent one equally with the other. A certain section of the public here at home seems, by some process of mental reasoning or mental obfuscation, to have arrived at the conclusion that President Kruger was waiting with open arms to welcome a German force, and ready to place his country under German protection. Of course all this was the merest chimera. A German Protectorate over the Transvaal or a predominant German influence in South Africa could never, even by the wildest stretch of imagination, come to be considered a question of practical policy.

Out of evil, however, proverbially cometh good, and the proposal of the German Government to despatch a small armed force to Pretoria, incidentally gave occasion for the ancient ally of England, gallant little Portugal, to demonstrate her friendship for this country, and her determination to preserve at any cost the inviolability of her territory. To the

German request for permission to land this force at Delagoa Bay and send it through Portuguese territory to Pretoria, the Lisbon Government returned a distinct and dignified refusal. The action of the Portuguese in this matter seems to me to have escaped in this country the generous recognition it deserved. Portugal does not now claim the position of a first-class power, but the world owes her a debt of gratitude for the achievements of her glorious sons in the past, and the names and fame of the intrepid Portuguese navigators, and the great Portuguese soldiers of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, will endure to the end of time. At the present moment, Portugal owns a huge slice of Africa, a great portion of which it has proved utterly impossible for her to develop, but I think a meed of praise ought to be given to her for the good work she has done at Delagoa Bay and in the development generally of the Port of Beira.

It was to me inexpressibly sad to witness the terrible outburst of bluster and braggadocio, worthy indeed of the Johannesburg financiers, but unworthy of a great nation like England, which so largely affected the usually stolid, staid and sedate people of this country in January 1896. They have now had time to reflect, and I sincerely hope they see what fools they made of themselves. England has nothing to fear from Germany, or from any other power or combination of powers, so long as she pursues the even tenour of her way, trusting not only in her enormous strength actual and latent,

and in her vast and illimitable resources, but trusting also in the purity of her motives, the uprightness of her actions and the conviction among the nations of the earth, that she will do right and act justly at any cost and at any sacrifice.

CHAPTER XI

THE FEELING IN ENGLAND

WHY the people of this country are so easily influenced by expressions of opinion in the newspapers, is a question that I have never been able to satisfactorily answer. The ordinary Englishman who goes to his business in the morning and who reads his favourite newspaper on the way, for the rest of the day, if he thinks at all upon current events, thinks only after the manner of the leading articles he has been reading in the morning and adopts as his own particular opinions the opinions therein expressed. This is undoubtedly a time-saving process, but it is hardly an intellectual feat, nor does it seem to me to be either a satisfactory or a fair way of arriving at correct conclusions upon vexed problems. The ordinary newspaper man, be he editor, leader-writer or what not—and I have known many of them—is not a bit more intellectual, or in the slightest degree more fitted to express an opinion upon any subject, than the ordinary man in the street. If the newspaper man

were to ventilate his opinions in the first or third-class carriage, as the case may be, in which he rides to or from his office, he would most probably be put down by his auditors as either a blatant humbug or a bore, and nobody would pay the slightest attention to him. But when he sits down in the editorial chair or mounts upon the sub-editorial stool, and indites his opinions upon all and sundry matters, regarding most of which he usually knows nothing, substituting the pronoun "we" for the pronoun "I," and when these opinions are printed on paper, the public—that foolish, credulous, idiotic public—imagines it is listening to the voice of an oracle when, instead, it is often only reading the scribblings of the hack journalist, and actually adopts and ratifies and takes as its very own the opinions of this very ordinary, sometimes a penny, sometimes twopence, a liner. Now, when the various occurrences in the South African Republic came about at the end of December and beginning of January last, the newspaper editor and writers of this country, with a few exceptions, went in for sheer and unadulterated and exceptionally wicked Jingoism. I suppose the people who owned and controlled these various journals thought there was money in pandering to this Jingo feeling, and, accordingly, they set about the process with very much the same objects in view as had the Johannesburg financiers in organising an agitation against the Government of the South African Republic. Accordingly, the wildest rumours, the most improbable and impossible stories, legends puerile and fantastic, were for many days

published broadcast by the newspapers of the United Kingdom. One evening journal in London gravely informed its readers that it had received from a most trustworthy source intelligence of a reliable nature that Dr Jameson had defeated the Boers, reached Johannesburg and set up a provisional government. I mention this rumour, not because of any particular importance that attached either to it or the paper in which it appeared, but simply as an example in point of the manner in which the Press of England lost its head at a critical period, and determined to accentuate and exacerbate the feeling against the Boers, which was entirely the outcome of prejudice and ignorance. Certainly, as I have said, there were some laudable exceptions to this fanning of the flame of excitement, which undoubtedly prevailed among the public for many days during an extremely critical period.

I have said much about the trend of public opinion in this country, and in respect of the manner in which the so-called organs of public opinion led the public on a false scent. There was, however, one man in this country, a noble and heroic figure, with whose opinions and actions I have not always been in agreement, but whose general course of conduct, both in political and private life, has ever obtained my profound admiration and respect. I refer to that venerable statesman, the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone, one of the noblest figures of the nineteenth century, a man who has always raised his voice, in season and out of season, on behalf of the poor, the

oppressed, the down-trodden, and in the interests of truth and justice. It was, therefore, with considerable feelings of pleasure that, when excitement in regard to matters in the Transvaal was almost at its height, that I read the following interesting letter from the pen of the aged statesman:—

“DEAR SIR,—I have always thought the Transvaal had rather peculiar claims upon us, and I am much pleased with what I see thus far of Kruger’s conduct. But we are not out of the wood yet, and I am not entitled to interfere. As at present advised, however, I am alike surprised and disgusted at the outrage committed on the Republic; and even if the Uitlanders were the main cause, that is no answer to those whose territory was invaded and their peace disturbed by armed invasion.—Your very faithful and obedient,

“W. E. GLADSTONE.

“*January 17, 1896.*”

Needless to say, Mr Gladstone’s letter gave considerable satisfaction to President Kruger and the Government of the Transvaal, and had no little effect in bringing about the better state of feeling which, I believe, now exists between the Boer population and the Uitlanders. The sympathy expressed by Her Majesty the Queen in reference to the terrible dynamite explosion in Johannesburg also caused considerable satisfaction. In fact, I believe, and I have good reason for saying so, that if Lord

Salisbury's Government deals with President Kruger on just and upright lines, respects the independence of the Transvaal and promises to conserve it, there is every prospect of not only friendly, but cordial, feelings springing up between the Dutch and English races, not in the Transvaal only, but in South Africa. As General Joubert, in thanking the Orange Free State burghers, remarked, there is a great future before South Africa if it is only united. Their cause, said the General, was the cause of the South African people, who would achieve their end by combining all who are under a different rule into one nation. This combination, I may remark, was the aim of Lord Carnarvon, Sir Bartle Frere, and many other eminent statesmen and administrators. It is the hope of every man who has the welfare of South Africa at heart, and I believe in my soul that the psychological moment has almost arrived when such a consummation can be effected.

I have alluded in this chapter to the fictitious and exaggerated reports that appeared in many newspapers published in this country in regard to matters in the Transvaal. When all else failed, we had the old, old stories about Boer atrocities which, as Mr Froude showed in his book, *Oceana*, were stale garbage, and when investigated, had always been proved to be absolutely false. However, they were once again published here in the month of January 1896, but it is pleasing to be able to state that so soon as they were published and the intelligence was transmitted to the Cape, Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, Mr J.

Hofmeyr, Mr J. Merriman, Mr W. P. Schreiner, Mr J. W. Sauer, Sir J. Sivewright, Sir T. Upington, Mr Te. Water, Mr David Graaf, and other prominent persons, signed the following declaration for publication in London :—

“The telegrams sent to the London papers giving accounts of outrages perpetrated by Boers on British subjects are regarded here as mischievous fictions, and are deplored by all Africans as calculated further to embitter race feeling and to retard a peaceful settlement.”

CHAPTER XII

LETTERS ON THE TRANSVAAL QUESTION

SHORTLY after the invasion of the Transvaal by the Chartered Company's force under Dr Jameson, I found public opinion here in England so utterly adrift in regard to the true facts of the case, as between Boers and Uitlanders, that I deemed it necessary, in the interests of truth and justice, to address several letters to the Press in order, if possible, to correct prevalent misconceptions. These letters, if I may make bold to say so, served, I believe, a useful purpose in directing attention to the fact, which had apparently been entirely disregarded, that the Boers had something, and a very considerable amount, to urge on their behalf, and that the "Transvaal Question" was by no means the one-sided matter the Press of this country had deluded the public into believing it to be. I reproduce the letters I refer to for the information of my readers:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "FINANCIAL TIMES"

"SIR,—Recent exciting episodes in the Transvaal are quickly passing out of the nine days' wonder stage and becoming a matter of history. While they are to some extent fresh in the public memory, it is, I think, advisable, and it is certainly only fair, that the public should have placed before them some plain unvarnished truths, in order to enable them to arrive at a juster conclusion in respect of the matters in dispute between Boers and Uitlanders than was possible during the period of excitement through which the Transvaal has recently passed.

"Up to the present time I have studiously held aloof from the controversy about the Transvaal in the public Press, which has, for the most part, consisted of acrid and heated denunciations of Mr Kruger and his countrymen. I might, I think, reasonably enough have claimed, from my knowledge of, and interests in, the South African Republic, that my opinion in regard to events therein is as valuable as that of the self-constituted 'authorities' who have been airing their views and advertising themselves and their papers for several weeks past. The champions of the Uitlanders in this country have, in effect, bidden us behold the spectacle of many thousands of our own countrymen—industrious, intelligent, law-abiding Englishmen—rightly struggling to be free in a foreign country where they were under the yoke of, and generally oppressed by, an infinitesimal minority

of Dutch farmers. These Uitlanders are, I know, believed by the great mass of the public in England to have been merely sticking up for their rights, including freedom of speech, and many other privileges to which we are accustomed, and that are highly valued in a free country. In connection therewith, we have been told that the Uitlanders have, above all, been asserting the grand old principle, in defence of which our American brethren fought and beat us more than a hundred years ago, namely, no taxation without representation. All this, I say, is the prevalent opinion in England, and it does not say much for the accuracy of the public judgment here, or of the Press, which affects to guide and mould public opinion, that such a burlesque of what has really taken place in the Transvaal, and the motives of the Uitlanders generally in their agitation, should be accepted as the absolute truth.

“First and foremost, the Uitlanders are very far from being all Englishmen; there are men of every nationality in Johannesburg, but of most of them it may be predicted with safety that they are not Englishmen, Frenchmen or German, but, above all things, financiers, whose patriotism is largely a question of £ s. d. These men came out to the Transvaal to exploit its riches, and with a full knowledge of the laws and ordinances of the country. Having amassed wealth, they began to think that it was a thousand pities such an abnormally rich country as the Transvaal, should be in the possession of a parcel of Dutch Boers, who

actually had the insolence to call upon Uitlanders to pay taxes, and thereby hand over to the Government a very minute portion of the gold they were extracting from the Transvaal territory. This feeling, by dint of much writing and speaking, gradually spread. A 'National Union' was formed, and the Uitlanders threatened all manner of things when the time came for them to act. Well, the time did come, poor Jameson was lured to his fate, and the Uitlanders began to shake in their shoes, saving those of them, who knowing what was coming, decided, like the good financiers that they are, to make the most of it, and had accordingly gone 'bears' of Rand gold mining shares. Some of these 'bears' are now in gaol, and their 'bear' operations accordingly are not likely to turn out as profitable as they at one time expected.

"The public will, in my opinion, be very foolish if they waste any sympathy over the Uitlanders. That the latter have grievances I do not deny, but I am just as sensible of the fact that President Kruger and his Government are extremely desirous to ameliorate any reasonable causes of complaint, if the Uitlanders will only take up the position of law-abiding citizens in a foreign country, instead of, as heretofore, posing as rebels, who intend on the first favourable opportunity to make a clean sweep of the board and seize upon the riches of the Rand, or such of them as they do not already possess. President Kruger is probably not an angel, but neither are the Uitlanders angels, and

their behaviour with reference to Dr Jameson scarcely induces one to regard them as men of valour.—I am, etc.,

“W. F. REGAN.

“17th January 1896.”

TO THE EDITOR OF THE “ECHO.”

“SIR,—Now that the excitement with regard to the various episodes in the Transvaal has to some extent quieted down, it appears to me that, in the interests of justice and fair dealing as between man and man, some publicity should be given to the other side of the Transvaal question; because there is another side to this as to most other questions, as I hope I shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of your readers. For some weeks past the English public have been induced to believe by many writers and financiers, not in every instance disinterested, that the Boers of the Transvaal are a miserable collection of autocratic, pig-headed Dutchmen, who grind beneath their heels all the wealth, intelligence and industry of Johannesburg and the Rand generally, who are oppressed not only in their liberties, but financially. These Uitlanders are generally supposed by the public here at home to be a band of gallant Englishmen struggling day by day against the vicious principle of taxation without representation; in fact, worthy representatives of good old John Hampden, and those other patriotic and venerated Englishman, who, by their struggles in the past, have gained for Englishmen the liberties they now enjoy. Now, sir, any

such idea as this is the merest travesty of the condition of things that actually exists in the South African Republic.

"If we are just, we must not forget that the Boers are in the South African Republic simply because they wished to get free of our South African colonies, and to possess land of their own, where they could govern themselves according to their own ideas, and engage in their rural pursuits unhampered and untrammelled by those colonial laws and regulations which they found irksome. No doubt a good many people think that the Boers are stupid and absurd people for entertaining these ideas. Well, they may be stupid and absurd, but we must recognise the fact that the South African Republic is, except in regard to its foreign relations, an independent nation, and that the rulers thereof are perfectly within their rights in regulating the administration of the country, and deciding who shall and who shall not be admitted to the franchise or other rights of citizenship. As to the autocratic propensities of the Boers, about which we have heard so much of late, it is all the merest fudge. A perusal of the contents of the English newspapers published in Johannesburg would convince the people of this country that the liberty of the Press, is, at anyrate, in no danger in that part of the world, because those journals have contained for many months past criticisms and comments on the administration and administrators of the State, and charges of corruption and malfeasance generally against nearly every official of the South African

Republic, all written in language far exceeding in severity and vituperation anything to which even we are accustomed in this country.

“If President Kruger were the despot he has been portrayed here, he would certainly have stopped long ago the gross licence of language indulged in by the English newspapers published in Johannesburg. But not a bit of it, and this fact surely goes far to show that President Kruger is anything but an autocrat, and that the Uitlanders who possess a free — an excessively free — Press have nothing whatever to complain of in that respect. And so in regard to liberty of speech also. It is not too much to say that if the National Reform Union had existed in any other country, great or small, in Europe or America, it would long since have been suppressed, and the members thereof prosecuted and imprisoned. But what do we find in the Transvaal? The National Reform Union is unmolested, and its members are as free in their speech on the platform as the English Press in Johannesburg is free in its comments on men and things in the Transvaal. Clearly, therefore, this Kruger is a peculiar kind of ‘autocrat.’ In what does his autocracy consist, and wherein does the shoe pinch in respect of these Uitlanders? I will tell your readers. The motley collection of gentlemen who are embraced under the generic term of Uitlander, are men of every nationality, but whose nationality and patriotism are all summed up in the one word—

finance. This Kruger, wicked man that he is, actually has the temerity to tax these Uitlanders who have come to the South African Republic to extract its riches for their own benefit. Those riches, if they belong to anybody, belong to the original inhabitants of the Republic, and the rulers of that State would have been perfectly justified, legally and morally, in preventing any Uitlanders from settling down there and proceeding to extract the great riches of the Rand. These men have grown rich and prosperous upon the great wealth that undoubtedly lies beneath the surface of the Transvaal. They have amassed enormous sums of money, and they cannot for the life of them bear to see the coffers of the Transvaal treasury full, and the Dutch officials of that State receiving adequate remuneration for their services. No. These Uitlanders think that if they had not to pay taxation, they could make more money, and in their greed for pelf, they want to get rid of the 'autocratic' Kruger and the other Boers, and obtain possession of the country for themselves.

"Now, sir, in this matter I may claim to be impartial. I have large interests in the Transvaal myself, and in one way my sympathies might be supposed to be with the Uitlanders, but I cannot disguise from myself the fact that the hybrid collection of foreigners in the South African Republic, in their agitation, in their threats, in their vituperation, have been simply and solely influenced by their pockets. The conduct of the Uitlanders, after all

their tall talk, in leaving Jameson to his fate, has very properly incurred the reprobation of all right-thinking people in this country.—Yours faithfully,

“WM. F. REGAN.

“Jan. 17, 1896.”

TO THE EDITOR OF THE “FREEMAN’S JOURNAL”

“SIR,—The people in England have so utterly lost their heads over the Transvaal Question, that it seems to be expedient that one like myself who, with a full knowledge of the country, can claim to be impartial as between Boers and Uitlanders, should state his views publicly in regard to the many matters arising out of Dr Jameson’s invasion of the Transvaal that have been agitating the public mind for some weeks past.

To anyone like myself who knows what Johannesburg is, and what description of men the Uitlanders are, and who is intimately acquainted with the ideas, sentiments and characteristics of President Kruger, and other members of the Government, it seems passing strange that public opinion in Great Britain should have been so wofully led astray as appears to have been the case in regard to the ‘Transvaal Question.’ This ‘Question’ in its entirety has been manufactured by Uitlanders, whose set purpose for some time past has been to get possession of the country, with its vast actual and latent wealth, and clear the Boers out of it neck and crop. President Kruger has

from the very first been fully acquainted with the aims and objects of this conspiracy against the Government, and it was hardly to be expected that he would have fallen in with it by granting to these Uitlanders, without the slightest discrimination, the full rights of citizenship, and so, in effect, have signed his own death-warrant. All the fatuous nonsense that has appeared in the Press of this country in regard to the aspirations of the Uitlanders, and their desire to assert at any cost those grand old principles that have made England free and famous, is really ludicrous to anyone like myself who knows what the Uitlanders are and what it is they want. Johannesburg is, as probably your readers are aware, a city with a population of over 100,000, drawn from all parts of the world. It is this motley population of foreigners that has demanded from the Transvaal Government, with menaces, the full rights of citizenship, and when President Kruger, very properly, in my opinion, declined to comply with such extravagant demands, formed themselves into an association which they called a 'National Union,' and which if it had existed in England or Ireland, much less in any Continental nation, would have been suppressed by the strong arm of the law, and every member of it prosecuted for treason. When a collection of men go in for treasonable projects, and indulge in threats against a lawfully-constituted Government, their only justification can be success. The Uitlanders blustered and threatened and talked a considerable amount of high-falutin' nonsense about the dangers

to which their wives and families were subject to in Johannesburg, the only danger, I may remark, being the outcome of the treasonable conspiracy against the existing Government of the South African Republic. But what was the *dénouement*? When Dr Jameson, lured across the frontier by their wails respecting their wives and families, came to the rescue of these Uitlanders, they made not the slightest attempt to make good their valiant words, they never stirred an inch outside Johannesburg, and they allowed Jameson to be engaged in a fierce combat with an overwhelming Boer force, within fifteen miles of the city, without even making the slightest attempt to render him assistance, direct or indirect. Having defeated Jameson's party, President Kruger had the game in his hands, and if he were the autocrat and cruel monster that he is depicted by not a few English papers, he would have shot every survivor of Jameson's force. Instead of doing this, however, the President handed these several hundred prisoners over to the English authorities, and his behaviour in so acting has certainly been in marked contrast to the bluster and bravado, all ending in smoke, of these pot-valiant Uitlanders. Having done this, President Kruger not unnaturally thinks the time has come to put a stop to the treasonable practices of the foreign population of the Transvaal, and he accordingly arrested the ringleaders of the conspiracy against the Government. Let us wait until the trial of the prisoners now in Pretoria Gaol is concluded, and we shall no doubt find—in fact, I know we

shall—that President Kruger has no desire to inflict on these men the penalties they have incurred, and, in my opinion, they richly deserve. He will, however, insist that they shall forever rid the South African Republic of their presence, a step which, in my opinion, will tend to the future peace and prosperity of Johannesburg and the Transvaal generally, and enable President Kruger to grant those concessions to the Uitlanders that I know he desires to confer as largely and generously as possible, and which would have been granted long ago had it not been for the arrogant behaviour of the self-constituted leaders of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg and their precious ‘National Union,’ which was not ‘National’ in any proper sense of the term. —Yours obediently, “WM. F. REGAN.

“17th January 1896.”

‘TO THE EDITOR OF THE “NORTHERN WHIG.”

“SIR,—So much has been written in the Press and spoken on public platforms during the past few weeks respecting ‘Boers and Uitlanders, in almost every instance to the disadvantage of the Boers, that I feel impelled by a sense of justice, now that public feeling has to some extent calmed down, to endeavour to afford some enlightenment on the subject respecting which my interests in, and knowledge of, the Transvaal generally, and Johannesburg in particular, enable me, I think, to speak with some authority. Recognising as I do in your journal a

paper that has during the recent crisis attempted to calm and control the excited feelings of the multitude and prevent them from jumping to somewhat erroneous conclusions upon imperfect information, I venture to ask your permission to calmly and impartially narrate in the *Northern Whig* the circumstances that have led up to the recent events in the Transvaal.

"Now, sir, what is primarily responsible for producing the recent and present deplorable condition of things in the Transvaal? Gold. It is the same old story that we can perchance remember ourselves, or, if we cannot, can read in history as having happened all the world over. The Transvaal, unfortunately for the Boers, who, rightly or wrongly, live a rural life away from the din and turmoil of towns, and 'trekked' to the Transvaal to get away from men and things that were not in accordance with their ideas, was a few years ago found to be rich in the precious metal, and as soon as news of this was noised abroad, men, good, bad and indifferent, but largely of the latter two classes, flocked there from all parts of the world, till it has come about that Johannesburg has a population for its size probably less reputable than any city on the face of the globe. Well, in due course, the gold mines became developed, with the result that there has been, month by month, a large and steadily-increasing output of the precious metal therefrom. Enormous fortunes have consequently been realised by vendors, promoters, investors and speculators,

all, be it observed, directly or indirectly due to the mineral wealth of the Transvaal Republic. The Republic, not unnaturally, taxed the hybrid inhabitants, who had come there in search of and had found wealth—taxed them not to punish them, but merely to defray the cost of Government and other expenses incidental to the service of the State. Thereupon the immigrants resented this, talked glibly about 'taxation without representation,' referred to the revolt of the American colonies against Great Britain, because the latter ignored this great principle, and demanded, there is no other word for it, to be admitted to all the rights and privileges of citizenship of the Transvaal Republic without further ado. President Kruger, who, whatever his faults, is certainly not lacking in shrewdness, saw clearly enough that were he to accede to these preposterous proposals, he and his fellow Boers might as well at once commence about 'trekking' afresh if they could find any uninhabited portion of Africa to 'trek' to, and declined to grant such demands, but promised to consider any reasonable grievances the Uitlanders might desire to put forward. Thereupon the latter indulged in scarcely veiled threats, and much vituperative language in the English papers published in Johannesburg, and organised a society which made no secret of its intentions to resort to force if necessary. Arms were imported in large quantities by devious methods, and a gigantic conspiracy was formed to get possession of the Transvaal for the Uitlanders, not from any patriotic or even

plausibly upright motives, but simply and solely in order that the Uitlanders might come into full possession of the country with all its wealth and expel the Boers therefrom. The object of this precious scheme is now full well known to your readers, and I think it may be truthfully averred that the only man who comes well out of the whole business is President Kruger. He has shown that he knows how to be magnanimous and merciful, and no honest man can say justly that the words of congratulations addressed to him by the Queen, the High Commissioner, the Governor of Natal and others have in any way gone beyond the merits of the case. Even in the hour of triumph, President Kruger has promised to alleviate any substantial grievances which the Uitlanders could show they suffered from, and from my knowledge of him, I verily believe the President will keep his promise in the spirit as well as in the letter.—Yours, etc.,

“WM. F. REGAN.

“17th January 1896.”

CHAPTER XIII

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S DESPATCH—HOME RULE FOR THE RAND

MR CHAMBERLAIN'S conduct generally, in regard to the invasion of the Transvaal by the Chartered Company's forces under Dr Jameson, has been so admirable that I am loth to make what may be deemed hypercritical remarks in respect of any action on his part in regard to matters arising out of that invasion. Nevertheless, in a book such as this some reference must undoubtedly be made to the voluminous despatch, published in the *London Gazette* of 7th February, addressed by Mr Chamberlain to Sir Hercules Robinson, and propounding what was virtually a scheme of Home Rule for the Rand. Whatever the merits of Mr Chamberlain's proposals, it was, I think, a thousand pities that they should ever have been made public before the contents of the despatch had reached the person for whom it was primarily intended, viz., President Kruger. As it was, the President gleaned, in the first instance, from other sources details of the far-reaching, if not revolutionary, proposals put forward

by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in regard to the future of the State of which Mr Kruger is the head. In this matter I feel bound to say Mr Chamberlain has "played to the gallery," and in his love of public approbation has made a distinct *faux pas*, the consequences of which are likely to be more serious than is at present foreseen.

Mr Chamberlain's despatch was a direction to the High Commissioner as to the general tenour which the Colonial Office desired him to adopt in negotiations with President Kruger, with a view to induce the Transvaal Boers to modify their institutions in an enlarged and pretendedly liberal sense, with a view to remove, if possible, some of the chief causes of complaint which the Uitlanders represented as being "grievances" for them. In the first place, as I have said, Mr Chamberlain committed a great blunder in publishing that despatch before it could possibly have reached Sir Hercules. *Secondly*, I think Sir Hercules, after having previously replied to Mr Chamberlain's more confidential communication, to the like general effect, to the purport that "it would be inopportune and premature under the existing circumstances to broach such questions," would have committed another blunder in forwarding to President Kruger a copy of the cabled *precis*, had it not been that it was published *in extenso* quite as soon as the copy *precis* could reach him, and that it was reported direct to the President by the Transvaal Consul-General by cable.

Thirdly, I do not think Mr Chamberlain's scheme to be at all well-considered or politic.

Municipal self-government the Uitlanders would readily obtain, and that is really all they can reasonably ask for. But this they repudiate in declaring that "Municipal Government, subject to the legislation of the President and Volksraad (Raad), as at present constituted, would be only a gift from one hand taken away with the other," which is as much as to say that the authority of the City of London Corporation, or of the London County Council, is a mockery, because both, and, in fact, all our own municipal institutions are subject to the supreme authority of the State and of Parliament.

What the Uitlanders want—but will certainly not obtain through the instrumentality of Chamberlain's somewhat curious contrivances and expedients—is admission to the National Franchise and Representation, so that they could swamp the Burghers altogether (as they would) in the Raad, and reduce any Boer President to the position of a mere cipher—thus doing much more to gratify the rapacity of the mine gamblers than would the reinstatement of the odious Annexation of 1877, which led to the disasters of 1880 and 1881, and to the all but absolute independence of the Boers, would or could accomplish for British colonists. It would be virtually to reannex the Transvaal, not to the empire but to the financiers of Johannesburg. The Boers are very well aware that this is the

real purpose, and that Mr Chamberlain and the Imperial Government were being used as mere tools to this end. Accordingly, the President and the Raad, who framed the constitution for themselves and not for intrusive interlopers into the country, which their Burghers first occupied as a retreat when they were fugitives from the British colonies and colonial Government, would be simpletons to accede to Mr Chamberlain's inconsistent scheme.

The Uitlanders are, as I have previously said, aliens and intruders, and have no natural right to representation except in their own municipalities. They have voluntarily rushed into the country, in which they have occupied twenty-six mining districts at least, almost exclusively in pursuit of gold. If the Rand were granted representation in the Raad, the twenty-five other districts would have equal claims to the like representation, and the Uitlander members of the Raad would outnumber the Burgher members. Thus the Uitlanders would virtually appropriate the State and the country, which have been erected and occupied by the Boers for themselves, from out of the Boers' hands, power and control.

It is not surprising, therefore, that so far from manifesting any intention of accepting a single one of Mr Chamberlain's ill-timed propositions, President Kruger is very busy in turning to account the most ample and acceptable supply of arms, transport, vehicles and animals, ammunition, accoutrements, etc., which the Chartered Company's people and the

Uitlanders have been so opportunely compelled to surrender to the Boers (and they have acquired, free of cost), by distributing arms and ammunition in abundance amongst the Burghers in the distant country districts, and especially along the western, northern and north-eastern frontiers, that the Burghers throughout may be ready for sudden commandeering and for relentless action, in case a conflict be once more forced upon them.

Nothing could have been more inopportune that the proposal even (excepting its publication) than the introduction of such a scheme at such a time. And even if it had been workable (which could only have been if very carefully prepared by a juriscounsel thoroughly *au fait* about the Boers generally, and about President Kruger in particular) it invited rejection by anachronism. Not being even workable, and being so ill-timed, in my humble opinion it is doomed to failure, and it would be more politic not to attempt its revival from asphyxiation.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CHARTERED COMPANY IN RHODESIA

IN an early portion of this book I reproduced the Charter of the British South Africa Company *in extenso*, and I then remarked that in regard to questions wholly and solely concerning the South African Republic, the British South Africa Company ought, strictly speaking, to have no concern. But the unfortunate expedition of Dr Jameson has altered all that, and the future of the South Africa Company will most certainly be considerably affected, and its powers be assuredly largely modified, as a direct result of the invasion of a friendly State by its late Administrator and its forces.

Whatever modifications may be made in the Charter, it may, however, I think, be taken as certain that no question will arise of the withdrawal of the Charter from the Company. In many respects I am totally out of sympathy with the aims, objects, and aspirations of, not only the Company itself, but many of the persons connected therewith; but still I cannot help admitting the fact, and I do admit it fully and freely, that the

Company has done a great work in South Africa, and that the potentialities of the vast territories under its control are such as the mind can hardly realise. Now, I may frankly remark that this is a matter upon which I may assuredly claim to speak with that knowledge which comes from experience. My interests in Rhodesia, as in the Transvaal, are considerable. I have invested every penny I have in the world therein, and I look to the future with absolute confidence. My belief is that Rhodesia, as it becomes developed and better known, will prove to be the El Dorado of the twentieth century. Of its enormous latent mineral wealth there can be no question any more than of the fertility of the soil, the fineness of the climate and its capacity for supporting in prosperity, if not in wealth, an enormous European population. As I have said, I gladly recognise the great work which the Chartered Company has done so far in Rhodesia, and I feel assured, with Mr Rhodes and Earl Grey actively superintending operations at Buluwayo, we may expect in the near future to see the prosperity of Rhodesia, and with it, of course, of the Chartered Company, advancing by leaps and bounds. In this connection it is to be hoped the public will diligently read and carefully digest the report of the Chartered Company which was published in the newspapers during the course of the last week in February 1896. This report was only made up to the end of March 1895, and I am not concerned with the finances or financial operation of the Company as detailed therein. My

interest in the report is simply in respect of what it states as to the operations then in progress to develop the resources of the Chartered Company's territory. We have been told incessantly—as a matter of fact—that there is no gold in Rhodesia. Evidently the man who writes nonsense of this nature relies upon his imagination for his facts. That gold exists in Rhodesia, not only in paying quantities, but largely and richly, there can be no doubt. What has prevented mining operations in Rhodesia being successfully carried out hitherto, is not the lack of gold there, but the lack of the means of transport and the enormous expense attendant on conveying and erecting suitable machinery, to say nothing of the cost of milling. When roads are constructed and railways made, the prosperity of the country will, I firmly believe, proceed apace. Railway facilities are now the required desiderata, and railway construction is at present in full swing. The Bechuanaland Railway has for some time past been open as far as Mafeking, and another section of ninety-five miles is to be completed in July next, when further extensions will be taken in hand, while the Beira or east coast route, part of which is now open, is being rapidly extended. The development of mining business will assist the agricultural interest, creating, as it must, a demand for all the necessities of life. In the Chartered Company's report, to which I have referred, there is a list of eleven mining companies in which the Chartered Company has an interest, and a further list of some two hundred, in the mining interests of

which the Chartered Company has a share. As the development of the country proceeds, these mining interests must necessarily return a large revenue to the Chartered Company.

In respect of the Chartered Company, and its future, considerable interest must necessarily attach to an article which appeared in the March number, 1896, of the *New Review*, from the pen of Mr Rutherford Harris, Secretary to the British South Africa Company, and member of the Legislative Assembly of Cape Colony. Mr Harris, who entitles his article "The Fate of South Africa," states that although he came home and landed in England in company with Mr Cecil Rhodes, nevertheless, he does not write officially or in any sense as the mouth-piece of the Company, but simply as one whose connection with it has afforded him unusual opportunities of gauging British sentiment and studying British enterprise in South Africa. I shall not stop to inquire how far a man can differentiate between his public and his private capacity. I shall, in spite of Mr Harris' disclaimer, regard him as the mouth-piece of Mr Cecil Rhodes, and I shall look at his opinions from that point of view. Mr Harris indignantly repudiates the assertion that the late troubles in Johannesburg were brought on by stock-jobbing schemes, and he speaks in high terms of Jameson's tact and diplomacy. Mr Harris contends, that not English speculation but German intrigue was at the root of the mystery. By concessions to German companies, by unfair rates on the railways,

and by other unfair manipulations of traffic, there has, he asserts, been a deliberate attempt to divert into German channels the stream of commerce which is bound to increase in volume every year, and to transfer into German pockets that mighty harvest of wealth of which British capital and British enterprise have sown the seed. In support of these sweeping assertions, Mr Harris adduces not one scintilla of evidence. His statement that German intrigue has been at the root of all the mischief in the Transvaal is utterly grotesque.

Mr Harris, there can be no doubt, in this article is but the mouthpiece of Mr Cecil Rhodes, Privy Councillor and now Administrator of Rhodesia, and it is therefore interesting to learn on such high authority that "a community of 14,000 male Boers may claim the divine right of a pastoral oligarchy and coquet with the power of a military despot, but, even so, the laws of political evolution cannot be arrested to humour their political intelligence. We may, therefore, take it that, sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, the Uitlanders will obtain the political rights enjoyed by all civilised communities. But this political emancipation of the Transvaal, which is bound to come, must affect every State in South Africa. The Transvaal, as an opulent and thickly-populated State, surrounded by poorer and less-favoured neighbours, cannot fail to drag the Free State, the Cape Colony and Natal into some closer communion with its political and commercial organisation. There will be a federation

of South Africa. But what time will the Transvaal set to that federation? What policy will the States of South Africa adopt towards England and the world? The answer to these questions depends on the attitude of England during the present crisis. If England does her duty, she will some day have a dominion of South Africa loyal as the dominion of Canada; but if not, then a dominion loyal to Germany, or a United States of Africa with a Monroe doctrine of their own. I have used Canada as an illustration, because the French Canadians appreciate the blessings of British rule, and because the great majority of the Dutch in Cape Colony do and will continue to appreciate those blessings, provided always that Great Britain shall continue to respect the language, religion and racial sentiment of the Dutch as of equal importance to their own. And in this connection the question of native labour must not be overlooked."

There is an implied threat in all this which surely does not come with a good grace from the mouth-piece of a Privy Councillor, but there is more behind it and even stronger language. "Unless," says Mr Harris, "the British people will consent to look a few years ahead, and to consider the South African question as a whole, we of British blood in South Africa cannot, with all the goodwill in the world, avert a disaster to British power as great as the loss of the American Colonies. We may some few of us struggle against the stream, but if the 'imperial factor' be found wanting in the first elements of

imperial rule, we shall be swept away in a swelling current of Afrikaner patriotism. There is no room for a *roi fainéant* south of the Zambesi."

I am given to understand that not a few people in this country are under the impression that Mr Cecil Rhodes has vast political ambition, and I have heard it gravely asserted by men of light and leading, that if Mr Cecil Rhodes has any obstacles placed in the path that he has marked out for himself, he is quite prepared to "cut the painter" and erect a South African Republic which shall extend from Cape Town to Cairo. It is not, of course, for me to say how much or how little truth there may be in rumours of this nature; I am fully aware that public men and even *quasi* public men are often misrepresented and maligned, and have motives and opinions attributed to them which they not only do not entertain but never even dreamt of. But a man in Mr Rhodes's position, especially in view of recent events, ought to be circumspect, and he ought to see that those under him and those associated with him in a confidential capacity are likewise; and in all seriousness, I would ask whether opinions such as the following ought to be publicly propounded by the Secretary of the Chartered Company of which Mr Cecil Rhodes is the moving spirit? In the article in the *New Review*, Mr Harris took upon himself to express the opinion, that "all the South African States must eventually form a federation, either of United States independent of, and hostile to, Great Britain, or a Dominion like that of Canada,

with either England or Germany for its sovereign power;" and he agrees with those who consider that "on the Transvaal, or rather on the fate of the Uitlanders in that State, depends the solution of the problem. At present 14,000 male Boers, a pastoral people and opposed to all progress, rule absolutely an Uitlander population of some 120,000 people, the majority of whom are either British born or of British descent, speaking the English language as their mother-tongue. They comprise the intelligence, the wealth, the energy, and all that makes for progress and civilisation in a country as large as Italy. By their resources and determination they have increased the export of gold from nothing, until it now amounts to 8,000,000 sterling per annum, and by the end of this century, now only four years distant, the development of their 'deep levels' will increase this export of gold to twenty millions sterling, and thereafter for the next thirty or forty years they will maintain their production at that figure. The Transvaal will, therefore, furnish in the near future two-thirds of the yellow metal of the world, and with this increase of prosperity, the present population of 120,000 Uitlanders must increase also until, by the year 1900, it may safely be put at 240,000, and a few years later at half a million. At the present moment the Uitlanders own, by actual purchase of the soil, more than one-half of the Transvaal, and contribute nine-tenths of the entire revenue, yet they have no share in the Government of their country. It is

not to be supposed that such a position can last."

Of the morality of such sentiments as these it is not for me to judge, but my readers who have got thus far will, I feel sure, clearly comprehend that in view of all the circumstances which have led to these poor hunted farmers settling in the Transvaal, the fact that gold has, unfortunately for them, been found there, cannot justify their vineyards being seized by the greedy plutocrats of the Rand. I conclude as I commenced, by saying that the Chartered Company has done a great work in Africa, and that a great work lies before it, but if the Chartered Company is to perform that work adequately and efficiently, it must devote all its energies, and all the energies of all its officials and servants, to its proper sphere of operations, and hold strictly aloof from matters political and otherwise that do not properly appertain to it.

CHAPTER XV

THE ALLEGED WRONGS OF THE UITLANDERS

THE Boers, including the first emancipated section of the Orange River, have throughout, as I have already endeavoured to make my readers understand, only sought to wander farther and farther away from the English settlers by successively "trekking" to the outermost confines of the colony (and beyond its actual boundaries to the north-eastward), in search of an isolation such as they have always coveted, either by displacing native tribes or by squatting in unoccupied wildernesses, such as was, firstly, Graaffreynet, secondly, the Orange River Settlement, thirdly, the interior (and unsettled part of Natal), fourthly, the howling wilderness of the Transvaal. In all these movements, they were but seeking to remove themselves from contact with the English colonists, and to dwell in new lands apart and to themselves. They went to regions, one after another, to which the English settlers were then quite averse from going, in order to be by themselves, and to enjoy their own habits and pursuits, uncongenial as

they were to Englishmen, in *absolutely new* and segregated settlements of *their own making exclusively*. They, in effect, were emigrants who renounced the British connection altogether and formed new settlements of their own, and which they wished and hoped to *preserve for themselves* as emancipated communities, in the independence of total severance from any other European concessions. Owing to their effectual co-operation against the Basutos, those amongst them who had squatted beyond the Orange River, parcelling out the whole territory amongst themselves in the large farms or holdings which it is one of their marked characteristics to long for, were recognised (in 1854), politically, in the independence which they had enjoyed by their total segregation from the rest of Cape Colony. Those who were excluded from that settlement by the appropriation of all the territory amongst the first settlers, "trekked" further to the eastward, until, ultimately, finding themselves crowded out in interior Natal even, by the influx thither also of more English settlers, who had then been attracted chiefly by the sugar cultivation nearer to the coast, and had spread themselves beyond the Quaklamba Ranges, even to Pietermaritzburg and along the Tugela, they (the Boers) sought refuge, for isolation again, in the wilderness beyond the Vaal. They, like the Orange River people, were the first possessors (of European origin) of the whole country. They had occupied it when no other European race had the least idea of colonising it

and, in that sense, they were denationalised colonists, acknowledging no allegiance whatever to any power save that of their own Burgher community, which they organised into a sort of rude State, adapted to their own requirements in the way of government, and institutions, which they fashioned congenially, according to their own wants, tastes and social combination. True, as originally denizens of the Cape Colony, conquered by Great Britain in a certain sense, they were British subjects, although they never acknowledged that relation, and the only colourable pretext for annexing their territory and thus again *forcibly* reducing them to a second subjection, was that territory which they (as British subjects) had colonised had been thus, *ipso facto*, rendered British territory. But as the Boers had migrated into the Transvaal wilderness, far away from the confines of recognised British territory, *for the express purpose and with the avowed and express object of totally detaching themselves from British connection*, and from every kind of British institution, in order to frame and enjoy institutions upon a sort of patriarchal model of their own, which they had accordingly established for themselves, it most certainly was an arbitrary, if not an unnatural, exercise of power by a State of overpowering strength, whose connection they had repudiated, and from which they had fled in their exodus, to suddenly, and without warning or reason, declare by a mere proclamation, *ex mero motu*, that their institutions were abrogated and null, their laws, such as they

were, a dead letter, their territory appropriated, and themselves amenable to the operation of legislation most of which they abhorred.

The Boers of the Transvaal were as much entitled as had been those of the Orange River to respect for that spirit of *independence* which had prompted all their migration. They could not claim or vindicate it (nor did they) in Natal, because there the whole coast line of the colony had previously become the sphere of British settlement. But when they advisedly removed so far into the interior, where it was at that time contrary to British colonial policy to encourage settlements—and whence (no more than from beyond the Orange River did their kinsmen) they neither did nor threatened to molest the British settlements they had abandoned—I cannot understand upon what principle the attempt to coerce them back into the condition of British Colonists could be justified. The reconquest of the Transvaal after Majuba Hill was, however, considered by most Englishmen obligatory, in order to avenge the fallen British soldiers who had been recklessly hurled against them, even though the Boer resistance had been justified. But inasmuch as no such reconquest was attempted, but the Boer independence, which we had so recently outraged and wantonly molested, was at length restored by treaty, it is clearly incumbent upon Englishmen to respect that acknowledged independence, and the laws and institutions which the Boers have framed and set up in the exercise of their undoubted rights, and not to seek their violent overthrow; least of all, indeed, to

subserve the insatiable greed of gangs of stock-jobbing gamblers, without any kind of scruple, compunction or moral sense, such as abound in Johannesburg. They affect to complain that they are unfairly (unjustly) taxed, that they are excluded from the franchise, etc., etc. But, clearly, the Boer Government have the undoubted right to legislate as it pleases, with the concurrence of its own Burghers, within and for its own territory. Their Raad has as much right to enact and apportion taxes, and to reserve or otherwise regulate the franchise, in and for the Transvaal, as has the House of Commons in and for the United Kingdom. The Uitlanders flocked into the Transvaal for their own behests and not to serve or please the Boers, who would prefer their room to their company; and all the more noisy and demonstrative of them (such as are now undergoing prosecution) were quite aware before they went into the Transvaal what were those laws, powers, privileges and institutions which the Boers have, in their absolute independence, enacted, reserved and established, and to which such Uitlanders have voluntarily subjected themselves. Under these circumstances, the Uitlanders are not, by any means, victims of hardship, nor can they reasonably complain of grievance. On the contrary, it is they themselves who are the wanton aggressors. The Boers established their own polity expressly to hold themselves aloof from all Uitlanders and to retain complete independence of them. It were, therefore, insanity in them if they were to admit the Uitlanders to national

legislative power, which would quickly enable the Uitlanders to reverse all Boer legislation, and to reduce the Burghers to the enforced suppression of everything for which they have isolated themselves from the rest of the world. It has been pretended that this could not result from the admission of one representative for Johannesburg into the Raad, because he would be in a singular minority against twenty-five or more other members. But President Kruger has very truly pointed out, that there are more than twenty-five mining centres in the Transvaal, all of which are the thronged resorts of Uitlanders, and that, if representation were granted to Johannesburg, it could not be refused to the other mining communities. Then, with respect to the alleged oppressive inequality of taxation as affecting the Uitlanders exclusively, these complainants seem to forget that the proceeds of such differential taxation are almost (if not quite) exclusively devoted to public works, such as roads, railways, etc. (and to the interest and amortisation of public debt incurred for such purposes), *constructed for the almost exclusive benefit of the Uitlanders themselves and their operations.*

Except it were by a successful revolution in the interest of the Uitlanders, and achieved by them, knowing the peculiarities, the aspirations, the temper and the predilection of the Boers and their leaders as well as I do—a revolution which would probably drive the Boers *en masse* into Matabeleland, where there would be no adequate force to resist them, I

do not think there is any way in which the system of government in the Transvaal can be changed, except with the free consent of the Burghers themselves. The *raison d'être* of that system of government is to *insure the permanency of an isolated independence for the Boers themselves*. The constitution of the Transvaal, like that of the Orange Free State, is framed with this express object. The immense majority secured by the extreme Boer candidate, Steyn, for the Presidency of the Orange State conclusively proves that recent events have revived the rigid spirit of *independent exclusiveness*, even amongst the far less rugged Boers of that State. If the barriers of Boer exclusiveness in the Transvaal were once removed, or even lowered, the Burghers know very well that all they cherish in existence would be torn from them.

In the matters of education and of the admission of the English language into use for public affairs, the Transvaal Government is, I know, quite prepared to make concessions. So it is also in the way of municipal institutions, but this the Uitlanders appear to scout and with disdain, in which I cannot but think they are very ill-advised; inasmuch, especially, as by that means they would control the larger part of the imposts and expenditures levied and devoted to public works. And I believe that the creation of Uitlander municipalities in the Kaap, Zoutspensburg and Waterberg districts (and in any others that might be proclaimed), as well as in the Witwatersrand, would answer all the legitimate purposes of the

Uitlanders. And I feel quite sure that any attempt at such interference as Mr Chamberlain sketched out in his despatch, and made public before the contents thereof had been communicated to President Kruger, would immediately array the whole force of the Orange Free State in unison with the Transvaal for resistance *à outrance*. Anything that conflicts with the *exclusive* principle of the constitutions of the Boers, strikes fatally at their national existence from which *exclusiveness* with independence is inseparable. *Exclusive* independence and independent *exclusiveness* are the prime motives of the people, and, therefore, of the States which they have constructed to that end, and to which they consequently adhere with desperate tenacity.

Now I do not desire my readers to suppose that the Uitlanders have no grievances that require adjustment and rectification. There is no perfect system of Government in the world, and even in this country year after year, we hear clamouring for reforms and witness agitation for the amelioration of the lot of some particular class of the community. As I have already admitted, the Transvaal system of government may not be in all respects suited for a mass of people educated in Great Britain, France, Germany or the United States, and bringing to South Africa the prejudices and ideas of the land of their birth. On the other hand, these people sought the Transvaal and not the Transvaal them, and they would have little in reality to complain of if President Kruger and his Government pointed

out this obvious fact to them, and advised them accordingly to make the best of things as they found them. But President Kruger has not at any time taken up this *non possumus* attitude. The President who, in spite of all that his assailants have said of him, is a just man, has desired, and I believe, still desires and intends to institute such reforms as will eventuate in the redress of all legitimate grievances. The Uitlanders may protest, but neither the President nor the Volskraad intends to be hurried or frightened into any drastic uprooting of the Constitution of the Transvaal. The Press of this country have been urging Mr Chamberlain to bring the requisite pressure to bear on President Kruger, to extort from him a promise to comply with the preposterous demands of the Uitlanders *en bloc*, and Mr Chamberlain has shown symptoms of compliance in the matter. His despatch to President Kruger contained a scheme in regard to Home Rule for the Rand, a scheme, too, which was favoured by neither party, and of which it is safe to assert we shall hear no more. Mr Chamberlain has apparently accepted all the alleged grievances of the Uitlanders as genuine, and not only genuine but urgent, and he has to all intents taken these grievances under his wing. Even if they were genuine, the Uitlanders, as I have said in another chapter, have put themselves completely out of court, inasmuch as they endeavoured to obtain by force what they could only claim as an act of grace. Before the Secretary of State for the

Colonies had committed himself to an out-and-out support of the Uitlanders, it would surely have been advisable that he should have taken steps to have impartially investigated the real facts of the case, and not the garbled version of the facts put forward by the Uitlanders.

The Uitlanders may reckon on receiving at President Kruger's hands what they never have been inclined to do him—justice; and, large-minded, tactful, astute statesman that, amidst trials and difficulties, he has hitherto shown himself, I feel confident that he will redress any genuine grievances the Uitlanders may convince him they possess in a friendly spirit, and with a full desire to in any way promote the prosperity and happiness of the inhabitants of the Transvaal, whatever their nationality. Were any earnest of the President's intentions in this respect needed, it may be found in the friendly speeches by him on the 19th February 1896, on the occasion of the terrible dynamite disaster in Johannesburg, when His Honour expressed a hope that out of this terrible devastation good might result, and the different sections of the community be brought closer together by the disaster. This is assuredly a prayer to which all right-thinking men will respond "Amen." The consummation for which the President hopes rests entirely with the Uitlanders. If they will only rid themselves of their greed, with their petty and personal dislikes, and work honestly and earnestly together for the good of the country which they have voluntarily chosen as their habitation, the Trans-

vaal will in the future be in the happy position of a nation with no history ; be, in fact, a rich and prosperous community composed of men of divers races united together for a common aim and a common purpose—the advancement and prosperity of the land which has brought them wealth and everything that wealth can confer.

CHAPTER XVI

SOME REFLECTIONS AND A MORAL—KRUGER, CHAMBERLAIN, ROBINSON, AND DE WET

I FEEL I cannot conclude this book without devoting a little attention to what I may properly term personal characteristics of some of the men who have come prominently before the public in connection with recent events in the Transvaal.

First and foremost there looms large the imposing figure of the great President of the South African Republic. A man of the time truly this. A man who has writ his name large on history, who has had great opportunities and has risen to them. A man who has shown magnanimity and mercy, clemency and justice. A man of deep religious feeling, honesty of purpose, singleness of life, thoroughness of character. A man moulded by nature for the position he fills and adorns. Not a drawing-room courtier, certainly, not an orator, not a crafty diplomatist, but a man, a real live man, possessing all the qualities and qualifications that his position requires, and free from all those vices and defects which are too often found in



PRESIDENT KRUGER.

FROM A PORTRAIT BY ELLIOT AND FRY.

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men holding such positions, or engendered or developed by the office. In the short space of two months, President Kruger has lived down, even in England, an amount of prejudice, not to say hatred, enormous in its extent. It is no exaggeration to say that, towards the latter part of 1895 and in the beginning of 1896, he was the best hated man in this country; but there has been a sudden revulsion of feeling, and wherever one now goes, and events of the day are the subject of conversation, we may hear the remark that "Kruger is not such a bad fellow, after all." The fact is, that the English people, though very often prejudiced, though liable to be led away for the time by the Press, are ultimately just in their judgments. People here in England have begun to reason thus: "This man, the head of a State, has his territory invaded by an armed force; a treasonable society is in full swing in the largest town in the State arming foreigners with a view of obtaining by force certain reforms which are, rightly or wrongly, demanded. The invading force is defeated, the treasonable movement collapses, Kruger has all these men in the hollow of his hand and he does not harm a hair of their heads. What ruler of any other country of the world would have done likewise? Can one imagine any other Government acting in this apparently philanthropic manner? Clearly this Kruger is not the autocratic, overbearing, cruel master he has been portrayed in certain newspapers," I myself feel a peculiar satisfaction in this revulsion of public opinion, and I think, and I say it with all

modesty, I may justly claim that my efforts in the Press and elsewhere have to some extent brought about this agreeable state of things. When President Kruger visits England, and I believe there is no doubt that he will visit England, I anticipate that he will receive a reception, not only friendly, but cordial and enthusiastic, and that he will return to South Africa imbued with the idea that the British public are, above all things, just and generous. I sincerely hope that nothing will interfere—and the only thing that now can interfere will be some muddling at the Colonial Office—to prevent President Kruger coming to England, because I believe such an event will tend more than anything else to promote those feelings of friendship and goodwill which it is most important should prevail between the South African Republic and the Paramount Power in South Africa.

Another man who has loomed large in the public gaze in connection with the Transvaal Question is the Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies. Now, I am not about to add to the volume of fulsome adulation of which Mr Chamberlain has been the recipient during the past few weeks, and of which he must be heartily tired. Mr Chamberlain simply did his duty in connection with Dr Jameson's raid, nothing more nor less, and I rather fail to see why the fact of a man having done his duty should necessitate his being bespattered with fulsome praise. There are thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands of poor, obscure souls in this England who every day of their lives conscientiously and

strictly do their duty, and who yet from one year's end to another never receive one single word of approbation. A recent biographer of Mr Chamberlain, Mr S. H. Jeyes, who has brought his book distinctly up to date, by including in it an account of Mr Chamberlain's course of action in reference to the Transvaal raid, has not paid the subject of his biography much of a compliment by remarking that Mr Chamberlain arrived at the conclusion that Dr Jameson's action was a mistake while the issue was still uncertain, while it was generally believed that Dr Jameson was almost sure of success. Without an hour's hesitation, says the biographer, Mr Chamberlain disavowed and denounced the project, and did all that could be done to prevent it being carried out, and did it knowing that he would be reviled by every chauvinist in the Empire had Dr Jameson but ridden into Johannesburg at the head of a victorious troop. Any statesman, says Mr Jeyes, who was merely possessed of a cool head would eventually have reached the same judgment, but Mr Chamberlain reached it in a moment's notice, and acted upon it without waiting to see how things would turn out. All this is no doubt perfectly true, but why mention it, why point out as a feather in Mr Chamberlain's cap that he did not wait to see how the cat jumped? As I before said, the end can never justify the means, and even if Dr Jameson had ridden into Johannesburg, flushed with victory and elated with success, the duty of Her Majesty's Government would still have been the same.

As regards Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Colony and Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, I shall say very little. Sir Hercules is an estimable gentleman, who would be in his proper place at home at his own fireside instead of being in the midst of all the toil and turmoil and worry and trouble attendant on his dual, inconsistent, and utterly irreconcilable position in South Africa. Sir Hercules has passed the age of three-score-and-ten years, and, I think I may say as a general rule that when men are getting on for the fourscore years mentioned by Solomon, they are much better by their own fireside than directing and controlling the affairs of the Empire. I was very much struck by a recent remark of Cardinal Vaughan in reference to some action of his great predecessor, the late Cardinal Manning. Cardinal Vaughan observed that he believed that as men advanced in years, towards and above fourscore, although there might be no falling off in the vigour of the intellectual faculties, or even physically, there nearly always was as regards judgment. This seemed to me, even in the light of one's own experience, a particularly true remark, and for this reason I must confess that, where possible, even in business matters, much less in affairs of State and momentous concerns, I like to see younger men with all their faculties about them at the helm exercising full control over the ship, having an accurate knowledge of rocks and shoals and currents and winds and meteorological

conditions generally, with their nerves perfect, their digestion unimpaired and their brain unclouded.

And now a few reflections in reference to a man, and a very estimable man, too, who has been much maligned in this country, and who has not had any opportunity of being heard in his own defence. I refer to Sir Jacobus De Wet, the British Agent in the Transvaal. Sir Jacobus has a Dutch name and is no doubt of Dutch descent, but the fact of his having a Dutch name is no reason why he should be termed "a Dutchman" by certain newspapers in this country, or that it should be insinuated right and left that the British Agent was nothing more nor less than a Boer spy. There probably never was any libel more gross than this, or more utterly devoid of any foundation and fact. As a matter of fact, Sir Jacobus is in feeling and sympathy a thorough Englishman, and my information leads me to believe that Her Majesty has no more loyal and zealous servant in South Africa than this gentleman. It seems to me that the utterly false ideas which have gained credence here respecting Sir Jacobus De Wet are entirely the outcome of the attacks levelled at him in certain journals. I must apologise to my readers for once more inflicting this subject upon them. It is, however, for the last time, and I purpose quoting here an extract from one of the "open letters," to which I have already referred, published in the *Johannesburg Critic*, and addressed to Sir Jacobus De Wet. Here is the manner in which the writer addresses publicly Her Majesty's

representative in the Transvaal, in reference to some alleged dereliction of duty on Sir Jacobus' part, of which the writer constituted himself judge and censor.

"Surely if you had been doing your duty, even only in so far as transmitting information, these deliberate falsehoods would have been contradicted as soon as uttered? Were you sampling Mr Kruger's tobacco at the time—not the commando bag, be it understood—or were you passing the bottle with Messrs Leyds and Esselen, or, possibly, getting *reliable* information in General Joubert's back parlour from that doughty warrior's own lips? Upon my word, it looks like it. Altogether there seem too much Jacobus, and too little De Wet or de Wit about the whole business. I trust I am not wronging you, but you must pardon me if I am, for I can only judge from the evidence of facts. I find a British Commissioner in residence at Pretoria with obvious duties. I find also that the British settlers are treated worse and worse every year, until the last crowning indignity—an attempt on their personal liberty—is even undertaken. I note that no improvement to their position seems possible until they are driven to take the law into their own hands. All the while our Resident continues on the very best possible terms with the oppressors of his own countrymen, the former, be it understood, being his own kith and kin.

"I believe you were chosen to fill the post you occupy for the very reason that you could patter

the *taal* and understood the bucolic peculiarities of the country so well that there was no danger of your offending susceptibilities like any raw Englishman might have done. If such be the case, I can only commend the wisdom of the selection from the Transvaal point of view. I do not think you have trodden on one single Burgher's corn or abraised the most prominent of Republican bunions. I believe that when the time comes for you to be relieved from your onerous position, every member of the dopper and *reimschoen* community will fetch out his private stocking to honour you with a public banquet, and I have no doubt whatever that if the Golden Eagle had not had its unfledged pinions prematurely extracted, after the Executive itself, you would have been the first recipient of this crowning *honour*.

"In conclusion, I can only say: 'Well done, good and faithful servant, you have succeeded for once in serving two masters.'"

The English language, in my opinion, does not contain words sufficiently strong to characterise an attack such as this on a man, who, from his position, is precluded from replying to it as it deserves.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSVAAL

ANY book dealing even in a sketchy manner with the Transvaal and the Boers, cannot, even if it would, omit some consideration, however theoretical it is and must undoubtedly be, of the future of that country. That the future has many problems which must be solved, I cheerfully admit, and that the Government of the Transvaal will have many difficulties to encounter is not only probable but certain. In spite of temporary interruptions in the working of some of the mines and a decreased output for January 1896, in consequence of the disturbances, it is pretty well certain that the population of the Rand will steadily increase and that the immigrants will view, possibly with jealousy and certainly with disfavour, any prolongation of Boer rule. Of course the matter, the "grievance," I suppose, I had better term it, will not be put in this bald way. There has not been, and assuredly there will not be, any difficulty whatever in detailing any number of "grievances," and giving them that air of plausibility necessary to impress

people in this country that they are *bona-fide*. I was particularly struck with this fact a short time ago in perusing an article contributed to the *Pall Mall Gazette*, entitled "The Ruin of the Rand." The alliteration is taking, and the article, if I may say so, was eminently readable. And yet its tendency, I will not say its object, was fallacious throughout, and anyone perusing it and accepting the statements therein contained, would have derived an absolutely erroneous and entirely incorrect idea regarding affairs in the Rand. As an example in point of what I say, let me quote the following extract:—

"The settled policy of the Boer, from the moment he perceived that the indefinite expansion of the mining industry meant the downfall of his political ascendancy, has been to check the natural growth of the threatening element by studied discouragements and more or less covert restraints. He will now be spurred on by the passions of victory to new and more ambitious efforts in the same direction. What has been complained of in the past? That oppressive monopolies, enjoyed by foreign vampires, needlessly enhanced the cost of producing gold and prevented the working of low-grade ores. Recent events will not cause the foreign vampires to loose their hold; rather will they bring in their train a new horde of monopolists to batten upon the industry, men who have been seeking for years past an opportunity to prey upon its vitals, but who have hitherto been kept at bay. It will be easy for these *exploiteurs* to establish a claim upon the recognition of a grateful

Government, and their importunity will be no longer denied. The monstrous exactions of the Netherlands Railway Company have been another fertile source of discontent. Will these exactions be lessened after the Chamber of Mines is practically broken up, as it must have been by recent events, and none remain to disturb the hallowed peace of the financiers at Amsterdam and Berlin, in whose behalf that enterprise is run? Hitherto the sole mitigation of Netherland's extortion has lain in the fact that the Cape Free State railways have come within forty miles of the Rand; but it is virtually certain that the Free State will now throw in its lot with the Transvaal, the railways which were built for the Republic by the Cape Colony will be expropriated by the aid of Transvaal gold, and the last state of the unfortunate industry will, in this matter, be worse than the first. Its isolation will now be complete.

"For several years a fight has been raging over the right to mine numerous deep-level claims, known as *bewaarplaatsen*. The German blood-sucker fastened with characteristic determination upon these, heedless of the fact that he had no sort of claim to them, equally heedless of the circumstance that in some cases they were a matter of life and death to the outcrop company to whom they legitimately belonged. By dint partly of appeals to the honesty of the better class of Boer representatives, partly to bribery of the baser sort, the fate of these valuable properties has been warded off up to the present time in the hope that

something would happen to bring in the reign of honesty and fairplay. It is easy to forecast what will happen now.

"Year in and year out the cry has gone up that the efficiency of native labour was impaired, crimes and brutalities unspeakable were provoked, and a premium was placed upon the theft of raw gold by the absence of police and the presence of unlimited canteens. Additions are to be made to the standing army of the Republic as a consequence of recent events; but we hear nothing of additions to the civil police, and there is too much reason to fear that bad liquor will flow even more freely in the future than it has flowed in the past.

"The customs' tariff has been a scandal of the first magnitude. Everything the Outlander consumed has been taxed to an extent which few in England can imagine. The Boer, while exceedingly careful not to tax himself, seemed to grudge the unwelcome alien almost the very air he breathed. He will doubtless discover, under the new dispensation, some means of bringing even the greatest of God's gifts within his capacious net. Forts cannot be built to overawe Johannesburg, citadels cannot be raised at the capital to provide a secure retreat for the spurious Republicans in their inevitable hour of need, unless the mining industry can be made to bear the cost."

Of course anyone who knows anything practically of the Rand, and regards the matter, not from a capitalist, but from a moral point of view, will not be taken in by this sort of writing, however deftly it is

executed. The Boers are in the Transvaal because they desired to dwell apart, live to themselves and lead a pastoral life away from the busy haunts of men. They invited no greedy capitalists, no hungry plutocrats, ravenous after pelf and dross, to come and occupy their land and extract its wealth in order to get rich quickly and hurry out of the country to squander their gains in the debaucheries of great cities. If these hunters after pelf choose to come to the Transvaal they must take matters as they find them, and if they don't like it—well, there is the alternative! The Boer, as I have more than once observed in this book, has been abused and maligned and execrated by sundry people who have had an interest, and a deep interest, too, in maligning, abusing and execrating him. Let me, before I conclude, call one witness to the contrary. A great man now gone to his reward, a great writer, a great historian, whose memory will be cherished as long as the English language endures—I refer to the late Mr J. A. Froude—now, what says he of the Boer? Here is his testimony: "They were rough, but they had rude virtues which are not the less virtues because in these latter days they are growing scarce. They are a very devout people, maintaining their churches and ministers with excessive liberality. Their houses being so far apart, they cannot send their children to school and generally have tutors for them at home. Religious observances are attended to scrupulously in their household. The Boers of South Africa, of all human beings now on this

planet, correspond nearest to Horace's description of the Roman peasant soldiers who defeated Pyrrhus and Hannibal. There alone you will find obedience to parents as strict as among the ancient Sabines, the *severa mater*, whose sons fetch and carry at her bidding, who, when those sons go to fight for their country, will hand their rifles to them and bid them return with their arms in their hand, or else not return at all." Proceeding to refer to the Boer methods of administering their country, Mr Froude goes on to remark: "Their methods were not our methods, and, were easily misrepresented. Stories were told—untrue generally, but not wholly without foundation—of Boers on the borders of the Transvaal kidnapping native children or purchasing them, of plundering tribes and bringing them up as slaves under the disguise of apprentices. The Transvaal Government severely and successfully repressed these proceedings. I say successfully, because in the years during which the Transvaal was again a British province, cases of the kind would have been brought to light had any then existed, and not a single child was discovered in the condition described. Yet these practices were reported to England as ascertained facts, and were honestly believed. The Boers were held to have broken their engagement, and many excellent people among us insisted that we were neglecting our duty in leaving them uncontrolled." How history does repeat itself! Lies were the principal weapon in former campaigns against the Boers by interested parties who coveted their land and their heritage, and lies

are seemingly again to-day the only weapon against which the Boers cannot successfully contend.

Mr Froude was not only a man of sound judgment, he was, moreover, a far-seeing statesman. His remarks in his work, *Oceana*, on the future of South Africa, including, of course, the future of the Transvaal, are particularly apposite at the present moment when the future of the Transvaal is likely to become a burning and practical question. Mr Froude, as my readers are no doubt aware, had a mission in the beginning of the eighties in connection with Lord Carnarvon's grandly-conceived but ill-timed scheme for a confederation of the various states and colonies of South Africa. "If," says Mr Froude, "the Transvaal had ever received proper treatment and fairness from the English Government, or had we lent her a hand in our native difficulties, there would have been some chance of the desired confederation. A little help of money to the Transvaal, a few kind words, the concession of a fair western frontier and an intimation to the border tribes that we and the Dutch were henceforth friends, and that an injury to them would be taken as an injury to the British Crown, and every Dutchman in South Africa would have torn the leaves out of his book of grievances and have forgotten them for ever. But Lord Carnarvon mistook the nature of the warm feeling which he had aroused. He supposed it to be in favour of his confederation scheme, with which it had nothing directly to do; he felt

that to bring about a South African Dominion would be understood and admired in England as a brilliant and useful political achievement. The Transvaal appeared the key of the situation. With the Transvaal an English province again, the Orange Free State would be compelled to follow. He had recovered in some degree the Dutch confidence. It was a plant of tender growth, but he believed that it would now bear pressure. The life of English ministries is short. If they are to achieve anything they must act promptly or they may leave the chance to their successors. The Transvaal treasury was empty, and an occupation of the country would at the moment be unresisted. He was assured by the South African English—at least, by many of them—that the Transvaal farmers were sick of their independence and would welcome annexation. He could count on the support of both parties in Parliament. Mr Courtney, I believe, was the only English member of the Legislature who protested. I, myself, was certain that to take over (as it was called) the Transvaal would undo the effect of his past action, and would bring back the old bitterness. The step was taken. The 'South African Republic,' so proud of its independence that it had struck a coinage of its own, was declared British territory. 'Confederation,' which had been made absolutely impossible, was next to follow, and Sir Bartle Frere was sent to the Cape as Governor to carry it out. How he fared is fresh in our memories. His task was

from the first hopeless. Yet he could not or would not understand it to be hopeless. He was not even told the truth. It was said that the native tribes were too strong; that if South Africa were confederated, they would have to deal with the Caffres, Basutos, Zulus, etc., single-handed, and that they were not equal to it. If this was the difficulty, Sir Bartle could sweep it away. Hitherto, we had at least affected a wish to protect the coloured races. Now all was changed. He found an excuse in a paltry border dispute for a new Caffre war. He carried fire and sword over the Kei, dismissing his ministers and appointing others who were more willing to go along with him in his dangerous course. He broke up the Zulus after a resistance, which won for them more credit than the ultimate conquest brought honour to ourselves. South Africa was wet with blood, and all these crimes and follies had been committed for a shadow which was no nearer than before. The Zulus had been enemies of the Boers, but their destruction had not reconciled the Boers to the loss of their liberty. They demanded back their independence in dogged, determined tones. Sir Garnet Wolseley's campaign against Secocoeni, who had once defeated them, made no difference. The Liberal party in England began to declare in their favour. They learnt at last that the Liberal leader had condemned the annexation as adopted under false pretences, and when the Liberals came into power in 1880, they counted with certainty that their com-

plaints would be attended to. We could at that time have withdrawn with dignity, and the Boers would have perceived again that when we were convinced of a mistake we were willing to repair it. But I suppose (and this is the essential difficulty in our colonial relations) that the Government knew it would be right to do, but were afraid to do it, in fear of an adverse vote in the Parliament to which they were responsible, and party interests at home were too important to be sacrificed to the welfare of remote communities. It was decided that before the complaints of the Transvaal Boers could be heard, they must first acknowledge the Queen's authority. They had taken arms for their freedom, and did not choose to lay them down when the rulers of England had themselves admitted they were in the right. Then followed the war which we all remember, where a series of disasters culminated on Majuba Hill and the death of Sir George Colley.

"I, for one, cannot blame the Government for declining to prosecute further a bloody struggle in a cause which they had already condemned. I blame them rather for having entered upon it at all. To concede after defeat what might have been conceded gracefully when our defeat was on both sides thought impossible, was not without a nobleness of its own. But it was to diminish infallibly the influence of England in South Africa, and to elate and encourage the growing party, whose hope was, and is to see it vanish altogether. Had we

persisted, superior strength and resources must have succeeded in the end. But the war would have passed beyond the limits of the Transvaal. It must have been a war of conquest against the whole Dutch population who would have taken part in it. We should have brought a scandal on our name. We should and must have brought to the verge of destruction a brave and honourable people. We should have provoked the censure, we might perhaps have even provoked the interposition of other Powers. For these reasons I think that Mr Gladstone did well in consenting to a peace, although it was a peace which affected painfully the position and feelings of the English South African colonists, and could not fail to leave a dangerous sting behind it. The peace was right. It was a pity only that as a balm to our wounded pride we insisted on stipulations which could not, or would not, be observed, while we had left ourselves no means of enforcing them. Some concession, I suppose, was necessary to irritated pride at home, but the conditions which we inserted in the treaty were a legacy from our earlier errors, and that they came to be mentioned at all was a pure calamity. Having swallowed the draught, we might as well have swallowed it completely without leaving drops in the bottom of the cup. The origin of all the anger of the Transvaal people had been the arming the native chiefs against them from the diamond fields. These chiefs had remained our allies in the war. We could not, or thought we could not, leave them without tak-

ing security for them and their territories. I think it would have been better, though it might have seemed unhandsome, to have fallen back on the Orange River Treaty and resolved to meddle no more in the disputes between the Boers and these tribes. Had we maintained our authority, we could have maintained the tribes by our side; but to abandon the country and to insist at the same time that the inhabitants of it should fall into their natural relations was to reserve artificially a certain cause of future troubles. The chiefs whom we called our friends had been drawn into an attitude of open menace against the Boers. The Boers were not to be blamed if they preferred to form settlements of their own in those territories that they might not be exposed again to the same danger."

I have inserted this copious extract from Mr Froude's great work because it seems to me to have a vast bearing upon, not only the present, but the future of the Transvaal, as well of South Africa generally. I, myself, am and always have been, a firm believer in a confederation of the South African Colonies and States. But such a confederation must be the outcome of the spontaneous desire on the part of all the Colonies and States affected, and there must be a total absence, of not merely force, but of anything savouring of undue pressure to bring about such a happy consummation. One thing is certain, the Boers must be permitted not only to retain their independence but to have that pastoral existence conserved, for which they have sacrificed so much.

As Mr. Froude rightly remarks, it only requires a little generosity, a little careful handling, some consideration for feelings and sentiments and ideas, with which we are unable to sympathise for the simple reason that we cannot understand them, to make the Dutch population of South Africa as friendly and cordially disposed towards Great Britain as is the French population of Canada. Believe me, there is no hatred of, no ill-feeling towards, Englishmen, as Englishmen, in the Transvaal Republic. What the Boers hate is the crew of gold-grabbers who swarm in the Rand and who are regarded by the simple farmers of the Transvaal as something approaching the children of Satan. These simple-minded, pious, primitive Christians who finish up their uneventful day of dull routine with praise and prayer in the bosom of their family, have nothing in common with, and could hardly be expected to have anything in common with, the gold-grabber who, so far as I know, is not given to indulging in prayer and praise even when his profits have been unduly large. The Boer in his notions of life and his mode of livelihood, his ideas and sentiment is a cross between our Puritan forefathers and the ancient Israelite. The modern Uitlander is essentially a product of the latter part of the nineteenth century, and let me sincerely hope that nature will not reproduce him in any future type. In my humble opinion, if this Boer question is handled with foresight and judgment, and dealt with justly and honestly, the South African problem becomes a very simple one. Once let us conciliate the Boers

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of the Transvaal, once let us make them believe that they can rely upon the friendship of England, and that their independence is guaranteed and will be safeguarded by England, and we shall find the whole Dutch population of South Africa drawn by imperceptible cords of sympathy and goodwill towards the Paramount Power in South Africa. The outcome of such a state of things, the possibilities, vast and grand beyond question, which it opens up, are to me singularly entrancing. I can see in my mind, though I shall probably not live to see it in the flesh, a vast confederation under the protection of Great Britain occupying, shall I say South Africa, or shall I say the greater portion of that dark Continent which will then be no longer dark? I see a happy and contented and prosperous population, drawn from the unemployed in this country, developing the untold wealth, mineral and vegetable, of that rich land, keeping up the best traditions of the English race, and building up slowly but surely an empire which will in time, in the centuries to come, mayhap rule the world and replace that British Empire which will then, in accordance with those mysterious laws which affect empires and nations, as well as individuals, have ceased to exist, having accomplished the purposes for which Providence permitted it to increase and prosper, and extend and grow in wealth and greatness as did, too, the Greek and Roman Empires.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I HAVE now accomplished the task I had set before me. As I said at the beginning of this book, so now I repeat at the close, it makes no pretensions to literary merit. It is merely a rough-and-ready and hurried production of a man who has no time to cultivate style, and who has to dash off his ideas and impressions during odd moments at various portions of the day. But I felt, and felt deeply, that the Boers had not had justice done to them in this country. I felt, and I still think, that taking the great mass of literature, ephemeral and otherwise, which has appeared in connection with the Transvaal Question, the Boer side of the question has scarcely if at all, been heard. And so I determined that if no one else would take up the cudgels on their behalf, I would to the best of my poor ability. All I ask the reader of this book is that he will, in perusing and considering it, clear his mind of cant

and prejudice and those preconceived ideas generally, which are so fatal to arriving at a sound judgment upon any matter, public or private. No man, at least no honest man, could deny that the Boers have for many decades past been treated by successive British Governments and Cape Governors with gross injustice, or that the time has not assuredly now come when we should attempt to rectify this matter, and to see that they shall, though late in the day, have at least justice. A man can be enthusiastic about these simple peasant farmers, whose only desire is to serve God in solitude, and to possess and till the land and enjoy the fruits thereof in due season, in peace and quietness. But who could get up the slightest enthusiasm for the financiers of Johannesburg, men who think of nothing, speak of little and are concerned about hardly anything but gold? These men have practically deified the precious metal; they have set up another golden calf in Johannesburg, and they cannot understand, much less sympathise, with these poor farmers, these simple heroes, who disdain to fall down and worship this bovine deity. Frankly speaking, I cannot keep my patience with men who prate about the wrongs of the Uitlanders and ask us to rise to heights of pity and to excesses of enthusiasm over the "grievances of the Uitlanders." For myself, I care not whether they get the franchise or not, for I know full well that they themselves care nothing. As I have said, over and over again, I repeat here as my last word, that the so-called grievances of the Uitlanders have been, and are, a

mere blind to the carrying out of their nefarious projects, and that their only object has been, and still is, to get possession of the Rand, in order to possess its riches for themselves and themselves alone.

APPENDIX

PRESS TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS IN THE DATE OF THEIR ORDER OF RECEIPT

EXTRACT FROM "THE GALWAY VINDICATOR"

12th December 1895

MR W. F. REGAN

It will be perceived, from an advertisement in our columns, that Mr Regan is about to publish a work illustrative of the present state of the Transvaal, giving the respective positions of Boers and Uitlanders. Just now this is a very interesting question, so that Mr Regan's work will be most acceptable to the public, as accurate knowledge is essential. Mr Regan's capability for the task he has undertaken is unquestionable, as he is well informed on all questions connected with the Transvaal Republic.

[TRANSVAAL CRISIS

EXTRACT FROM "PALL MALL GAZETTE"

1st January 1896

TRANSVAAL CRISIS

Exaggerations and Alarms

The following telegram from Johannesburg was received in London this morning by Mr Regan of Threadneedle Street :—"The reported exodus of British subjects exaggerated ; people leaving on business. If said to be leaving on grounds of alarm, no truth in this. May session of Volksraad will concede many demands, and meet grievance in fair spirit. Mines not closing ; no intention. Advise moderation.—VAN BUREN." Subsequently a further telegram was received, stating that President Kruger was calling the citizens to arms, and that the situation was very serious.

EXTRACT FROM "THE SUN," 2d January 1896

THE RAID ON THE RAND

Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who is the owner of several farms in the Transvaal, informs the Press Association that he has received news from a continental source that Dr Jameson has not arrived at Johannesburg, and that as yet no collision has taken place between his force and the Boers.

EXTRACT FROM 'THE EVENING STANDARD'

2d January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL

A representative of the Exchange Telegraph Company had an interview this afternoon with Mr W. F. Regan, and was informed by that gentleman that as yet it was impossible to receive messages from Johannesburg, but from continental sources he had heard that Jameson was expected there, and that he had not as yet come to blows with the Boers. Mr Regan's impression is that the representative of Her Majesty's Government had come up with Jameson's forces and used influence with President Kruger to prevent a collision.

EXTRACT FROM "PALL MALL GAZETTE"

3d January 1896

THE CRISIS IN THE TRANSVAAL

Jameson to be Court-Martialled—His Followers to be Released

Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, has received the following message:—"Jameson to be tried—his followers to be released."

[THE TRANSVAAL

EXTRACT FROM "THE EVENING STANDARD"

3d January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL

Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, has received the following message:—"Jameson to be tried by court-martial. Followers will be released."

Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who is a considerable landowner in the Transvaal, and intimately conversant with Transvaal affairs, in an interview with the representative of the Press Association this morning, called attention to the fact that he was the first to communicate to the Press a cablegram which he received from Johannesburg, in which it was stated that the reports received from that country were greatly exaggerated. He considered that the fact of the citizens of Johannesburg remaining quiet, and not joining hands with Jameson, goes to prove that the cable message from his correspondent, Mr Van Buren, represented the true state of affairs and the feeling of the people of Johannesburg. From his own experience he felt certain that the Boer Government will exercise moderation, and he considers that our people at home should exercise a little more caution and self-control.

EXTRACT FROM "THE SUN," 3d January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL

Jameson to be Tried

Mr W. F. Regan, who has large interests in South Africa and good sources of information, has received the

following important message:—"Jameson to be tried by court-martial. Followers will be released." This indicates that President Kruger means to use his victory moderately. Peace may now be restored again; and everyone will hope that, grave as was his error, the unlucky doctor will be set free at the end. The danger of taking private enterprise into partnership with foreign statescraft has, by the events of the past few days, been abundantly demonstrated.

EXTRACT FROM "THE STAR," 3d January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL—JAMESON'S FATE

His Followers to be Released—Himself to be Court-Martialed

The Central News says Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, has received the following message:—"Jameson to be tried by court-martial. Followers to be released."

EXTRACT FROM "THE EVENING STANDARD"

4th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL

This afternoon Mr Regan showed a representative of the Exchange Telegraph Company a letter he had received to-day from Buluwayo, dated 20th November. The writer stated that a force was then being organised, and that serious business was evidently intended. It is believed

that this was the force under Dr Jameson, that its concentration on the Transvaal border was known to Kruger and his colleagues, and that Jameson, assuming that Johannesburg would extend help to him, disregarded secrecy.

EXTRACT FROM "THE SUN," 4th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL—BATTLE OF KRUGERSDORP

Premeditated

This afternoon Mr W. F. Regan showed a reporter of the Exchange Telegraph Company a letter he had received to-day from Buluwayo, dated November 20th. The writer stated that a force was then being organised, and that serious business was evidently intended.

EXTRACT FROM "THE OBSERVER," 4th January 1896

REGAN'S DESPATCHES

The Foreign Office and the English people have again to thank Mr W. F. Regan, whose restless enterprise in Africa and rapid movements by means of a perfectly organised system have astonished everyone. Mr Regan was the first man in England to make public the breaking out of war in the Transvaal. We give to-day a full report of Wednesday's news. Within 20 minutes after receipt of cable message from Johannesburg, Mr Regan despatched to this office the alarming intelligence that Dr Jameson had crossed the frontier and was marching upon Johannes-

burg. We believe Mr Regan mailed from his London Office on Wednesday, between the hours of 10 and 11 o'clock a.m. to various parts of Europe no less than 190 telegrams. A section of the London Press compares Mr Regan to Bonaparte, whilst by London City men our townsman is now styled "Lightning William."

EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS," 4th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL WAR—A BRITISH OFFICER PRECIPITATES
A CRISIS

Mr W. F. Regan has the First News

On Wednesday the news was flashed across the wires by Mr W. F. Regan that Dr Jameson with 800 men had invaded Transvaal territory. The news created quite a panic all over Europe, and there has been great fluctuations in the money market since.

EXTRACT FROM "THE LONDON TIMES "

4th January 1896

The Press Association says that Mr Regan, an African merchant in London, has received a telegram, *via* the Continent, stating that Jameson's followers will be released by the Boers on proper guarantees being given. Dr Jameson is to be tried before Supreme Court.

EXTRACT FROM "THE PEOPLE," 5th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL

Views of a South African Land-owner

The Press Association is informed by Mr W. F. Regan (of Threadneedle Street, the owner of several farms in South Africa) that he has received a letter from the Buluwayo Club, dated November 20th last, in which it was stated that a force was then being organised. This force, Mr Regan is of opinion, was the one under Jameson, which has recently been defeated. A portion of the letter has been produced to us, and the writer goes on to say that serious business is evidently intended, as great attention is being paid to the general character and strength of the force. Mr Regan believes that the concentration of such a force in Bechuanaland and on the Transvaal border was known to President Kruger, and that Dr Jameson, believing that Johannesburg would extend a helping hand to him when he was once over the frontier, disregarded secrecy. Mr Regan says that he does not believe that the Home Government knew anything of the existing state of affairs in Rhodesia, and though Mr Rhodes may have heard of the intention of the Rhodesian commanders, it is quite possible that he advised Dr Jameson to abstain from hostilities. Mr Regan then referred to the fact that he had sent out earlier in the week two telegrams referring to the events in the Transvaal. Mr Regan contends that, in the light of subsequent events, it must be admitted that his information was correct in every detail. All through this business he had his news from the Continent, which went to prove that Germany was in sympathy with the

Boers and had been in a position to obtain intelligence before us. He had been disgusted at reading in the papers during the past few days that "as Jameson and their men had made their beds so they must take the consequences," as any interference on their behalf or a plea for mercy to Kruger would be nothing short of dragging our national honour in the mud. "Shame!" he said. "Were we going to desert a brave man who has helped to build up our power in South Africa?" Away with the national honour for the moment. Let us keep before us the fact that, although the Administrator's act had been a rash one, it was done with the object of protecting, as he thought, the lives of his fellow-countrymen who were supposed to be in danger. It is quite possible that if the request was made to Kruger that Jameson be handed over to the British Government, *who would institute an inquiry and deal with his case*, the request might be granted. Kruger was not the man represented by the majority of the Press in this country. All who knew him intimately admitted that his instincts were humane, and that he had during his term of office endeavoured to do what was right, and hold the scales equally between both parties. Asked what he thought of the situation generally, Mr Regan stigmatised the business as an unfortunate one, and in his opinion it had given the Boer Government a new lease of life for at least ten years, or in any case during Kruger's lifetime. The moral support of Germany and Holland, as well as the Orange Free State, must strengthen the Boer position.

N.B.—It will be observed that the suggestion I made in this letter as to handing over Dr Jameson to the British Government has been carried out in its entirety.

EXTRACT FROM "WEEKLY TIMES AND ECHO"**5th January 1896****THE TRANSVAAL CRISIS**

Yesterday afternoon Mr. W. F. Regan showed a Press representative a letter he had received from Buluwayo, dated November 20th. The writer stated that a force was then being organised, and that serious business was evidently intended. It is believed that this news, with the intention to concentrate the force on the Transvaal border, was known to Kruger and his colleagues, but that Jameson, assuming that Johannesburg would extend help to him, disregarded secrecy.

EXTRACT FROM "PALL MALL GAZETTE"**6th January 1896****THE LATEST RUMOUR REGARDING DR JAMESON**

Mr Regan, it is stated, has received from Amsterdam a cable to the effect that not a hair of Dr Jameson's head will be harmed, and he and his followers will presently be released on parole as soon as certain arrangements are completed with the British Representative conferring with the Transvaal Government.

EXTRACT FROM "THE FINANCIAL TIMES"**7th January 1896****THE CAPE CRISIS**

Mr W. F. Regan, the well-known South African authority, is confident that Jameson's life will not be sacrificed.

He informs us that he has received a telegram from Amsterdam this afternoon, to the effect that not a hair of Jameson's head would be harmed. The Administrator and his followers will presently be released on parole, or as soon as certain arrangements have been completed between the British representative at Pretoria and the Transvaal Government.

EXTRACT FROM "THE DAILY TELEGRAPH"

7th January 1896

GERMAN INTRIGUES AGAINST ENGLAND

Mr Regan, who is conversant with the affairs of the South African Republic, remarked in an interview:—"In regard to the attitude of Germany at this time, it must not be forgotten that during the past six months the Press of that country has been publishing articles from German residents in Johannesburg, the prevalent tone of these communications pointing to the possibility of some such state of affairs as now exists." Mr Regan has received, *via* Amsterdam, a cable to the effect that not one hair of Dr Jameson's head will be harmed, and that the Administrator and his followers will presently be released on parole, as soon as certain arrangements are completed with the British Representative now conferring with the Transvaal Government.

EXTRACT FROM "THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE"

8th January 1896

THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Exchange Telegraph Company has received the following message from Mr Regan:—"I have it from Transvaal official sources that the Administrator will not be shot. A conference between Kruger and the British Representative is about to take place, and you will hear presently that Kruger has exercised his clemency. If Jameson had happened to be my own brother, I should not feel in the least alarmed."

EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS," 8th January 1896

INTERVIEW WITH A TRANSVAAL LANDOWNER

Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who is a considerable landowner in the Transvaal, and intimately conversant with Transvaal affairs, in the course of an interview with the Press Association stated that it had been known for some days to the people in Johannesburg that Dr Jameson was in the immediate neighbourhood of the Transvaal border, and his opinion was that the British residents in Johannesburg, thinking that their lives and property were in danger, had made an appeal to Jameson for protection. Jameson's men were in a compact body, under a leader, whereas Kruger's forces

were scattered, and some of the Boers might have cut the wires to prevent any news reaching points outside the Transvaal until such time as the Boers could gather in force to strike an effective blow. There was to be a meeting of residents in Johannesburg on the 6th January to demand a redress of grievances from the Boer Government, and President Kruger was under the impression that after that meeting a popular rising might take place, and there was not the least doubt that he was massing his forces in order to quell what he would consider a rebellion. This would naturally alarm the populace, and lead to their appealing to Dr Jameson for assistance. From what he knew of Dr Jameson's determination, he was not a man to be prevented from going to Johannesburg if he thought his presence there was required.

EXTRACT FROM "THE GALWAY VINDICATOR"

8th January 1896

STATEMENT BY MR REGAN

Our *Irish Times*' representative had some conversation with Mr Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who, speaking of circumstances within his knowledge, remarked:—"In regard to the attitude of Germany at this time it must not be forgotten that during the past six months the Press of that country has been publishing attacks from German residents in Johannesburg, the prevalent tone of these communications pointing to the possibility of some such state of affairs as now exists."

Later in the day, Mr Regan informed us that he had received, *via* Amsterdam, a cable to the effect that not one hair of Dr Jameson's head will be harmed, and that the Administrator and his followers will presently be released on parole, as soon as certain arrangements are completed with the British Representative conferring with the Transvaal Government.

EXTRACT FROM "THE SUN," 8th January 1896

TRANSVAAL CRISIS

Jameson Tried and Sentenced to Death

The Exchange Telegraph Company has received the following message from Mr W. F. Regan, 41 Threadneedle Street:—

"It is quite true that Jameson has been tried and sentenced to death, but I have it from Transvaal official sources that the Administrator will not be shot. A conference between Kruger and the British Representative is about to take place."

EXTRACT FROM "THE ECHO," 10th January 1896

TELEGRAPHIC DIFFICULTIES

One feature of the present crisis has been the great interruption of the telegraphic service. Private enterprise has, however, on several occasions supplied the deficiency, and the public have to thank, among others, Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who has forwarded from time to time to the newspapers copies of

important and authentic cablegrams received by him some hours before the same intelligence has reached the Government.

Message from Mr Regan

Mr W. F. Regan has sent a message to the Exchange Telegraph Company, in which he says :—"It is not true that President Kruger has made exorbitant demands. Certain claims have been made and guarantees demanded, of a nature that will be impossible, under the circumstances, for Her Majesty's Government to refuse ; and Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Jacobus de Wet have admitted the moderation of the Transvaal Government. Under the treaty entered into with Mr Gladstone's Government, it was laid down that the frontier should be protected, and the British covenanted to prevent raids on the Transvaal. That being so, the Boer executive are justified in claiming, under the law of nations, adequate compensation for infringement. President Kruger has withheld the just resentment of his people, and in a difficult and momentous crisis exhibited chivalrous forbearance. It is quite true that a commission is about to proceed to Rhodesia with the object of inquiring into the circumstances of Jameson's raid. All the evidence necessary for Mr Chamberlain's purposes will be furnished."

EXTRACT FROM "THE MINING WORLD"

11th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL AND RHODESIA

Mr W. F. Regan is one of the largest buyers and sellers of land in South Africa, and his name is just now pro-

minently before the public. He buys and sells on a grand scale, and he himself has stated that few of the Rhodesian Companies have had a connection more or less remote with him. He has also large properties in the Transvaal, and is believed to know more about the Boers, and, perhaps, to be more in their confidence, than any Englishman, not actually in the country. It is also mysteriously whispered that some of the telegrams that he has, to the surprise of most people, been able to get through during the past few days, have come from his Boer friends, but of this we have no actual knowledge, and merely mention the rumour we have heard. The opinions of such a man as Mr Regan, at such a juncture as the present, are worth having, and that gentleman freely expressed them. There is no mystery about him, and when listening to some of his outspoken views, our representative mildly observed:—"Do you wish these placed under your name?" Mr Regan at once answered in the affirmative, and said:—"I am absolutely neutral, and am speaking to you less as a politician than as a business man, though I find it difficult to dissociate the one position from the other." It will, therefore, be seen that Mr Regan inherits in a marked degree the courage of the race, and, like John Knox, "Fears the face of no man."

"Last November," said Mr Regan, "I knew of this movement, and had confirmation of it. I am of opinion that Mr Rhodes has not given the instructions to Dr Jameson on which the latter acted, although his utterances may have led the latter to rely at least on his moral support. I am further of opinion that Kruger has demanded the disbandment of the Chartered Company's forces as being a menace to his Republic, and this request should be granted. I am also of opinion that the troops being

gathered on this side are intended for Mashonaland and Matabeleland, which must not remain unprotected. Furthermore, I think Kruger will grant reasonable concessions, and that harmony, though perhaps not absolute unity, will be restored. It is to our Government Kruger will look for the payment of his indemnity, as under our treaty with him we undertook to prevent raids, a point upon which sufficient stress has not been laid. If the Home Government have to pay, the Executive will want to prevent a recurrence of similar raids, and so they will take possession of the country. History repeats itself. Look back at the circumstances surrounding every charter issued to a group of individuals, and you will find that complications have arisen owing to the ambition of one or two of the group. I know for a fact that within the last six months there has been a 'Young England party' in Rhodesia, and few persons in London have a better opportunity of knowing this than I, because I own large properties there, and Rhodesians fresh from the spot, including the leading spirits of this Young England party, have been visiting my office day by day. Jameson and Willoughby were at the head, and, in my opinion, have been acting independently of Mr Rhodes, who is both judicious and shrewd, and would not give instructions to either to advance unless he had positive proof that the Johannesburgers meant business. Any man who knows Johannesburg and its peculiar population, made up of all nationalities, must conclude that, without a leader and a union (the latter has never existed) the people could not possibly give effectual assistance to Jameson."

"What of the National Union?"

"It is a house divided against itself. A waiting policy should have been pursued, and in time the Boers would be

compelled to give the franchise and then the majority would have elected their own President. But now the Boers have the moral support of the greater part of Europe. Jealousy of England unites them; but hatred of each other disunites them. If Germany did or could send troops to Africa, it would be tantamount to a declaration of war, and every British subject there capable of bearing arms would do so. Reading German papers, and conversing with Germans who are interested in the Transvaal, I gather that the object of Germany would be to send as many of her Socialistic subjects to the Transvaal as possible. And this is the problem we shall have to face. The Emperor's telegram is a partial carrying out of this party policy. The threatened despatch of the fleet by our Government is intended to bring about an immediate settlement of the question, and to prove to Europe that England is prepared to meet, and will not brook interference. Of this action I most strongly approve. As to Dr Jameson, the Government can only try him for misdemeanour under the Foreign Enlistment Act, and were he fined, a subscription would be raised to pay the amount within twenty-four hours. As to its own officers—that is another question. Out of evil will come good. We have been on the brink of a rupture with America, but Congress and the American people approve our action in South Africa. This, I think, will lead to a settlement of our differences with the United States. The Government there, and I know the States well, have to contend with foreign influences of various kinds, including the large German element."

"How did you get your cables through?"

At this point Mr Regan, who had previously been communicative, lapsed into reticence. He applied a match to

a cigar that was already alight ; he smoothed the lappets of his coat—in fact, he did everything but answer the question, but went on to say :—"I consider I was in duty bound to let the public know the news, in order to ease the minds of people who have relatives out there, as to the true state of affairs. My system in Africa is so perfect, that I can command the best news at any time. I have in my employment men on whom I can rely, who have ample funds at their disposal, and whose instructions in an emergency are neither to spare those funds nor themselves. I have been severely criticised over the Ashantee business, because I attacked the policy of the Government in sending out an expedition at enormous expense. I said this expenditure was unnecessary, as not a blow would be struck. I adhere to that opinion, because King Prempeh has made up his mind not to fight the British.

"He sent messengers here whose credentials Mr Chamberlain doubted because they were not sealed ; but how ridiculous it is to lay stress upon such a trifle. I doubt if you could get a seal in all Coomassie, and in my judgment we are very much more savage in asking for such a thing. The bone of contention is the residence of a British Representative in Coomassie. Well, we may establish our agent there in what we think a strong position, but when he retires to the coast he will carry, on return, his life in his hands. Not only will he be subject to dangers that actually exist ; but there is one, Samory by name, who is very ambitious to found an empire of his own, and has given the French a good deal of trouble. We will have, in the near future, to fit out an expedition against this man, which will probably cost two or three millions. Mark you" (said Mr Regan, warningly), "I am certain of this from what I hear from my agents in his country."

"What are your views about the Chartered Company?"

"I should be pleased to hear that the charter had been cancelled, for the Company has, from its inception, adopted a suicidal policy. Take, for instance, one of my properties in Rhodesia. I ship machinery and develop it, and as soon as profitable returns are made, the Company step in and ask for 50 per cent. Such a state of things is unknown elsewhere, and the most the Company should ask for is 10 or 15 per cent. all round. This would be the means of inducing capitalists on a grander scale to develop the mineral resources of the country."

"Where are your properties?"

"I have about 190,000 acres in the Transvaal, in the districts of Rustenburg Waterburg, Lydenburg and Pretoria. I have about 350,000 acres in farms of from 3000 to 6000 acres each in Rhodesia, principally at Bulawayo, Salisbury, Gwelo and Victoria. Having purchased these properties at bed-rock prices, and having improved them, I look to their future profitable sale without misgiving. This crisis has proved to continental nations that countries like the Transvaal and Rhodesia must be very wealthy when more than one power seems ready to go to the brink of war to gain a slice. I have abundant evidence during the past twelve months (and it is on this evidence I have purchased) that Rhodesia is equal in mineral wealth to the Transvaal, and it is on this mineral wealth my chief reliance as a business man is placed. This very day, in this building—Gresham House" (the interview took place in our editorial sanctum), "in the face of this crisis I have sold at a large price a property $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Bulawayo. Last week, I sold in London 60 claims 18 miles from Bulawayo, and I have had during the week three applications from Berlin for

Rhodesian properties. Bear in mind that these are my own properties, and that I am not an agent. I keep on buying and selling. At present there are on the way from Rhodesia the deeds of no fewer than nine separate properties purchased by cable. I have sold estates to almost every Rhodesian Company in London, as well as to private capitalists on the Continent, and look forward in the coming spring to a big boom in South African securities, and to those of Rhodesia more than anywhere else. I purchased recently a property, located close to Buluwayo, some ore from which, when sent to Mr Claudet (assayer to the Bank of England), gave the extraordinary return of 69 ozs. to the ton from one shaft, and 14 ozs. from another. I could scarcely credit these results, but I had confirmation sent by the Mining Commissioner of Buluwayo that a packet of ore crushed by him gave but a little under the above returns. Of course, it is not possible for these returns to be kept up along the line of reef, but they go to prove that the gold is there, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Buluwayo. My policy has been to buy my mining claims as near to a thriving centre or town as possible, so that a purchaser can cable out and ascertain whether my statements are correct. For outlying districts, you have to purchase oxen, and several weeks elapse before you can determine the value of your security. I find that the most promising properties are located close to the towns in Rhodesia, and can only account for this by the fact that, in Lobengula's time, he concentrated his forces as close as possible to that part where minerals could be found ; and the ancient workings appear to prove this."

Mr Regan left with the air of a man confident that his views would prove correct, and most confident of all in the

coming upward movement in Transvaal shares in general, and Rhodesian shares in particular.

EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS," 11th January 1896

BLACK FOR THE UITLANDERS

The important telegram which I publish from South Africa this morning clears up much that was obscure, and confirms the general view of affairs at which we had arrived up to a period, and which I put before you yesterday, in the form of a diary. With regard to the moral aspect of Dr Jameson's action, I must make some remarks in my notes. But so far as the failure of it was concerned, the explanation of it is now perfectly clear. He was betrayed by the Uitlanders, to whose rescue he set forth on the spur of the moment, and for whose relief, in what he believed to be pressing dangers, he and his fellow Englishmen endured the most cruel privations and faced the most terrible risks. The precise details of the conduct of these Uitlander gentry are still somewhat obscure. It is not quite clear whether they made a move at all or whether they made some feeble move and then thought better of it. But two things seem clear, first, they did not support the advance of Dr Jameson, which they had asked for. On the contrary, when Dr Jameson had come within easy distance of Johannesburg, he found not any Uitlanders to meet him, but compact forces of Boers who (as my correspondent describes) replenished their ammunition from Johannesburg while the Uitlanders looked on. Secondly, the Uitlanders, having sent to Dr Jameson to

come and help them, went also to President Kruger to discuss conciliatory measures for averting a crisis. That astute old campaigner was fully equal to the occasion in which the apparently craven conduct of the Uitlanders gave him such signal advantage. He parleyed with Dr Jameson's invokers, while he massed his forces to cut off Dr Jameson himself, and thus it was that Dr Jameson's blunder—for such it was in any case—became also so miserable a failure. I do not wonder that feeling at Cape Town has been deeply moved alike at the desperate pluck of Dr Jameson's Englishmen, and at their despicable betrayal by the Uitlanders of Johannesburg. Unless any information is forthcoming, the feeling of nausea at the spectacle of this betrayal which will prevail on all hands is expressed by my correspondent in a phrase that will stick when he refers to money-grabbers who have not "the pluck of a rat."

But President Kruger has got to live with his rats for all that. The state of feeling at the Cape will give Sir Hercules Robinson a very free hand in negotiating with President Kruger. Men who have no spirit in the assertion of their rights must expect to have those rights as lightly regarded. Still even the meekest of God's creatures, if they are very numerous, must in the long run have some concessions made to them, especially if they are the creatures who do all the money grabbing. President Kruger, therefore, if he is wise, will still grant them something; but in view of the state of feeling in Cape Colony, Sir Hercules Robinson will not be compelled to get as much as otherwise he would. The whole situation is indeed, as I have already said, one which eminently leads into "a great deal," and in the following article I can recall some previous unofficial bargaining. But the first will have to be over Dr Jameson and his fellow prisoners, and it is here that the conduct

of the Uitlanders and the general contempt in which it is held will give Sir Hercules Robinson a fresh card. He will, to put it bluntly, be able to buy Jameson at the cost of the Uitlanders—a very righteous form of vengeance, if it should come to that. The purchase would be all the easier, because, though two wrongs do not make a right, yet, on the other hand, it is never very edifying when pots take to calling kettles black. Sir Hercules Robinson and President Kruger who have met before to discuss questions of filibustering expeditions, will be in a peculiarly favourable condition for realising the appositeness of these remarks.

Meanwhile do not let us fall into any mistake as in some quarters there seems to be a disposition to do, about the resignation of Mr Rhodes. Here also our correspondent's telegram ought to prevent misunderstanding. There is on the one hand no doubt whatever that Dr Jameson did not act with the authority, or to the knowledge of Mr Rhodes. But, on the other hand, Mr Rhodes may be relied upon (as my correspondent puts it) "to face the music." He will meet the situation as it exists, and will do the best he can for British interests in South Africa, and for the Chartered Company, which he has made into an instrument for promoting them. Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that he ceases to be a factor to be reckoned with, because he has resigned the premiership of the Cape Colony, nothing unless it be another statement that we find made to-day, namely, that Sir Gordon Sprigg is the really strong man of the situation. Mr Rhodes was the first man in South Africa before he became Premier. He remains the first man now. The head remains the same, no matter what hat—whether Cape Premier or Chartered Company—is on the top of it. That Mr Rhodes has lost some prestige,

and what is more important, that the causes which he has at heart have lost much by recent events, everybody must admit. It is now Mr Rhodes's task to help in repairing the blunders and making up the lost way. By resigning the Premiership he has helped to smooth Sir Hercules Robinson's path, while receiving for himself more freedom and less responsibility.

EXTRACT FROM "THE MINING WORLD"

11th January 1896

Mr P. Sunburn was one of the few Johannesburgers who came out to help Dr Jameson. He was made prisoner on his way, and the latest news by cable sent to Mr Regan is to this effect:—"Am now in Pretoria's gaol and very comfortable!" 'The Boers appear to have behaved very well to their fallen foes. Jameson, it is said, shed tears of rage over the conduct of the Johannesburgers.

EXTRACT FROM "THE MANCHESTER WEEKLY TIMES"

17th January 1896

MR W. F. REGAN AND KRUGER'S DEMANDS

Mr W. F. Regan has sent the following message to the Press:—"It is not true that President Kruger has made exorbitant demands as given in the London Press. Certain claims have been made and guarantees demanded

of a nature that it will be impossible, under the circumstances, for Her Majesty's Government to refuse; and Sir Hercules Robinson, through Sir Jacobus de Wet, has admitted the moderation of the Transvaal Government; it was laid down that the frontier be protected, and the British covenanted to prevent raids on the Transvaal. That being so, the Boer Executive are justified in claiming, under the law of nations, adequate compensation for infringement. President Kruger has held the just resentment of his people, and in a difficult and momentous crisis has exhibited chivalrous forbearance. Our duty and desire should be to calmly and without undue haste, forgetting our defeat, sternly face the settlement of differences in a friendly spirit with the Transvaal Republic. This once done, we will establish in South Africa a reputation for integrity and honesty of principle as between man and man. It is true that a commission is about to proceed to Rhodesia with the object of inquiring into the circumstances of Jameson's raid.

EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS," 18th January 1896

REGAN'S WORDS OF WISDOM

Early last week I sent to the Press Mr Van Buren's message that the Johannesburgers were not prepared for hostilities. A section of the London Press scouted this and held to a man Britishers in Johannesburg would come to Jameson's assistance. Subsequent events proved that my correspondent was right. I was the first to

make public the news of Jameson's arrest, as also the fact that he was to be tried. My information was strictly correct when I sent to the Press the message that not a hair of Jameson's head would be harmed. I was quite justified in making the statement, and I have it now from Transvaal official sources that the President will exercise his prerogative and that the Administrator will not be shot. Men who know anything of South African matters will support me when I say that though Jameson made a grave blunder, Chamberlain by his unstatesmanlike and precipitate action has rendered a settlement of the Transvaal question much more difficult by coquetting with the President instead of *awaiting development of events*. Chamberlain has thrown an obstacle in the way of a possible declaration of war by England. Chamberlain must have been aware that it was too late to stop the forces of the Chartered Company. That being so, his policy should have been to be more careful in his utterances, and not permit continental nations to make use of his official manifesto when he declared that the British subjects in the Transvaal had no sympathy or support from England. Now were we to take up arms under any pretext against the Transvaal, Germany, Holland and the Orange Free State, in supporting the Boers, would have the moral support of Europe. In the light of subsequent events my message to the London Press, as to the massing in Rhodesia of a second force, must be held as strictly correct. That Jameson's raid was premeditated is proven up to the hilt owing to the fact that a cable was sent to London that the massing of such a force was incorrect, because I find a telegram was sent to Bulawayo directing that the 1000 men moving from there to the Transvaal frontier be stopped. The informa-

tion supplied you that Kruger laid a trap for Jameson, in order that he (Jameson) might cross the frontier, is not true, because the President sent his son-in-law to meet Jameson and request the latter to re-cross the frontier; instead of doing so, the Rhodesian commander made prisoner the messenger. In this matter my sympathies are neutral, but I think it right that the public should be made aware of the true facts. History repeats itself, and if we investigate the workings of every corporation to whom extensive powers have been given, we may find that complications of a grave nature have arisen. The future may disclose that it was not with the concurrence of Mr Rhodes that Jameson crossed the frontier. In fact, I go so far as to say that Rhodes knew nothing of the movement. I have an opportunity of knowing, inasmuch as I am the owner of considerable real estate in Rhodesia. By his utterances Rhodes may have led Jameson and his followers to believe that support would be given, and I think great weight ought to be attached to the fact that Rhodes knew nothing of the second contingent arming in Buluwayo to follow in Jameson's footsteps. That the Johannesburgers are not united in their protest against the Boer rule is borne out by the fact that the leading corporations in the city have been barricading and mounting guns with a view of protecting their property against the mob, when their arms and attention might be directed against the Boers. I regret to find that a section of the London Press in a grave crisis have endeavoured to inflame the passions of our people instead of adopting a policy of moderation. We have enemies within the camp as well as outside, and our wisest course would be to wait the development of events and move with caution, as it is this cautious and waiting

policy that has brought victory to the Boers. In the past we have been a thinking nation, though of late I feel that the policy by which our great-grandfathers built up this mighty Empire is no longer ours. Let the English people leave the settlement of this momentous question to the most capable mind in Cape Colony, otherwise we may find complications may arise. Let us keep before our mind's eye the fact that our ship is in a storm, and that if we depose the skilled captain and entrust our lives and craft to a crew divided against itself, rocks, shipwreck and disaster will be the result.

EXTRACT FROM "THE FINANCIAL TIMES"

20th January 1896

BOERS AND UITLANDERS

To the Editor of *The Financial Times*

SIR,—Recent exciting episodes in the Transvaal are quickly passing out of the nine days' wonder stage, and becoming a matter of history. While they are to some extent fresh in the public memory, it is, I think, advisable, and it is certainly only fair, that the public should have placed before them some plain, unvarnished truths in order to enable them to arrive at a juster conclusion in respect of matters in dispute between Boers and Uitlanders than was possible during the period of excitement through which the Transvaal has recently passed.

Up to the present time I have studiously held aloof from the controversy about the Transvaal in the Public Press, which has for the most part consisted of acrid and heated

denunciations of Mr Kruger and his countrymen. I might, I think, easily enough have claimed, from my knowledge of, and interests in, South African Republic, that my knowledge with regard to events therein is as valuable as that of the self-constituted "authorities" who have been airing their views and advertising themselves and their papers for several weeks past. The champions of the Uitlanders in this country have in effect bidden us behold the spectacle of many thousands of our countrymen—industrious, intelligent, law-abiding Englishmen—rightly struggling to be free in a foreign country where they were under the yoke of, and generally oppressed by, an infinitesimal minority of Dutch farmers. These Uitlanders, are, I know, believed by the great mass of the public in England to have been merely sticking up for their rights, including freedom of speech and many other privileges to which we are accustomed, and that are highly valued in a free country. In connection therewith we have been told that Uitlanders have, above all, been asserting the grand old principle in defence of which our American brethren fought and beat us more than a hundred years ago, namely, no taxation without representation. All this, I say, is the prevalent opinion in England, and it does not say much for the accuracy of the public judgment here or of the Press, which affects to guide and mould public opinion, that such a burlesque of what has really taken place in the Transvaal, and the motives of the Uitlanders generally in their agitation, should be accepted as an absolute truth. First and foremost, the Uitlanders are very far from being all Englishmen; there are men of every nationality in Johannesburg, but of most of them it may be predicted with safety that they are not Englishmen, Frenchmen or German, but above all things, financiers whose patriotism

is largely a question of £ s. d. These men came out to the Transvaal to exploit its riches, and with a full knowledge of the laws and ordinances of the country. Having amassed wealth, they begin to think that it is a thousand pities such an abnormally rich country as the Transvaal should be in the possession of a parcel of Dutch Boers, who actually had the insolence to call upon Uitlanders to pay taxes, and thereby hand over to the Government a very minute portion of the gold they were extracting from the Transvaal territory. This feeling, by dint of writing and speaking, gradually spread. A "National Union" was formed, and the Uitlanders threatened all manner of things when the time came for them to act. Well, the time did come—poor Jameson was lured to his fate, and the Uitlanders began to quake in their shoes, saving those of them who, knowing what was coming, decided, like the good financiers they are, to make the most of it, and had accordingly gone "bears" of Rand gold mining shares. Some of these "bears" are now in gaol, and their "bear" operations accordingly not likely to turn out as profitable as they at one time expected.

The public will, in my opinion, be very foolish if they waste any sympathy over the Uitlanders.

That the latter have grievances I do not deny, but I am just as sensible of the fact that President Kruger and his Government are extremely desirous to ameliorate any reasonable causes of complaint if the Uitlanders will only take up the position of law-abiding citizens in a foreign country, instead of, as hitherto, posing as rebels, who intend on the first favourable opportunity to make a clean sweep of the board and seize upon the riches of the Rand, or such of them as they do not already possess. President Kruger is probably not an angel, but neither are the

Uitlanders angels, and their behaviour with reference to Dr Jameson scarcely induces one to regard them as men of valour either. However, they have had their little fling, and they can hardly now object to being called upon to pay the costs thereof, though I have every reason to believe that President Kruger will rest content with banishing a few of the ringleaders from the Transvaal and sending them back to us in the City—where, I may remark, they are certainly not wanted.—I am, etc.,

WM. F. REGAN.

41 THREADNEEDLE STREET,
LONDON, 17th January 1896.

EXTRACT FROM "THE FREEMAN'S JOURNAL"

20th January 1896

THE TRANSVAAL CRISIS

Boers and Englishmen

To the Editor of *The Freeman's Journal*.

SIR,—The people in England have so utterly lost their heads over the Transvaal question that it seems to be expedient that one like myself who, with a full knowledge of the country, can claim to be impartial as between Boers and Uitlanders, should state his views publicly in regard to the many matters arising out of Dr Jameson's invasion of the Transvaal that have been agitating the public mind for some weeks past.

To anyone like myself who knows what Johannesburg is and what description of men the Uitlanders are, and who is intimately acquainted with the ideas, sentiments and characteristics of President Kruger and other members of the Government, it seems passing strange that public opinion in Great Britain should have been so woefully led astray as appears to have been the case in regard to the "Transvaal question." This "question" in its entirety has been manufactured by Uitlanders whose set purpose for some time past has been to get possession of the country with its vast actual and latent wealth, and clear the Boers out of it neck and crop. President Kruger has, from the very first, been fully acquainted with the aims and objects of this conspiracy against the Government, and it was hardly to be expected that he would have fallen in with it by granting to these Uitlanders, without the slightest discrimination, the full rights of citizenship and so in effect have signed his own death warrant. All the fatuous nonsense that has appeared in the Press of this country in regard to the aspirations of the Uitlanders, and their desire to assert, at any cost, those grand old principles that have made England free and famous, is really ludicrous to anyone like myself who knows what the Uitlanders are, and what it is they want. Johannesburg is, as probably your readers are aware, a city with a population of somewhere over 100,000, drawn from all parts of the world. It is this motley population of foreigners that has demanded from the Transvaal Government with menaces the full rights of citizenship, and when President Kruger, very properly, in my opinion, declined to comply with such extravagant demands, formed themselves into an Association which they called a "National Union," and which if it had existed in England or Ireland, much less any continental

nation, would have been suppressed by the strong arm of the law, and every member of it have been prosecuted for treason. When a man or collection of men go in for treasonable projects and indulge in threats against a lawfully-constituted Government, their only justification can be success. The Uitlanders blustered and threatened and talked a considerable amount of high-falutin' nonsense about the dangers to which their wives and families were subject in Johannesburg—the only danger I may remark, being the outcome of their treasonable conspiracy against the existing Government of the South African Republic. But what was the *dénouement*. When Dr Jameson, lured across the frontier by their wails respecting their wives and families, came to the rescue of these Uitlanders, they made not the slightest attempt to make good their valiant words, they never stirred an inch outside Johannesburg, and they allowed Jameson to be engaged in a fierce combat with an overwhelming Boer force within fifteen miles of the city, without even making the slightest attempt to render him assistance, direct or indirect. Having defeated Jameson's party, President Kruger had the game in his hands, and if he were the autocratic and cruel monster that he is depicted by not a few English papers he would have shot, and he most certainly would have been justified in shooting, every survivor of Jameson's force. Instead of doing this, however, the President has handed these several hundred prisoners over to the British authorities, and his behaviour in so acting has certainly been in marked contrast to the bluster and bravado, all ending in smoke, of these pot-valiant Uitlanders. Having done this, President Kruger not unnaturally thinks the time has come to put a stop to all the treasonable practices of the foreign

population of the Transvaal, and he has accordingly arrested the ringleaders of the conspiracy against his Government. President Kruger, by his treatment of Jameson and his men, has shown that he knows how to be magnanimous and merciful in the hour of victory. Let us wait until the trial of the prisoners, now in Pretoria Jail, is completed, and we shall no doubt find—in fact, I know we shall—that President Kruger has no desire to inflict on these men the penalties they have incurred and, in my opinion, they richly deserve. He will, however, insist that they shall forever rid the South Africa Republic of their presence, a step which, in my opinion, will tend to the future peace and prosperity of Johannesburg and the Transvaal generally, and enable President Kruger to grant those concessions to the Uitlanders which I know he desires to confer as largely and generously as possible, and which would have been granted long ago had it not been for the arrogant behaviour of the self-constituted leaders of the Uitlanders in Johannesburg, and their precious “National Union,” which was not national in any proper sense of the term.—Yours obediently,

W. F. REGAN. .

41 THREADNEEDLE STREET, E.C.,
17th January 1896.

EXTRACT FROM "THE NORTHERN WHIG"

20th January 1896

BOERS AND UITLANDERS

To the Editor of *The Northern Whig*.

SIR,—So much has been written in the Press and spoken on public platforms during the past few weeks respecting Boers and Uitlanders, in almost every instance to the disadvantage of the Boers, that I feel impelled by a sense of justice, now that public feeling has to some extent calmed down, to endeavour to afford some enlightenment on the subject respecting which my interests in, and knowledge of, the Transvaal generally and Johannesburg in particular, enable me, I think, to speak with some authority. Recognising as I do in your journal a paper that has during the recent crisis attempted to calm and control the excited feelings of the multitude, and prevent them jumping to somewhat erroneous conclusions upon imperfect information, I venture to ask your permission to calmly and impartially narrate in *The Northern Whig* the circumstances that have led up to the recent events in the Transvaal.

Now, sir, what is primarily responsible for producing the recent and present deplorable condition of things in the Transvaal? Gold. It is the same old story that we can perchance remember ourselves, or, if we cannot, can read in history as having happened all the world over. The Transvaal, unfortunately for the Boers, who, rightly or wrongly, live a rural life away from the din and turmoil of the towns, and trekked to the Transvaal to get away from men and things that were not in accordance

with their ideas, was, a few years ago, found to be rich in the precious metal, and as soon as news of this was noised abroad, men—good, bad and indifferent, but largely of the latter two classes—flocked there from all parts of the world till it has come about that Johannesburg has a population for its size probably less reputable than any city on the face of the globe. Well, in due course the gold mines became developed, with the result that there has been, month by month, a large and steadily increasing output of the precious metal therefrom. Enormous fortunes have consequently been realised by vendors, promoters, investors and speculators—all, be it observed, directly or indirectly due to the mineral wealth of the Transvaal Republic. The Republic, not unnaturally, taxed the hybrid inhabitants who had come there in search of, and had found, wealth—taxed them not to punish them, but merely to defray the costs of government, and other incidental expenses to the service of the State. Thereupon the immigrants resented this, talked glibly about “taxation without representation,” referred to the revolt of the American colonies against Great Britain, because the latter ignored this great principle, and demanded—there is no other word for it—to be admitted to all the rights and privileges of citizenship of the Transvaal Republic without further ado. President Kruger, who, whatever his faults, is certainly not lacking in shrewdness, saw clearly enough that were he to accede to these preposterous proposals he and his fellow Boers might as well commence about trekking afresh if they could find any uninhabited portion of Africa to trek to, and declined to grant such demands, but promised to consider any reasonable grievances the Uitlanders might desire to put forward. Thereupon the latter indulged in scarcely-veiled threats,

and much vituperative language in the English papers, published in Johannesburg, and organised a society which made no secret of its intentions to resort to force if necessary. Arms were imported by large quantities by devious methods, and a gigantic conspiracy was formed to get possession of the Transvaal for the Uitlanders, not from any patriotic or even plausible upright motives, but simply and solely in order that the Uitlanders might come into full possession of the country and its wealth, and expel the Boers therefrom. The object of this precious scheme is now full well known to your readers, and I think it may be truthfully averred that the only man who comes well out of the whole business is President Kruger. He has shown that he knows how to be magnanimous and merciful, and no honest man can deny that the words of congratulation addressed to him by the Queen, the High Commissioner, the Governor of Natal and others, have in any way gone beyond the merits of the case. Even in the hour of triumph, President Kruger has promised to alleviate any substantial grievances which the Uitlanders could show they suffered from, and from my knowledge of him I verily believe the President will keep his promise in the spirit as well as in the letter. As for those persons who have been arrested for treason, and will be shortly brought for trial for that offence, the public need waste no sympathy on them. The most they have to fear is banishment from the land wherein they have amassed wealth, and in return plotted against the ruler thereof for no higher motive than to still further increase their gain. In any other country these men would have been hanged for treason; but, be that as it may, it must be admitted that they played a desperate game, and I believe in many instances played it from

despicable motives. Well, they have played and lost, and their failure, let it be said, is chiefly owing to their own cowardice or supineness at the crucial moment. They can now hardly ask to have their stakes returned or the game played over again. Johannesburg will know them no more, and the morality of its financial atmosphere is likely to be all the better from this fact.—Yours, etc.,

WM. F. REGAN.

41 THREADNEEDLE STREET, LONDON, E.C.,
17th January 1896.

EXTRACT FROM "THE ECHO," 20th January 1896

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TRANSVAAL QUESTION

To the Editor of *The Echo*.

SIR,—Now that the excitement with regard to the various episodes in the Transvaal has to some extent quieted down, it appears to me that, in the interests of justice and fair dealing as between man and man, some publicity should be given to the other side of the question, because there is another side to this as to most other questions, as I hope I shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of your readers. For some weeks past the English public have been induced to believe by a lot of writers and financiers, not in every instance disinterested, that the Boers of the Transvaal are a miserable collection of autocratic, pig-headed Dutchmen, who grind beneath their heels all the wealth, intelligence and industry of Johannesburg and the Rand generally; who are oppressed not only

in their liberties, but financially. These Uitlanders are generally believed, by the public here at home, to be a band of gallant Englishmen, struggling day by day against the vicious principle of taxation without representation, in fact, worthy representatives of good old John Hampden, and those other patriotic and venerated Englishmen who, by their struggles in the past, have gained for Englishmen the liberties they now enjoy. Now, sir, any such idea as this is the merest travesty of the condition of things that actually exists in the South African Republic.

If we are just, we must not forget that the Boers are in the South African Republic, simply because they wished to get free of our South African Colonies, and to possess land of their own, where they could govern themselves according to their own ideas, and engage in their rural pursuits unhampered and untrammelled by those Colonial laws and regulations which they found irksome. No doubt a good many people think that the Boers are stupid and absurd people for entertaining these ideas. Well, they may be stupid and absurd ; but we must recognise the fact that the South African Republic is, except in regard to its foreign relations, an independent nation, and that the rulers thereof are perfectly within their rights in regulating the administration of the country, and deciding who shall and who shall not be admitted to the franchise or other rights of citizenship. As to the autocratic propensities of the Boers, about which we have heard so much of late, it is all the merest fudge. A perusal of the contents of the English newspapers published in Johannesburg, would convince the people of this country that the liberty of the Press is, at any rate, in no danger in that part of the world ; because those journals have contained, for many months past, criticisms and comments on the

administration and administrators of the State, and charges of corruption and malfeasance generally against nearly every official of the South African Republic, all written in language far exceeding in severity and vituperation anything to which even we are accustomed in this country.

If President Kruger were the despot he has been portrayed here, he would certainly have stopped long ago the gross licence of language indulged in by the English newspapers published in Johannesburg. But not a bit of it; and this fact surely goes far to show that President Kruger is anything but an autocrat, and that the Uitlanders who possess a free—an excessively free—Press have nothing whatever to complain of in that respect. And so in regard to liberty of speech also. It is not too much to say that if the National Reform Union had existed in any other country, great or small, in Europe or America, it would long since have been suppressed, and the members thereof prosecuted and imprisoned. But what do we find in the Transvaal? The National Reform Union is unmolested, and its members are as free in their speech on the platform as the English Press in Johannesburg is free in its comments on men and things in the Transvaal. Clearly, therefore, this Kruger is a peculiar kind of "autocrat." In what does his autocracy consist, and wherein does the shoe pinch in respect to these Uitlanders? I will tell your readers. The motley collection of gentlemen who are embraced under the generic term of Uitlander, are men of every nationality, but whose nationality and patriotism are all summed up in the one word finance. This Kruger, wicked man that he is, actually has the temerity to tax the Uitlanders who have come to the South African Republic to extract its riches for their own benefit. Those riches if they belong to

anybody, belong to the original inhabitants of the Republic, and the rulers of that State would have been perfectly justified, legally and morally, in preventing any Uitlanders from settling down there, and proceeding to extract the great riches of the Rand. These men have grown rich and prosperous upon the great wealth which undoubtedly lies beneath the surface of the Transvaal. They have amassed enormous sums of money, and they cannot for the life of them bear to see the coffers of the Transvaal Treasury full, and the Dutch officials of that State receiving adequate remuneration for their services. No. These Uitlanders think that if they had not to pay taxation they could make more money, and in their greed for pelf they want to get rid of the "autocratic" Kruger and the other Boers, and get possession of the country for themselves.

Now, sir, in this matter I may claim to be impartial. I have large interests in the Transvaal myself, and in one way my sympathies might be supposed to be with the Utlanders; but I cannot disguise from myself the fact that the hybrid collection of foreigners in the South African Republic, in their agitation, in their threats, in their vituperation, have been simply and solely influenced by their pockets. And from information I have received, and on which I implicitly rely, I believe it will be found, when the whole of the recent episodes in the Transvaal have been sifted, that the disturbances there have been brought about not from any motive of getting the franchise, about which not one Uitlander in a hundred cares one jot, but merely as part of a conspiracy on the part of certain individuals, whose names are perfectly well known in financial circles, to depress the value of certain mining securities; in other words, the whole proceeding was a "bear" raid of the most

despicable kind. The conduct of the Uitlanders, after all their tall talk, in leaving Jameson to his fate, has very properly incurred the reprobation of all right-thinking people in this country. I can assure your readers that their conduct in this respect was merely on a par with what it has been in many others, and I go further and say that if President Kruger, after they have been brought to trial and convicted, exercises his undoubted right of banishing quite half of the individuals he has arrested from the South African Republic, he will be conferring a benefit on the commercial morality of Johannesburg, however much we may regret the fact that the expulsion of these financiers from the Transvaal will probably ensure their repairing to England.—Yours faithfully,

W. F. REGAN.

41 THREADNEEDLE STREET.

EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS," 22d January 1896

MR REGAN'S LATEST CABLES FROM AFRICA

Copy of Cable received from Johannesburg.

Hercules Robinson, before leaving, thanked President for kindness to prisoners, on behalf of British. Hely Hutchinson, Governor of Natal, endorsed. 16,000 burghers splendidly mounted and armed, presenting force capable of coping with 100,000 Rhodesians, will march through city presently. Johannesburgers' big talkers now quiet. Kruger grand old man of the hour. Might have shot all, law empowered, yet disposed to forget and forgive. Britons should think, ponder and be grateful. Remember

Kruger was defensive, not offensive. Communicate with Press. Large section of Britons here now support President. Majority of recent arrests not Englishmen. Section anxious to make money out of crisis. Dutch here do not attach much importance to German Emperor's interference. Second condition by Kruger to Robinson—British South Africa Charter to be revoked, as continued existence source of danger, and British pay indemnity; amount not fixed. British regulars to occupy Rhodesia. Certain concessions will be given Uitlanders, but not until meeting of Volksraad in May, and then subject to good behaviour meantime. British guarantees have been given President, hence troops moving up from Cape. All quiet here, mines working.

Copy of Cable received from West Africa

Advance column of British expected arrive at Coomassie to-day. Will be no fighting. This confirms my previous cables. Case of marching up the hill and down again.

EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS," 25th January 1896

During the past month, when the war of arms as well as words raged furiously and the German Emperor, Chamberlain, Kruger, Rhodes and Robinson, as well as Queen Victoria, all scrambled for the right to be heard, it is pleasant to note that one cool head, and that possessed by a blue-eyed Irish lad, hailing from the ancient city of the tribes, and having previously very extensive, if not exclusive, knowledge of the Transvaal, gauged the situation correctly, and thundered forth a war of words with such a force as to

command the attention of the leading organs of public opinion in England. The *Star* has burst with brilliancy, and Mr Regan is now quoted in the columns of the *Times*, *Standard*, *Chronicle*, *Daily Graphic*, *Daily News*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Echo*, *Star*, *Sun*, *Globe*, *Financial News*, *Financial Times*, *Life*, *South African Empire*, *Manchester Guardian*, *People*, *Sunday Times*, *Lloyd's*, *Reynold's*, *Glasgow Herald*, *Belfast Whig*, *Freeman's Journal* and *Independent*.

In connection with the above, it may be mentioned that it was Mr Regan who had the first news of the Ashantee business in London last Saturday. Mr Regan was kind enough to write to us that day, and we had the news in full here last Sunday morning. It was, therefore, somewhat amusing (to a pressman especially) to see the daily papers coming out with the same information on Tuesday. Through the same enterprising centre of news in these times we had the first intimation of the death of Prince Henry on Wednesday morning.

EXTRACT FROM "THE GALWAY OBSERVER"

15th February 1896

MR W. F. REGAN

Mr W. F. Regan, our distinguished townsman in London, who, as our readers are now aware, has quite an omnivorous capacity for work, is about to publish an account of the recent trouble in the Transvaal. Very probably, nay for a certainty, there is no man better able to do it than Mr Regan. It may be remembered that it was Mr Regan who

had always the first news of the startling and rather phenomenal events which have recently occurred in the South African Republic. He had, in fact, the first news about everything, while even the Colonial Office could only give out somewhat doubtful rumours which were sent to them. Mr Regan not only reported events as they occurred, but he actually in several instances prophesied events which turned out to be true. His book, therefore, will be most valuable as a faithful record of Dr Jameson's recent expedition and the circumstances which led up to it, and as such will be a valuable and reliable record of the whole period.

EXTRACT FROM "THE PRESS"

THE CRISIS IN "THE TRANSVAAL"

Details of the Fighting

Further news has come to hand respecting affairs in the Transvaal. On Saturday, news came to hand that Dr Jameson had been defeated by a force of Boers double that of the invading party, and that most of them had been made prisoners. On Monday, latest cable reports gave 240 killed of Dr Jameson's force.

Mr Chamberlain, in his speech that day to a deputation that waited upon him, said Britain would demand observance of treaty obligations, which was plainly intended as a hit-off to the Kaiser's ill-timed approval of the Boer attitude.

Wiring on Tuesday, Mr Regan, who is largely interested

in the Transvaal, wrote—"In my opinion, nothing but powder and shot in the near future will settle the Transvaal question. Jameson made a gallant stand, but cowardly Uitlanders did not come to his assistance—did not even make an effort to do so. I must say that Jameson acted very foolishly, and his action will lead to grave complications. President Kruger has now the moral support of Germany, Italy and Orange Free State, whilst Russia is at the moment busy on the east coast and in Abyssinia. The crisis will embolden Turkey to ignore British demands, and American citizens will endorse Cleveland's policy.—REGAN.

Regan writes that the wires were cut by Jameson's party to delay news, and that President Kruger was met by a deputation of the people of Johannesburg, to whom he promised several reforms, such as taking duties off food stuffs, subsidising all schools, etc. That town was then in a panic, and the people were leaving in great numbers, and one large train went off the rails and several people were killed and injured.

The London Times said, during a period of anxiety on Saturday:—In the City the only piece of news professing to have got through subsequently from the Transvaal was the information made public by Mr Regan to the effect that Dr Jameson was to be tried and the remainder of the prisoners released.

Later on, the Press Association says that Mr Regan has received a telegram, *via* the Continent, stating that Dr Jameson's followers will be released by the Boers on proper guarantees being given. Dr Jameson is to be tried by the High Court.

Another important telegram was received from Cape

Town giving a new and apparently authentic version of the battle fought on the 1st and 2d of January. This account brings out, in much more striking relief than the previous messages, the self-sacrificing bravery of the Chartered Company's forces. The more recent report speaks of Dr Jameson and Sir John Willoughby's column numbering only 450 men when the column started on their march. As 550 prisoners are said to be captured, it is obvious that the original force must have gathered some reinforcements on the way. The Boer force is said to have numbered not less than 2000, and were entrenched in a strong position at Krugersdorp awaiting the advance of their half-starved assailants. Jameson appears to have expected the aid of 2000 men from Johannesburg, and in the vain hope of their arrival he and his men made a stubborn fight, which continued with little intermission until the second day.

Accounts still differ as to the number of killed and wounded. The Government of Natal states that the Boers have set up a censorship of all press and private telegrams, many of which are mutilated prior to transmission. In view of this fact, it may be well to receive with all reserve the Boer accounts from Johannesburg which put Jameson's loss at 130 killed and 39 wounded, against only three killed and six wounded on the side of the Boers.

A Startling Story.

The Press Association's Stock Exchange correspondent says the disposition manifested on the Exchange is to await any further development of the political situation of the Transvaal. It is believed in the City that an important

announcement has yet to be made which will reveal a gigantic scandal in which important names will appear. It is even stated that the crisis has been precipitated for stock-jobbing purposes.

EXTRACT FROM THE "TIMES"

Mr W. F. Regan, of Threadneedle Street, who is a considerable landowner in the Transvaal, and intimately conversant with Transvaal affairs, in an interview with a representative of the Press this morning, called attention to the fact that he was the first to communicate to the Press a cablegram which he received from Johannesburg in which it was stated that the reports received from that city were greatly exaggerated. He considered that the fact of the citizens of Johannesburg remaining quiet, and not joining hands with Jameson, goes to prove that the cable message from his correspondent, Mr Van Buren, represented the true state of affairs and the feeling of the people of Johannesburg. From his own experience he felt certain that the Boer Government will exercise moderation, and he considers that our own people at home should exercise a little more caution and self-control.

It is reported from Buluwayo that Captain Napier and Captain Spreckley have been ordered to the Transvaal with the Rhodesian Horse. One thousand men were asked for, they expect to leave in about a week, and travel *via* Tati. In Johannesburg every provision has been made for the safety of the women and children. Most of the mines are closed

down, and everybody has come into town. There has nearly been a run on the banks. The commandant-general has instructed all field cornets to have their men in readiness. Families from Cape Town are travelling to Johannesburg much as usual, although the return trains are thronged with refugees. The National Union adheres to the maintenance of the independence of the Republic. Mr Regan, it is stated, has received from Amsterdam a cable that not a hair of Dr Jameson's head will be harmed, and he and his followers will presently be released on parole as soon as certain arrangements are completed with the British Representative conferring with the Transvaal Government.

The Ultimatum at Johannesburg.

A telegram received in London by the *Johannesburg Standard* and *Diggers' News*, despatched from Johannesburg on Monday, says:—"The Government ultimatum stipulates that Johannesburg must lay down arms within twenty-four hours. The leaders are expected to accept the situation and submit. Order prevails in the town. The population is going back to work. The attempt at revolution is over. The Government is expected to grant certain reasonable demands. There are six thousand Boers at Pretoria."

Mr Regan, who is conversant with the affairs of the South African Republic, remarked in an interview, "In regard to the attitude of Germany at this time, it must not be forgotten that during the last six months the Press of that country has been publishing articles from German residents in Johannesburg, the prevalent tone of their

communications pointing to the possibility of some such state of affairs as now exists."

THE ACT UNDER WHICH DR JAMESON
WILL BE TRIED.

33 & 34 VICT. (1870) c. 90.

Sec. 31 repealed by S. L. R. Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 39. Preamble; Sec. 3, from "shall come," where these words first occur, to "thereof and;" Sec. 23, the words "Commissioners of;" Sec. 26, from "or other" to "time being," and the words "to the Lord Lieutenant;" Sec. 30, so far as related to the term "The Secretary of State," repealed by S. L. R. Act, 1893 (No. 2), 56 & 57 Vict. c. 54.

An Act to Regulate the Conduct of Her Majesty's
Subjects during the Existence of Hostilities between
Foreign States with which Her Majesty is at Peace.
(9th Aug. 1870.)

WHEREAS it is expedient to make provision for the regulation of the conduct of Her Majesty's subjects during the existence of hostilities between foreign states with which Her Majesty is at peace:

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual

and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows :

Preliminary.

Short title of Act. 1. This Act may be cited for all purposes as "The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870."

Applica-
tion of
Act 2. This Act shall extend to all the dominions of Her Majesty, including the adjacent territorial waters.

Com-
mence-
ment of
Act. 3. This Act shall come into operation in the United Kingdom immediately on the passing thereof, and shall be proclaimed in every British possession by the Governor thereof as soon as may be after he receives notice of this Act, and shall come into operation in that British possession on the day of such proclamation, and the time at which this Act comes into operation in any place is, as respects such place, in this Act referred to as the commencement of this Act.

Illegal Enlistment.

Penalty on
enlistment
in service
of foreign
state. 4. If any person, without the licence of Her Majesty, being a British subject, within or without Her Majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty, and in this Act referred to as a friendly state, or whether a British subject or not within Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any such foreign state as aforesaid,—

He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted: and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

5. If any person, without the licence of Her Majesty, Penalty on leaving Her Majesty's dominion with intent to serve a foreign state. being a British subject, quits or goes on board any ship with a view of quitting Her Majesty's dominions, with intent to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, or, whether a British subject or not, within Her Majesty's dominions, induces any other person to quit or to go on board any ship with a view of quitting Her Majesty's dominions with the like intent,—

He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

6. If any person induces any other person to quit Her Majesty's dominions or to embark on any ship within Her Majesty's dominions under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state,—Penalty on embarking persons under false representations as to service.

He shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment or

either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted ; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

Penalty on taking il-
legally en-
listed per-
sons on
board ship.

7. If the master or owner of any ship, without the licence of Her Majesty, knowingly either takes on board, or engages to take on board, or has on board such ship within Her Majesty's dominions, any of the following persons, in this Act referred to as illegally enlisted persons ; that is to say,

- (1.) Any person who, being a British subject within or without the dominions of Her Majesty, has, without the licence of Her Majesty, accepted or agreed to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state ;
- (2.) Any person, being a British subject, who, without the licence of Her Majesty, is about to quit Her Majesty's dominions with intent to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state ;
- (3.) Any person who has been induced to embark under a misrepresentation or false representation of the service in which such person is to be engaged, with the intent or in order that such person may accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state ;

Such master or owner shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue ; that is to say,

- (1.) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted ; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour ; and
- (2.) Such ship shall be detained until the trial and conviction or acquittal of the master or owner, and until all penalties inflicted on the master or owner have been paid, or the master or owner has given security for the payment of such penalties to the satisfaction of two justices of the peace, or other magistrate or magistrates having the authority of two justices of the peace ; and
- (3.) All illegally enlisted persons shall immediately on the discovery of the offence be taken on shore, and shall not be allowed to return to the ship.

Illegal Shipbuilding and Illegal Expeditions.

8. If any person within Her Majesty's dominions, without the licence of Her Majesty, does any of the following acts ; that is to say,

- (1.) Builds or agrees to build, or causes to be built any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state ; or

Penalty
on illegal
ship build-
ing and
illegal ex-
peditions.

- (2.) Issues or delivers any commission for any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state ; or
- (3.) Equips any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state ; or
- (4.) Despatches, or causes or allows to be despatched, any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state ;

Such persons shall be deemed to have committed an offence against this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue :

- (1.) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted ; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour ;
- (2.) The ship in respect of which any such offence is committed, and her equipment, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty :

Provided that a person building, causing to be built, or equipping a ship in any of the cases aforesaid, in pursuance of a contract made before the commencement of such war as aforesaid, shall not be liable to any of the penalties im-

posed by this section in respect of such building or equipping if he satisfies the conditions following; that is to say,

- (1.) If forthwith upon a proclamation of neutrality being issued by Her Majesty, he gives notice to the Secretary of State that he is so building, causing to be built, or equipping such ship, and furnishes such particulars of the contract and of the matters relating to, or done, or to be done under the contract as may be required by the Secretary of State:
- (2.) If he gives such security, and takes and permits to be taken such other measures, if any, as the Secretary of State may prescribe for ensuring that such ship shall not be despatched, delivered, or removed without the licence of Her Majesty until the termination of such war as aforesaid.

9. Where any ship is built by order of or on behalf of any foreign state when at war with a friendly state, or is delivered to or to the order of such foreign state, or any person who to the knowledge of the person building is an agent of such foreign state, or is paid for by such foreign state or such agent, and is employed in the military or naval service of such foreign state, such ship shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been built with a view to being so employed, and the burden shall lie on the builder of such ship of proving that he did not know that the ship was intended to be so employed in the military or naval service of such foreign state.

10. If any person within the dominions of Her Majesty, and without the licence of Her Majesty,—

By adding to the number of the guns, or by changing

Presump-
tion as to
evidence
in case of
illegalship.

Penalty on
aiding the
warlike
equipment
of foreign
ships.

those on board for other guns, or by the addition of any equipment for war, increases or augments, or procures to be increased or augmented, or is knowingly concerned in increasing or augmenting the warlike force of any ship which at the time of her being within the dominions of Her Majesty was a ship in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any friendly state,—

Such person shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

Penalty on
fitting out
naval or
military
expedition
without
licence.

11. If any person within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions and without the licence of Her Majesty,—

Prepares or fits out any naval or military expedition to proceed against the dominions of any friendly state, the following consequences shall ensue :

(1.) Every person engaged in such preparation or fitting out, or assisting therein, or employed in any capacity in such expedition, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour.

(2.) All ships, and their equipments, and all arms and munitions of war, used in or forming part of such expedition, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty.

Punish-
ment of ac-
cessories.

12. Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures

the commission of any offence against this Act shall be liable to be tried and punished as a principal offender.

13. The term of imprisonment to be awarded in respect of any offence against this Act shall not exceed two years. Limitation of term of imprisonment.

Illegal Prize.

14. If, during the continuance of any war in which Her Majesty may be neutral, any ship, goods, or merchandise captured as prize of war within the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, in violation of the neutrality of this realm, or captured by any ship which may have been built, equipped, commissioned, or despatched, or the force of which may have been augmented, contrary to the provisions of this Act, are brought within the limits of Her Majesty's dominions by the captor, or any agent of the captor, or by any person having come into possession thereof with knowledge that the same was prize of war so captured as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the original owner of such prize, or his agent, or for any person authorised in that behalf by the Government of the foreign state to which such owner belongs, to make application to the Court of Admiralty for seizure and detention of such prize, and the court shall, on due proof of the facts, order such prize to be restored. Illegal prize brought in to British ports restored.

Every such order shall be executed and carried into effect in the same manner, and subject to the same right of appeal, as in case of any order made in the exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of such court; and in the meantime and until a final order has been made on such application the court shall have power to make all such provisional and

other orders as to the care or custody of such captured ship, goods, or merchandise, and (if the same be of perishable nature, or incurring risk of deterioration) for the sale thereof, and with respect to the deposit or investment of the proceeds of any such sale, as may be made by such court, in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.

General Provision.

Licence by Her Majesty how granted. 15. For the purpose of this Act, a licence by Her Majesty shall be under the sign manual of Her Majesty, or be signified by Order in Council or by proclamation of Her Majesty.

Legal Procedure.

Jurisdiction in respect of offences by persons against Act. 16. Any offence against this Act shall, for all purposes of and incidental to the trial and punishment of any person guilty of any such offence, be deemed to have been committed either in the place in which the offence was wholly or partly committed, or in any place within Her Majesty's dominions in which the person who committed such offence may be.

Venue in respect of offences by persons. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97. 17. Any offence against this Act may be described in any indictment or other document relating to such offence, in cases where the mode of trial requires such a description, as having been committed at the place where it was wholly or partly committed, or it may be averred generally to have been committed within Her Majesty's dominions, and the venue or local description in the margin may be that of the county, city, or place in which the trial is held.

18. The following authorities, that is to say, in the United Kingdom any judge of a superior court, in any other place within the jurisdiction of any British court of justice, such court, or, if there are more courts than one, the court having the highest criminal jurisdiction in that place, may, by warrant or instrument in the nature of a warrant in this section included in the term "warrant," direct that any offender charged with an offence against this Act shall be removed to some other place in Her Majesty's dominions for trial in cases where it appears to the authority granting the warrant that the removal of such offender would be conducive to the interests of justice, and any prisoner so removed shall be triable at the place to which he is removed, in the same manner as if his offence had been committed at such place.

Any warrant for the purposes of this section may be addressed to the master of any ship or to any other person or persons, and the person or persons to whom such warrant is addressed shall have power to convey the prisoner therein named to any place or places named in such warrant, and to deliver him, when arrived at such place or places, into the custody of any authority designated by such warrant.

Every prisoner shall, during the time of his removal under any such warrant as aforesaid, be deemed to be in the legal custody of the person or persons empowered to remove him.

19. All proceedings for the condemnation and forfeiture of a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, in pursuance of this Act shall require the sanction of the Secretary of State or such chief executive authority as is in this Act mentioned, and shall be had in the Court of

Power to
remove
offenders.
for trial.

Jurisdiction in re-
spect of
forfeiture
of ships
for offences
against
Act.

Admiralty, and not in any other court: and the Court of Admiralty shall, in addition to any power given to the court by this Act, have in respect of any ship or other matter brought before it in pursuance of this Act all powers which it has in the case of a ship or matter brought before it in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction.

Regulations as to proceedings against the offender and against the ship.

20. Where any offence against this Act has been committed by any person by reason whereof a ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, has or have become liable to forfeiture, proceedings may be instituted contemporaneously or not, as may be thought fit, against the offender in any court having jurisdiction of the offence, and against the ship, or ship and equipment, or arms and munitions of war, for the forfeiture in the Court of Admiralty; but it shall not be necessary to take proceedings against the offender because proceedings are instituted for the forfeiture, or to take proceedings for the forfeiture because proceedings are taken against the offender.

Officers authorised to seize offending ships.

21. The following officers, that is to say,

- (1.) Any officer of customs in the United Kingdom, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Commissioners of Customs, or any officer of the Board of Trade, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Board of Trade;
- (2.) Any officer of customs or public officer in any British possession, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Governor of such possession;
- (3.) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the

military service of the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from his commanding officer ;

- (4.) Any commissioned officer on full pay in the naval service of the Crown, subject nevertheless to any special or general instructions from the Admiralty or his superior officer,

may seize or detain any ship liable to be seized or detained in pursuance of this Act, and such officers are in this Act referred to as the "local authority"; but nothing in this Act contained shall derogate from the power of the Court of Admiralty to direct any ship to be seized or detained by any officer by whom such court may have power under its ordinary jurisdiction to direct a ship to be seized or detained.

22. Any officer authorised to seize or detain any ship in respect of any offence against this Act may, for the purpose of enforcing such seizure or detention, call to his aid any constable or officers of police, or any officers of Her Majesty's army or navy or marines, or any excise officers or officers of customs, or any harbour-master or dock-master, or any officers having authority by law to make seizures of ships, and may put on board any ship so seized or detained any one or more of such officers to take charge of the same, and to enforce the provisions of this Act, and any officer seizing or detaining any ship under this Act may use force, if necessary, for the purpose of enforcing seizure or detention, and if any person is killed or maimed by reason of his resisting such officer in the execution of his duties, or any person acting under his orders, such officer so seizing or detaining the ship, or other person, shall be freely and fully

Powers of officers authorised to seize ships.

indemnified as well against the Queen's Majesty, her heirs and successors, as against all persons so killed, maimed or hurt.

*Special
power of
Secretary
of State or
chief exe-
cutive
authority
to detain
ship.*

23. If the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority is satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched contrary to this Act, such Secretary of State or chief executive authority shall have power to issue a warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and upon such warrant the local authority shall have power to seize and search such ship, and to detain the same until it has been either condemned or released by process of law, or in manner hereinafter mentioned.

The owner of the ship so detained, or his agent, may apply to the Court of Admiralty for its release, and the court shall as soon as possible put the matter of such seizure and detention in course of trial between the applicant and the Crown.

If the applicant establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped, or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act, the ship shall be released and restored.

If the applicant fail to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not and is not being built, commissioned, or equipped, or intended to be despatched, contrary to this Act, then the ship shall be detained till released by order of the Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

The court may in cases where no proceedings are pending for its condemnation release any ship detained under this section on the owner giving security to the satisfaction of the court that the ship shall not be employed contrary to this Act, notwithstanding that the applicant may have failed to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the ship was not, and is not being built, commissioned, or intended to be despatched contrary to this Act. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority may likewise release any ship detained under this section on the owner giving security to the satisfaction of such Secretary of State or chief executive authority that the ship shall not be employed contrary to this Act, or may release the ship without such security if the Secretary of State or chief executive authority think fit so to release the same.

If the court be of opinion that there was not reasonable and probable cause for the detention, and if no such cause appear in the course of the proceedings, the court shall have power to declare that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the detention, the amount thereof to be assessed by the court, and any amount so assessed shall be payable by the Commissioners of the Treasury out of any moneys legally applicable for that purpose. The Court of Admiralty shall also have power to make a like order for the indemnity of the owner, on the application of such owner to the court, in a summary way, in cases where the ship is released by the order of the Secretary of State or the chief executive authority, before any application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such release.

Nothing in this section contained shall effect any proceedings instituted or to be instituted for the condemnation

of any ship detained under this section where such ship is liable to forfeiture, subject to this provision, that if such ship is restored in pursuance of this section all proceedings for such condemnation shall be stayed; and where the court declares that the owner is to be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages for the detainer, all costs, charges, and expenses incurred by such owner in or about any proceedings for the condemnation of such ship shall be added to the costs and damages payable to him in respect of the detention of the ship.

Nothing in this section contained shall apply to any foreign non-commissioned ship despatched from any part of Her Majesty's dominions after having come within them under stress of weather or in the course of a peaceful voyage, and upon which ship no fitting out or equipping of a warlike character has taken place in this country.

Special
power of
local
authority
to detain
ship.

24. Where it is represented to any local authority, as defined by this Act, and such local authority believes the representation, that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship within Her Majesty's dominions has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped contrary to this Act, and is about to be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched contrary to this Act, it shall be the duty of such local authority to detain such ship, and forthwith to communicate the fact of such detention to the Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

Upon the receipt of such communication the Secretary of State or chief executive authority may order the ship to be released if he thinks there is no cause for detaining her, but if satisfied that there is reasonable and probable cause

for believing that such ship was built, commissioned, or equipped or intended to be despatched in contravention of this Act, he shall issue his warrant stating that there is reasonable and probable cause for believing as aforesaid, and upon such warrant being issued, further proceedings shall be had as in cases where the seizure or detention has taken place on a warrant issued by the Secretary of State without any communication from the local authority.

Where the Secretary of State or chief executive authority orders the ship to be released on the receipt of a communication from the local authority without issuing his warrant, the owner of the ship shall be indemnified by the payment of costs and damages in respect of the detention upon application to the Court of Admiralty in a summary way in like manner as he is entitled to be indemnified where the Secretary of State having issued his warrant under this Act releases the ship before any application is made by the owner or his agent to the court for such release.

25. The Secretary of State or the chief executive authority may, by warrant, empower any person to enter any dock-yard or other place within Her Majesty's dominions and inquire as to the destination of any ship which may appear to him to be intended to be employed in the naval or military service of any foreign state at war with a friendly state, and to search such ship. Power of Secretary of State or chief executive authority to grant search warrant.

26. Any powers or jurisdiction by this Act given to the Secretary of State may be exercised by him throughout the dominions of Her Majesty, and such powers and jurisdiction may also be exercised by any of the following officers, in this Act referred to as the chief executive authority, within their respective jurisdictions; that is to say, Exercise of powers of Secretary of State or chief executive authority.

- (1.) In *Ireland* by the Lord Lieutenant or other the chief governor or governors of *Ireland* for the time being, or the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant :
- (2.) In *Jersey* by the Lieutenant Governor :
- (3.) In *Guernsey*, *Alderney*, and *Sark*, and the dependent Islands by the Lieutenant Governor :
- (4.) In the *Isle of Man* by the Lieutenant Governor :
- (5.) In any British possession by the Governor.

A copy of any warrant issued by a Secretary of State or by any officer authorised in pursuance of this Act to issue such warrant in *Ireland*, the *Channel Islands* or the *Isle of Man* shall be laid before Parliament.

Appeal
from
Court of
Admir-
alty.

27. An appeal may be had from any decision of a Court of Admiralty under this Act to the same tribunal, and in the same manner to and in which an appeal may be had in cases within the ordinary jurisdiction of the court as a Court of Admiralty.

Indemnity
to officers.

28. Subject to the provisions of this Act, providing for the award of damages in certain cases, in respect of the seizure or detention of a ship by the Court of Admiralty no damages shall be payable, and no officer or local authority shall be responsible, either civilly or criminally, in respect of the seizure or detention of any ship in pursuance of this Act.

Indemnity
to Secre-
tary of
State or
chief ex-
ecutive
authority.

29. The Secretary of State shall not, nor shall the chief executive authority be responsible in any action or other legal proceedings whatsoever for any warrant issued by him in pursuance of this Act, or be examinable as a witness

except at his own request, in any court of justice in respect of the circumstances which led to the issue of the warrant.

Interpretation Clause.

30. In this Act, if not inconsistent with the context, the following terms have the meanings hereinafter respectively assigned to them ; that is to say :—

“Foreign state” includes any foreign prince, colony, province, or part of any province or people, or any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any province or people. Interpretation of terms.
“Foreign state :”

“Military service” shall include military telegraphy, and any other employment whatever, in or in connection with any military operation : “Military service :”

“Naval service” shall, as respects a person, include service as a marine, employment as a pilot in piloting or directing the course of a ship of war or other ship, when such ship of war or other ship is being used in any military or naval operation, and any employment whatever on board a ship of war, transport, store ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque ; and as respects a ship, include any user of a ship as a transport, store ship, privateer or ship under letters of marque : “Naval service :”

“United Kingdom” includes the *Isle of Man*, the *Channel Islands*, and other adjacent islands : “United Kingdom :”

“British possession” means any territory, colony, or place being part of Her Majesty’s dominions, and “British possession :”

not part of the United Kingdom as defined by this Act :

"The Secretary of State :"

"The Secretary of State" shall mean any one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State :

"Governor :"

"The Governor" shall as respects *India* mean the Governor-General or the Governor of any presidency, and where a British possession consists of several constituent colonies, mean the Governor-General of the whole possession, or the Governor of any of the constituent colonies, and as respects any other British possession, it shall mean the officer for the time being administering the government of such possession ; also any person acting for or in the capacity of a Governor shall be included under the term "Governor" :

"Court of Admiralty :"

"Court of Admiralty" shall mean the High Court of Admiralty of *England* or *Ireland*, the Court of Session of *Scotland*, or any Vice-Admiralty Court within Her Majesty's dominions :

"Ship :"

"Ship" shall include any description of boat, vessel, floating battery, or floating craft ; also any description of boat, vessel, or other craft or battery, made to move either on the surface of or under water, or sometimes on the surface of and sometimes under water :

"Building :"

"Building" in relation to a ship shall include the doing any act towards or incidental to the construction of a ship, and all words having relation to building shall be construed accordingly :

"Equipping :"

"Equipping" in relation to a ship shall include the furnishing a ship with any tackle, apparel, furniture, provisions, arms, munitions, or stores, or any

other thing which is used in or about a ship for the purpose of fitting or adapting her for the sea or for naval service, and all words relating to equipping shall be construed accordingly :

“Ship and equipment ” shall include a ship and every- “Ship and
thing in or belonging to a ship : equip-
ment ; ”

“Master ” shall include any person having the charge “Master.”
or command of a ship.

Repeal of Acts, and Saving Clauses.

31. From and after the commencement of this Act, an Act Repeal of
Foreign
Enlistment
Act.
59 Geo. 3.
c. 69. passed in the fifty-ninth year of the reign of His late Majesty King George the Third, chapter sixty-nine, intituled “ An Act to prevent the enlisting or engagement of His Majesty’s subjects to serve in foreign service and the fitting out or equipping, in His Majesty’s dominions, vessels for warlike purposes, without His Majesty’s licence,” shall be repealed : Provided that such repeal shall not affect any penalty, forfeiture, or other punishment incurred or to be incurred in respect of any offence committed before this Act comes into operation, nor the institution of any investigation or legal proceeding, or any other remedy for enforcing any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid.

32. Nothing in this Act contained shall subject to for- Saving as
to com-
missioned
foreign
ships. feiture any commissioned ship of any foreign state, or give to any British court over or in respect of any ship entitled to recognition as a commissioned ship of any foreign state any jurisdiction which it would not have had if this Act had not passed.

Penalties
not to ex-
tend to
persons en-
tering into
military
service in
Asia.

59 Geo. 8.
c. 69, s. 12.

33. Nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to subject to any penalty any person who enters into the military service of any prince, state or potentate in Asia, with such leave or licence as is for the time being required by law in the case of subjects of Her Majesty entering into the military service of princes, states, or potentates in Asia.

The "LEADING CASES" on Foreign Enlistment are the "CAGLIARI," "ATT. GEN. v. SILLIM," "REG. v. JONES AND HIGHAT," "REG. v. SEYMOUR," "REG. v. CAPTAIN CORBETT," "REG. v. RUMBLE," and "REG. v. SANDOVAL, BAIRD and CALL." In U.S. the trials of COL. LYNN and MACMAHON, and THOMPSON and STARR, "The U.S. v. QUINCY."

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
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